University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

4-8-2008

A Private Commodity or Public Good? A
Comparative Case Study of Water and Sanitation
Privatization in Buenos Aires, Argentina,
1993-2006
Erin Steurer
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Steurer, Erin, "A Private Commodity or Public Good? A Comparative Case Study of Water and Sanitation Privatization in Buenos
Aires, Argentina, 1993-2006" (2008). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/515

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

A Private Commodity or Public Good? A Comparative Case Study of Water and
Sanitation Privatization in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1993-2006

by

Erin Steurer

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
Department of Geography
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Martin Bosman, Ph.D.
Mark Amen, Ph.D.
Fenda Akiwumi, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
April 8, 2008

Keywords: Private sector, potable water, water supply, sanitation services,
sewerage services, water policy, human rights, neo-liberalism, free market
capitalism
© Copyright 2008, Erin Steurer

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to extend a special thank you to Dr. Martin Bosman, Dr.
Fenda Akiwumi, and Dr. Mark Amen, my committee members, for all of their
invaluable input and support.

I would also like to thank all of my family

members, friends, and mentors for all of their support during the research process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. iv
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ vi
LIST OF ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................... vii
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... xii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
The Case of Buenos Aires........................................................................................ 3
Research Objectives ................................................................................................ 8
Projected Outcomes of the Study ............................................................................ 8
Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................... 9
Water: The Critical Issue ............................................................................ 9
Neo-liberalism and Privatization .............................................................. 14
History of Neo-liberalism .............................................................. 14
Privatization .................................................................................. 19
Privatization in the WSS Services Industry ............................................... 22
The Privatization Debate .......................................................................... 26
The Case Studies ....................................................................................... 45
CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY ............................................................................. 47
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 47
i

The Case Study Method ......................................................................................... 49
The Comparative Case Studies ................................................................. 51
CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS OF THE BUENOS AIRES CASE STUDY ................. 57
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 57
A Brief History of Argentina’s Water Services, Politics, and Economy ............... 58
History of Water and Sanitation Services ................................................. 58
Political and Economic History ................................................................ 66
The Privatization of Water and Sanitation Services ............................................. 73
An Environment Conducive to Privatization............................................. 79
Awarding of the Concession Contract ...................................................... 80
Contract Obligations and Pricing Mechanism ......................................... 85
The Concessionaire’s Regulator, ETOSS.................................................. 91
Results of the Contract .......................................................................................... 93
Contract Re-negotiations .......................................................................... 99
The Buenos Aires’ Citizens’ Role ............................................................ 111
End of the Contract ............................................................................................. 118
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS OF THE COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES .............. 124
Introduction ......................................................................................................... 124
The Mexico City Case Study................................................................................ 124
Historical and Economic Background Leading to Reform ..................... 127
Mexico City’s Water Sector..................................................................... 130
Mexico City’s Service Contracts ............................................................. 136
ii

Results of Mexico City’s Service Contracts ............................................ 142
Community Involvement .............................................................. 156
The Dolphin Coast, South Africa Case Study ..................................................... 157
The Water Sector before the Concession ................................................ 161
The Concession ....................................................................................... 166
Results of the Concession ........................................................................ 174
The United Kingdom Case Study ........................................................................ 190
The Water Sector before Privatization .................................................... 192
The Water Contracts ............................................................................... 197
Results of the Contracts........................................................................... 201
Similarities between the Case Studies ................................................................. 211
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION ................................................................................... 221
Introduction ......................................................................................................... 221
Analysis of the Results ......................................................................................... 221
Success and Limitations of the Study .................................................................. 230
Future Research .................................................................................................. 231
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 235

iii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.

AASA’s shareholdings per company in 1993 and 2000 ................................... 5

Table 2.

The largest investments in WSS Services in Developing Services from
1990-2000........................................................................................................ 23

Table 3.

The Different Options for PSP and Responsibility in the WSS industry ........ 26

Table 4.

OSN’s service coverage by 1993, directly before privatization...................... 61

Table 5.

The water and sewerage coverage and performance levels at the
beginning of the contract ................................................................................. 62

Table 6.

AASA’s shareholdings per company in 1993 and 2000 ................................. 83

Table 7.

Performance targets for the 30-year concession ............................................. 87

Table 8.

AASA’s investment plan and five-year terms’ goals ...................................... 88

Table 9.

Changing public opinion of privatization in Greater Buenos Aires ................ 96

Table 10. Comparison of average bimonthly charges, in Argentine pesos, before
and after the contract re-negotiation passed in August 1997 ........................ 102
Table 11. Service indicators for the Buenos Aires water system before and
during the contract ......................................................................................... 104
Table 12. The population served with water and sewerage services by the 10th
year of the concession (the end of 2002)....................................................... 107
Table 13. Access to drinking water and sewerage services and poverty rates by
municipality in 2001...................................................................................... 108
Table 14. Contract obligations not fulfilled by AASA ................................................. 109
Table 15. AASA’s Statement of Performance, 1993 (year 1) to 2002 (year 10) ......... 110
Table 16. The division of the 18 boroughs by zone ...................................................... 140
iv

Table 17. Water and sewerage coverage in the Federal District in 1990 and 1995
(percentages) ................................................................................................ 143
Table 18. The progression of collection of charges for potable water service in
the Federal District, 1992-2002 ..................................................................... 147
Table 19. Operational Cost Recovery in the Federal District Water System,
1993-1998 (in thousands of 2002 pesos) ...................................................... 148
Table 20. The accommodations and opinions of levels two, three, and four
customers (level one is excluded because they are not provided with
services) ........................................................................................................ 183
Table 21. Domestic water tariffs in 1997 ...................................................................... 184
Table 22. The current and proposed domestic water tariffs, 2000/2001 ....................... 184
Table 23. Parent companies of the 10 water companies ............................................... 198
Table 24. Average annual water bills, by company, from 1989 to 1999 ...................... 203
Table 25. Pre-tax profits, per company, in millions of £ and in real terms from
1989/1990 to 1997/1998................................................................................ 203
Table 26. Salaries of the highest paid directors by company, thousand of £, in
real terms and adjusted to 1997/1998 prices ................................................. 205
Table 27. The takeovers, diversifications, and vertical de-integrations for each
company in 2003 ........................................................................................... 209

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. The coverage area in Greater Buenos Aires served by AASA ....................... 84
Figure 2. The 18 boroughs in Mexico City’s Federal District ...................................... 141
Figure 3. Map of the Dolphin Coast municipality ........................................................ 162
Figure 4. The boundaries for the 10 water companies.................................................. 199

vi

LIST OF ACRONYMS
Aguas Argentinas S.A. ................................................................................................ AASA
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. ...................................................... AGBAR
Agua de México ................................................................................ AMSA or AGUAMEX
African National Congress ............................................................................................ ANC
Argentine Water and Sanitation .................................................................................. AySA
Borough of Dolphin Coast .......................................................................................... BoDC
Federal District Water Commission ............................................................................CADF
Christian Aid for Under-Assisted Societies Everywhere ......................................... CAUSE
Current Cost Accounting ............................................................................................... CCA
Users and Consumers’ Federation............................................................................ CECUC
Chief Executive Officer ................................................................................................ CEO
Federal Potable Water and Sanitation Cabinet....................................................... CFAPYS
Workers’ Confederation ................................................................................................ CGT
Infrastructure and Connection Charge ............................................................................CIC
National Water Commission ......................................................................................... CNA
Congress of South African Trade Unions ............................................................. COSATU
Central Association of Argentine Workers ................................................................... CTA
Development Bank of Southern Africa .......................................................................DBSA
Federal District ................................................................................................................. DF
vii

Hydraulic Construction and Works ......................................................................... DGCOH
Drinking Water Inspectorate ......................................................................................... DWI
Environment Agency........................................................................................................ EA
National Organization of Water and Sanitation Works ........................................ ENOHSA
Environmental Protection Agency ................................................................................. EPA
Tripartite Water and Sanitation Works Entity........................................................... ETOSS
Federation of Drinking Water Cooperatives of the Province of Buenos Aires ... FEDECAP
Phosphate Development Corporation.................................................................... FOSKOR
General Agreement on Trade in Services ................................................................... GATS
Gross Domestic Product ................................................................................................ GDP
Growth Employment and Redistribution ................................................................... GEAR
Government-Owned Enterprises ................................................................................. GOEs
Historic Cost Accounting .............................................................................................. HCA
Inter-American Development Bank ............................................................................ IADB
Industrias del Agua ...................................................................................................... IASA
Ingenieros Civiles Asociados ......................................................................................... ICA
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes ....................................... ICSID
International Conference on Water and Environment................................................. ICWE
International Finance Corporation .................................................................................. IFC
International Financial Institutions.................................................................................. IFIs
International Monetary Fund .......................................................................................... IMF
Investment Progress Group Holdings ............................................................................. IPG
viii

Integrated River Basin Management ........................................................................... IRBM
South African Iron and Steel Foundation .................................................................. ISCOR
Multinational Corporation ............................................................................................ MNC
Argentine Workers’ Movement ................................................................................... MTA
National Association of Water Companies ............................................................... NAWC
National Framework Agreement ................................................................................... NFA
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ...................................... OECD
Office of Water Services ......................................................................................... OFWAT
Work for Third Parties ................................................................................................ OPCT
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries......................................................... OPEC
National Sanitation Works ............................................................................................ OSN
Non-Governmental Organization ..................................................................................NGO
Public Limited Company ............................................................................................... PLC
Service Improvement and Expansion Plan.................................................................. PMES
Publicly Owned Enterprises ......................................................................................... POEs
Program for Shared Ownership .......................................................................................PPP
Public-Private Partnership ...............................................................................................PPP
Partido Revolucionario Institucional .............................................................................. PRI
Public Services International ........................................................................................... PSI
Public Services International Research Unit .............................................................. PSIRU
Efficient Water Use Program ................................................................................... PUEDA
Request for Proposals ..................................................................................................... RFP
ix

Retail Price Index ............................................................................................................ RPI
Regional Water Authorities ........................................................................................ RWAs
South African Municipal Workers’ Union ............................................................. SAMWU
Structural Adjustment Program ...................................................................................... SAP
South African Post ...................................................................................................... SAPO
Servicios de Agua Potable......................................................................................... SAPSA
Company for Urban and Rural Development .............................................................SAUR
Sanitation Workers’ Union of Greater Buenos Aires.......................................... SGBATOS
National Service of Drinking Water and Rural Sanitation........................................ SNAPS
State-Owned Enterprises .............................................................................................. SOEs
Sub-Saharan Africa ........................................................................................................ SSA
Universal Service and Environmental Charge ........................................................... SUMA
Statutory Water Companies ........................................................................................ SWCs
Tecnología y Servicios de Agua ................................................................................TECSA
United Nations................................................................................................................. UN
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development ............................. UNCED
United Nations Development Program ...................................................................... UNDP
Value-Added Tax .......................................................................................................... VAT
Ventilated Improved Pit .................................................................................................. VIP
Water and Sewerage Companies .............................................................................. WASCs
World Health Organization .......................................................................................... WHO
Water Only Companies .............................................................................................. WOCs
x

Water Services Act ....................................................................................................... WSA
Water Supply and Sanitation ......................................................................................... WSS
World Summit on Sustainable Development ............................................................. WSSD
World Trade Organization ........................................................................................... WTO

xi

A Private Commodity or Public Good? A Comparative Case Study of Water and
Sanitation Privatization in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1993-2006
Erin Steurer
ABSTRACT
The water privatization project in Buenos Aires, Argentina between 1993 and
2006 serves as the main case study in this investigation. The study begins by
introducing background information on neo-liberalism and free market capitalism
and their role in promoting private sector participation in the water supply and
sanitation (WSS) services industry. A comparative case study analysis of the
Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Dolphin Coast, and United Kingdom case studies has
revealed that there are some key similarities between the case studies. In the
conclusion, the key similarities are analyzed to make broader implications about
the nature of private sector participation in the WSS services industry.

xii

CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Privatization can be defined as the shifting of the production of goods or the
provision of services from the public sector to the private sector. Generally defined, it
involves the following changes: (i) increasing reliance on private entities and market
forces to operate functions or responsibilities that were, up until the 1980s, regarded as
appropriate for the state or even parastatals to run; (ii) making clients pay more of the real
or true cost of goods and services; and (iii) declining accountability to the public in that
elected representatives and professional government personnel no long keep or possess
the legal authority to track many of the above activities. By all accounts, privatization
began in the early 1980s when Great Britain, under Margaret Thatcher, started selling
publicly owned enterprises to private entities and/or shareholders. In its nascent stages,
privatization occurred mostly in Western Europe, but soon thereafter, the trend became
global (Feigenbaum, Hamnett, and Henig, 1998; Peck and Tickell, 2002). Advocates of
privatization believe that the private sector, with its innate drive for competition and
maximization of financial gain, would provide better services at a lower cost than purely
government-run operations. Not everyone, however, is convinced and the matter is a
source of rancorous debate among scholars and political activists.
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In the meantime, governments around the world are still actively experimenting
with privatization by turning over services previously run by the state to privately-owned
enterprises.

It is in this context that Latin America and the Caribbean emerged as

somewhat of a leader of privatization throughout the developing world between 1990 and
1996, accounting for 53% of the total profits accruing from the sale of publicly owned
enterprises (Manzetti, 1999: 1).

During this period, the privatization trend was

particularly evident in the water and sanitation sector where several major projects to
privatize these vital services have taken place not only in the region but also throughout
the world in the final decade of the 20th century. This development spawned a fierce
debate about the feasibility of treating water and sanitation services, which are
universally regarded as essential to meeting basic human needs, as both an economic
good and a public good at the same time.
Investigating the effects of treating water and sanitation services as an economic
good has many serious implications for human rights. Opponents of privatization believe
that treating these services as economic goods prevent governments from providing all
people in a service area with potable water and sanitation services. The outcome of the
debate is very important for the future of water policy because approximately one billion
people lack access to clean drinking water and an additional 2.6 billion lack access to
sanitation services worldwide (UNDP, 2006: v). This is a major obstacle that the United
Nations (UN) is trying to tackle, but as the “roll-out” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 389) of
privatization continues in different parts of the world, it is likely that the debate over
water and sanitation will continue well into the 21st century.
2

It is against this brief geo-historical background and context that it is important to
investigate comparative case studies of water privatization to help determine the
empirical validity of the arguments in favor of privatization of water supply and
sanitation (WSS) services and the counter-arguments against privatization of these
services. The main case study under investigation is Buenos Aires, Argentina, and the
efforts of the Argentine federal and Buenos Aires’ local government to privatize the
water and sanitation sector in the 1990s.

The case of Buenos Aires will then be

compared to three other water privatization case studies, namely, Mexico City, Mexico,
the Dolphin Coast, South Africa, and the progenitor case of the United Kingdom in order
to determine if what happened in Buenos Aires was unique. The Buenos Aires case will
be compared to the three other cases to evaluate any similarities between the cases to
shed light on the appropriateness of private sector participation (PSP) in WSS service
provision.
The Case of Buenos Aires
Beginning in 1991, the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina, and its 17 surrounding
municipalities decided to embark on a comprehensive contract to privatize the publicly
owned water and sewerage services. National Sanitation Works (Obras Sanitarias de la
Nación, OSN) was established in 1912 (Ministerio de Economía y Producción, 2008: 1)
and, prior to privatization, had been the government agency in charge of building and
managing water and sanitation services in the city of Buenos Aires and its surrounding
suburbs (Vilas, 2004a). Directly before the services were privatized, in May 1993, OSN
maintained over 1.2 million water connections and provided water to 99% of Buenos
3

Aires City’s three million residents and to 55% of the six million suburban residents in
the Greater Buenos Aires Metropolitan region. OSN provided sanitation services to
approximately five million urban and suburban residents in total, with over 700,000
sewerage connections, but served about 99% of the urban population and only 36% of the
suburban population (Vilas, 2004a: 6). OSN maintained water connections over an area
of approximately 500 square kilometers (km2) and maintained sewerage service coverage
over an area of approximately 400 km2 (Vilas, 2004a: 6). However, the water system that
served both the City of Buenos Aires and the 17 surrounding municipalities had last been
expanded and modernized in 1940 (Vilas, 2004a). At the time of privatization, the
contract was the largest single act of water privatization in history anywhere, with the
responsibility to service between nine and 11 million people (estimates vary) (Vilas,
2004b).
The concession contract was awarded to a consortium named Aguas Argentinas
S.A. (AASA), led by Lyonnaise-des-Eaux-Dumez of France, which later changed its
named to Suez and then later to Ondeo. The consortium also consisted of Sociedad
Comercial del Plata S.A., Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. (AGBAR),
Meller S.A., Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires S.A., Compagnie Général des Eaux A.A.,
and Anglican Water PLC. After subsequent share transfers, the ownership of AASA
changed slightly. Then, the contract was renegotiated in 2000, which led to further
changes in the shareholdings. After re-negotiation, AGBAR did not own any more
shareholdings, Meller Economic Group’s shareholdings decreased from 10.8% to 5.2%
and changed its shareholding name to Aguas Inversora, and the World Bank’s
4

Corporación Financiera Internacional joined the concession. Refer to Table 1 for the
division of the consortium’s shareholdings in 1993 and 2000, respectively.
By the end of the 1980s, Argentina was enduring a major economic crisis which
created widespread public distrust of the Argentine state as an effective administrator of
public assets. Consequently, a significant percentage of Argentines believed that the
private sector could and should provide water and sewerage services more efficiently and
at cheaper prices than the federal and state governments. This negative view of the state
was actively promoted by the newly elected President of Argentina, Carlos Saúl Menem,
who had come to power in 1989. Menem zealously promoted privatization as the only
solution to the government’s many shortcomings (Vilas, 2004a).
Table 1. AASA’s shareholdings per company in 1993 and 2000
Capital Origin

1993 (%)

2000 (%)

France

25.4

34.7

Argentina

20.7

N/A

Spain

12.6

25

Meller

Argentina

10.8

N/A

Banco Galicia y Buenos Aires

Argentina

8.1

8.3

France

7.9

7.6

United Kingdom

4.5

4.3

Workers

10

10

World Bank

N/A

5

Argentina

N/A

5.2

Investor
Ondeo (Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez)
Sociedad Comercial del Plata
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona

Compagnie Général des Eaux (Vivendi)
Anglican Water PLC
Programa de Propiedad Participada
Corporación Financiera Internacional
Aguas Inversora*

*Meller Economic Groups
Source: Schneier-Madanes, 2005: 152.
Against this backdrop of economic and political crisis, the water and sewerage
services were quickly privatized without much opposition in order to achieve the
5

following goals: (i) universalize and improve the quality of the water delivery services;
(ii) improve and expand the treatment of sewage and wastewater by incorporating new
technology to prevent pollution of the city and the wider Buenos Aires region’s
waterways; (iii) create the lowest tariff rate compatible with profits and investment; (iv)
protect consumers against monopoly abuses by the new concessionaire, AASA; and last,
but not least, from the perspective of the Menem government, (v) relieve the state of its
fiscal crisis.
Almost from the very beginning, however, the project failed to meet these goals.
The services proved inefficient and AASA struggled to live up to its contractual
obligations (Vilas, 2004b). Incredibly, this condition festered for 13 years before the
contract was finally rescinded by the administration of Nestor Kirchner in 2006
(Ministerio de Economía y Producción, 2006a). The reasons why the project failed have
spawned a vigorous debate in Argentina and beyond. For instance, some, including proprivatization scholars, Argentine government officials, members of the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and representatives of water and trade unions believe
that a combination of poor information management, weak regulatory institutions, and
perverse financial incentives led to the project’s premature cancellation.

Others,

including anti-privatization scholars, environmental and social activists, some Argentine
citizens, and even a few Argentine government officials, take a radically different and
principled view by contending that the project failed because water for human
consumption and sanitation services cannot be treated as public goods and economic
goods simultaneously.
6

Bakker (2003a and b) contends that three of the reasons why water is so hard to
commodify, and thereby amenable to be treated as an economic good, are that water is a
natural monopoly, water infrastructure carries externalities, and water has historically
been classified as a public good. Water supply is a natural monopoly because supply by
one firm necessitates lower costs than supply by more than one firm; the firm already in
place will have a significant cost advantage over any new firms. Hence, the market tends
to have only one seller and the market is thus prey to the problems associated with
monopoly power (Bakker, 2003a). Externalities are the costs (negative externalities)
and/or benefits (positive externalities) associated with water production that are not
accounted for in the price mechanism and hence are not realized by the producer.
Externalities are considered inherent to the production of water, regardless of the broader
economic system (Bakker, 2003a). In order to have a prosperous water market, the
negative externalities associated with producing water supply should not be incorporated
into the price of water.

Opponents of water privatization consider these negative

externalities a reason to classify water supply, or at least the public health effects
affiliated with water supply infrastructure, as a public good, i.e., “non-excludable and
non-rivalrous” (Bakker, 2003a: 22). In this context, networked water supply falls within
a category of goods and services for which the market, when allowed to function on its
own without any state intervention, does not perform well. Water services deviate from
the standard behavior of commodities, and hence, the market fails to safely control them
(Bakker, 2003a).

7

According to this view, treating water and sanitation services as simple economic
goods to maximize profits and increase economic efficiency is counter to the nature and
purpose of public water and sanitation services, as these are supposed to meet basic
human needs. Furthermore, the goal of profit maximization militates against the delivery
of adequate services, especially to the millions of poor residents of Buenos Aires.
Research Objectives
The objectives of the study are to: (1) identify what the consortium promised to
the government of Argentina and the citizens of Buenos Aires; (2) investigate why
AASA was not able to deliver on its contract obligations; (3) identify the specific role
that the actual privatization contract played in the failure to meet the promises; (4)
investigate the role of the Argentine state in the failure of the water concession; (5)
identify the role that the various communities of Greater Buenos Aires who expected
more reliable and affordable water and sanitation services played in the cancellation of
the concession; (6) compare and contrast the events in Buenos Aires to three related
water privatization schemes for additional comparative insights into water privatization;
and (7) determine if there is indeed a role that the private sector can play in providing
services essential to human needs and if so, identify the institutional conditions under
which private water companies can have such a role.
Projected Outcomes of the Study
After enduring a severe economic crisis in the late 1980s to early 1990s, the
government of Argentina and the city of Buenos Aires and its surrounding municipalities
opted to experiment with the largest act of water and sanitation privatization in history.
8

Despite some modest improvements and progress, the privatization project failed to meet
its lofty promises. The study will seek to determine the contending arguments for why
the Buenos Aires water concession contract ended prematurely and, in doing so, perhaps
identify the most likely reason for premature termination, as supported by the literature.
The study will also compare what happened in Buenos Aires to three other case studies to
identify any similarities between the cases and thereby draw parallels to make broad
inferences about PSP in the provision of water and sanitation services. The results of the
comparison will help articulate the preconditions, if any, that must be present between the
market and politics in order for WSS services to be treated as both economic and public
goods at the same time. The results of this study hope to make a modest contribution to
the body of literature on the debate over water and sanitation services privatization.
Theoretical Framework
Water: The Critical Issue
Universalizing the provision of clean and safe drinking water and sanitation
services is one of the world’s most pressing challenges today as evidenced by their
inclusion into the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDG). When the
Millennium Summit was held in New York City in 2000, the participating nations signed
the Millennium Declaration, committing themselves to take efforts to reduce extreme
poverty and establish time-bound targets. Then, in 2002, the United Nation’s Secretary
General developed a concrete action plan to meet the MDGs. Under Goal 7, Ensur[ing]
Environmental Sustainability, one target is to halve the proportion of people who lack
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015 (Millennium Projection, 2006).
9

Clean and safe drinking water and sanitation services are necessary for survival, yet twofifths of the world’s population still lack access to these services and this is why meeting
this MDG target is so important. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
estimates that one billion people currently lack access to clean and safe drinking water
and 2.6 billion lack access to sanitation services (UNDP, 2006: v). Additionally, threequarters of the human population endure water stress, most of whom live in developing
countries (Barlow and Clarke, 2002a).
The lack of clean and safe drinking water for so many people is the primary
culprit for water-borne diseases.

The World Health Organization (WHO) (2004)

estimates that 1.8 million people, most of whom are children under the age of five, die
every year from diarrheal diseases and 88% of these occurrences are directly caused by
unsafe water supplies and inadequate sanitation and hygiene services. Improving water
supplies can reduce diarrheal morbidity incidences by between 6 and 25% and improved
sanitation services can reduce morbidity by as much as 32% (WHO, 2004: 1). Cholera is
now widespread across Latin America, stretching from as far north as Mexico to as far
south as Argentina. The few cities in Latin America that have sanitation services that
reach 100% of the population, like Montevideo, Uruguay, are not plagued by cholera;
hence, the presence of well-functioning and comprehensive WSS services are critical to
prevent outbreaks of cholera and other water-borne diseases (Swyngedouw, 2004).
Other water-borne diseases, including malaria, schistosomiasis, intestinal
helminthes, Japanese encephalitis, hepatitis A, arsenic poisoning, and fluorosis are
contracted directly through the water supply and others are related to poor water
10

management activities (WHO, 2007). In fact, the lack of access to clean water and
sanitation services takes more lives each year than any war or terrorist activity (UNDP,
2006). However, the problems of water supply and its association with water-borne
diseases is marked if not masked by sharp geographical differences. As much as 50% of
urban residents in cities in developing countries lack ready access to clean and safe
drinking water (Swyngedouw, 2004), and since the world’s cities are only rapidly
growing (Davis, 2004), there is a growing concern for the future of water issues (Gleick,
1998).
In 2005, the world’s urban population surpassed the world’s rural population for
the first time in human history. The event may have even occurred earlier since Third
World censuses are notoriously unreliable. There were 86 cities with populations of over
one million in 1950; today there are 400 and there will be at least 550 by 2015 (Davis,
2004: 5). The world’s cities are growing by approximately one million babies and
migrants every week. Cities are expected to account for all future population growth
after 2020. The global population is expected to peak at 10 billion by 2050 (Davis, 2004:
5).
Despite rapid urban population growth, however, critical infrastructure has not
been able to keep up with the growing demand for essential services. Peri-urban slum
areas do not normally have formal utilities and sanitation services. For example, in the
poorest areas of Mumbai (Bombay), India, it is estimated that there is only one toilet per
500 people and only 11% of the poor neighborhoods in Manila, the Philippines, and 18%
in Dhakal, Nepal, have access to formal sewage disposal (Davis, 2004: 16). The situation
11

is even worse in Africa where approximately 57% of the urban population has no access
to basic sanitation services (Davis, 2004: 16).
Water is absolutely essential for survival; no one can live without it. It has been
estimated that the absolute minimum amount of water considered necessary for human
survival is 3-5 liters per day, or 0.8 to 1.3 gallons per day (Swyngedouw, 2004; Gleick,
1998). However, this is just a bare minimum. Studies demonstrate marked health
improvements when the amount is increased to at least 20 liters per day (Gleick, 1998:
496). Since clean drinking water and sanitation services are essential to life, and because
so many people lack access to such essential services, sound water policy and
management is of the utmost importance.
For many of these reasons, for the majority of the 20th century, the state was
responsible for providing universal access to water and sanitation services within its
boundaries.

Before the 20th century, however, the state was not responsible for WSS

service provision in most countries (Bakker, 2003a). Before the mid-19th century, private
companies or self-provisioning communities controlled networked water supply, where it
existed. In fact, in Buenos Aires, the private sector was the first to provide citizens with a
networked water supply (Bakker, 2003b). It was not until the mid-19th to 20th centuries
that state provision of WSS services became predominant in the world (Bakker, 2003a).
In the first three-quarters of the 20th century, water supply and infrastructure development
was part of a category of services that were produced, managed, and distributed by the
state and not the market because of its lower than average profitability rate. Other
services in this category include health services, education, and transportation (Kaika,
12

2005). WSS service provision was considered essential for the steady operation of the
market, the reproduction of labor power, and the growth of the economy (Kaika, 2005).
The responsibility of WSS service provision started to reverse again during the
waning years of the 20th century when a growing number of countries witnessed a shift in
this responsibility to the private sector (Bakker, 2003a). The main reasons for the shift
include the increasing pressure to find new methods of financing WSS infrastructure, the
emergence of the neo-liberal state, and the demand to decrease budget deficits and public
spending (Kaika, 2005). In the 19th century and for most of the 20th century, water was
treated as a public good but has since shifted to become a commodity to be bought and
sold in the market (Kaika, 2005). Interestingly, however, some of the countries that
placed faith in the private sector to provide more efficient WSS services than the state,
such as Argentina, have decided to shift the responsibility of WSS provision back to the
state. As Spronk (2005) notes, the water privatization trend appears to be reversing,
mostly because selling water for a profit, especially to low-income people, is rife with
difficulties and more controversial than anticipated.
Whether or not the private sector can more efficiently provide WSS services has
become the subject of a fierce debate. Those who favor private sector participation claim
that the private sector can provide the services more efficiently with higher quality,
because the private sector has both the financial resources and an incentive to maintain
water infrastructure and incorporate newer and more efficient technology, as it will
increase their profit margin. Those who oppose private sector involvement, on the other
hand, contend that the private sector does not always have an incentive to expand
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services to those outside of the piped network, especially to reach the poor, as there is no
financial incentive to do so. They also claim that the private sector does not necessarily
provide better quality service and inevitably makes the price of services increase, since it
is profit-driven. Although the trend in favor of water and sanitation services privatization
seems to have reversed in the last few years, there are still millions of people who are
served exclusively by the private sector, and there is a concern that privatization does not
help to solve, and in fact may hinder, the critical issue of expanding and maintaining
WSS infrastructure for growing urban populations and providing effective water and
sanitation services.
Neo-liberalism and Privatization
History of Neo-liberalism. The privatization of WSS services is part of the neoliberal agenda that began in the mid-1970s. As mentioned earlier, neo-liberalism was
first adopted in the UK under the Margaret Thatcher administration. Margaret Thatcher
won the election for Prime Minister in the UK in May 1979 with a conservative agenda.
Her party did not actively promote privatization, but it expressed its dissatisfaction with
nationalized industries’ performances and stated its desire to “roll back the frontiers of
the state” (Vickers and Yarrow, 1998: 155). The Ronald Reagan administration in the
United States in the early 1980s embraced and adopted Thatcher’s neo-liberal agenda and
the two countries became the heartlands of neo-liberalism (Gregory, 1998).
In the 1970s, the UK faced high inflation and rising unemployment rates and
thought that deregulation would help cure the state’s fiscal issues (Gregory, 1998). In her
first term of office, the sale of state assets produced proceeds of less than US$978 million
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per year, but after her reelection in June 1983, the privatization program accelerated
significantly. By 1987, at the next election, the proceeds from the sale of state assets rose
sharply to US$9.78 billion per year (Vickers and Yarrow, 1998: 155). Regulated private
enterprise was then considered superior to nationalization. Private sector involvement
was even considered superior for controlling natural monopolies, such as water, where
competition is difficult, if not impractical (Vickers and Yarrow, 1998). By the mid1990s, the reforms put into place by Thatcher had improved the UK’s economic situation
and unemployment rates started to drop in the late 1980s (Gregory, 1998).
Neo-liberalism can be defined as a theory of political economic practices that
posits that human well-being can best be realized by maximizing entrepreneurial
freedoms within an institutional framework that is identified by property rights,
individual liberty, free markets, and free trade (Harvey, 2005, 2006; Prasad, 2006a).
Under the neo-liberal framework, the state’s major role is to create and preserve an
institutional framework conducive to free market capitalism, free trade, and individual
liberties. The state typically controls the quality and integrity of money, controls and sets
up the military, defense, police, and jurisdictional functions needed to protect private
property rights and also to assist freely functioning markets. In sectors where fully
developed markets do not yet exist, such as education and health care, markets must be
developed by state action, if necessary. Aside from these tasks, the state should not
interfere. State intervention, in fact, should be kept to a minimum because “the state
cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices), and
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because powerful interests will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly
in democracies) for their own benefit” (Harvey, 2006: 145).
Neo-liberalism pushes market liberalization, deregulation, privatization of state
assets, and the removal of fiscal constraint (Scholte, 2005: 38). Note that deregulation
does not translate into an absence of regulation. Instead, it entails implementing laws and
creating institutions that maintain markets, favor their efficient operation, and guarantee
property rights and contracts. Neo-liberalism stipulates a switch from an interventionist
state to market-enabling governance (Scholte, 2005: 39). When it is in their interest, the
state and/or non-governmental organizations, like the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), exert pressure on those hesitant to implement neo-liberal policies (Scholte, 2005).
It is important to note that neo-liberalism differs from international liberalism.
International liberalism is based on the theories, laid out in the 18th and 19th centuries,
that held that a peaceful world order can be achieved (Burchill, 2005). The founding
father of liberal internationalism is Immanuel Kant, who, in 1795, devised the theory of
‘Perpetual Peace’ (Burley, 1992: 1914). Thomas Hobbes theorized that chaos is inherent
in state and international systems. According to the theory of perpetual peace, however,
states can surmount the inherent chaos in the international system and can thereby
eliminate war forever. Kant believed that this could be achieved by satisfying the three
following preconditions: (i) create a world of liberal republics with representative
governments and a separation of powers; (ii) instill a law of nations founded on a
‘federalism of free nations’; and (iii) enforce a law that establishes the right of universal
hospitality (Burley, 1992: 1914). Kant envisioned that the three requirements would be
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fulfilled one day as states adopted liberal republicanism and as principles of tolerance and
mutual accommodation evolved in reaction to differences in cultures, languages, and
religions and as international commerce expanded (Burley, 1992).
Neo-liberalism is the new version of classical liberalism and hence differs slightly
from international liberalism. Classical liberalism is based off the foundations of liberal
internationalism, but focuses more on democracy and free trade. Classical liberalism
dates back to John Locke and Adam Smith. Neo-liberalism is based on the laissez-faire
doctrine of classical liberalism, contending that an unobstructed market will regulate
itself and create prosperity, liberty, democracy, and peace to humankind. Since the 17th
century, liberal trade theorists have claimed that state borders should not hinder the
allocation of world resources with tariffs and other restrictions. The earliest liberalists
include Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill (Burchill,
2005). Adam Smith supported free trade and touted that the hidden hand of the free
market would benefit every member in every participating state and put them in the most
advantageous position in the world market. Essentially, the “self-interest of one becomes
the general interest of all” (Burchill, 2005: 73). David Ricardo argued that free trade is
important as it “binds together, by one common tie of interest and intercourse, the
universal society of nations throughout the civilized world” (Ricardo, 1821: 114). Kant
(who is also the founding father of liberal internationalism) asserted that uninhibited
commerce between nations would bring them together in a common and peaceful
enterprise. John Stuart Mill believed that free trade was necessary to achieve an end to
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war. He believed that commerce renders war obsolete as it enhances and multiplies
personal interests that naturally oppose war (Burchill, 2005).
Building off the earlier school of thought, Friedrich von Hayek in the 1930s and
Milton Friedman in the 1960s and 1970s advanced the neo-liberal agenda. World War II
and the growing concentration of power in federal governments in Western states left a
negative impression on liberal scholars. Scholars and journalists rejuvenated the dormant
ideas that called for limited government and individual rights (Schneider, 2003). Then, in
the 1970s, neo-liberalists, such as Milton Friedman, reactivated the classical liberal
argument that prescribes a free market as the best economic policy (Scholte, 2005).
Friedman was heavily influenced by von Hayek. Among orthodox economic scholars,
von Hayek is considered as one of the most influential people of the 20th century because
he revived liberalism and promulgated ‘Austrian economics’ (Walker, 2002: 1). Austrian
economics refers to the teachings of the Austrian School of Economics in the 19th
century. von Hayek advanced the Austrian School’s work on the business cycle and the
impracticality of socialism’s economic calculation (Walker, 2002). He paved the path for
neo-liberalism to become globally hegemonic and Friedman advanced his agenda.
Friedman argued for the limitation of government, the expansion of free market
economics, and individual rights. He felt that the government should only function to
protect its citizens’ freedom from enemies outside of and within its borders. In doing so,
it should maintain law and order, administer private contracts, and promote competitive
and free markets. The government should be limited beyond this scope, but may also be

18

involved when a situation is too expensive or difficult for the citizens to accomplish on
their own (Friedman, 2003).
von Hayek and Friedman have influenced economic policies greatly. Indeed,
Thatcher’s policies were heavily influenced by von Hayek’s work (Frowen, 1997) and
Reagan’s policies were influenced by Friedman’s. von Hayek and Friedman’s theories
and teachings have made such an impression that they have been used as guiding
principles in economics and have helped neo-liberalism become globally hegemonic.
One of the cornerstones of their teachings is the privatization of state assets, including
water and sanitation services, and thus the push to privatize state assets is directly related
to neo-liberalism’s foundations and hegemony.
Privatization. Commodification, corporatization, and the privatization of state
assets are notable features of the neo-liberal agenda. Neo-liberalism’s principal aim has
been to exploit new areas for capital accumulations in jurisdictions that were previously
considered strictly forbidden for profit-making purposes. Neo-liberals claim that the state
has largely failed to meet the increasing demand for services and argue that the private
sector can provide services more efficiently and effectively and keep pace with demand.
Accordingly, public assets of all kinds, including water, telecommunications, and
transport, have all been privatized, to one degree or another, throughout the capitalist
world (Harvey, 2005, 2006).
It is worth noting that privatization is also about the transfer of productive public
assets from the hands of the state to private companies. Thus, according to Arundhati
Roy (2001), productive public assets include natural resources, or ecosystem services,
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such as forests, air, and water. Savas (1987) defines privatization as “the act of reducing
the role of government, or increasing the role of the private sector, in an activity or in the
ownership of assets” (Savas, 1987: 3).
The ‘state failure’ perspective which informs neo-liberalism stems from 18th
century Enlightenment thought. It is based on the simple idea that nature has scarce
resources, that people try to maximize utility, and that markets are the most efficient
institutions through which the use of money should determine the rational distribution of
resources (Bakker, 2001). This idea indicates that capital markets can better evaluate a
public company’s performance than the state Treasury (Bakker, 2001).
During the last two decades of the 20th century, neo-liberalism has quickly
become globally hegemonic. Privatization has spread throughout the world since the last
quarter of the 20th century and has entailed dramatic state reforms in those countries
where it has been adopted (Harvey, 2006). Once a state has been transformed into a neoliberal set of institutions, the flow of money goes from the poor to the rich. This process
is called “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2006). The state goes about this by
first adopting privatization schemes and cutting back on state expenditures that support
the social wage. Harvey (2006) contends that even when privatization seems favorable to
the lower classes, the long-term effects can actually be harmful to them.

Other

redistributive policies that tend to occur include revising the tax code to benefit returns on
investment instead of income and wages, providing subsidies and tax breaks to
corporations, and the displacement of state expenditures (Harvey, 2006). The state can
be concerned with social welfarist issues only after economic growth, jobs, and
20

investment have been safeguarded, and even then, the issues can only be addressed
briefly and in a fashion conducive to financial interests (Peck and Tickell, 2002).
In the past, international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and
IMF, designed structural adjustment programs (SAPs) for developing countries to help
bring them out of poverty. Recently, however, IFIs have shifted from using SAPs to
poverty reduction strategies because of the new found consciousness of the impact of
economic policies on the poor, especially in developing countries (Bayliss, 2002).
Despite the shift in attitude toward the poor, however, Bayliss (2002) claims that the new
policies are very similar to the structural adjustment reforms and hence maintain the same
neo-liberal basis. More specifically, there is still a focus on markets and efficiency and
instead of revising policies that sincerely consider the poor, there has been a smooth
transition: what was thought to be beneficial for macroeconomic policies is also thought
to be beneficial to the poor (Bayliss, 2002). This is important because IFIs often include
privatization as a condition for securing loan agreements, SAPs, and poverty reduction
strategies. Privatization of state assets is often part of the eligibility criteria for securing
debt relief as well (Bayliss, 2002). Hence, privatization is directly tied to the neo-liberal
agenda of IFIs and developing countries are often desperate for debt relief and are thus, in
a sense, coerced into privatizing state assets.

Opponents of PSP in WSS service

provision argue that because such economic policies are not genuinely concerned with
the impacts on poor people, and since water is a basic human need, PSP is not appropriate
in this sector.
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The term ‘roll-out’ of privatization introduced earlier refers to the politically and
institutionally mediated responses to the shortcomings of the Thatcher/Reagan neo-liberal
project. Their project was based on overconfident deregulation and marketization, which
later proved to have significant limitations and contradictions. The ‘second neo-liberal
transformation’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 388) occurred in the 1990s under the
administrations of Bill Clinton in the US and Tony Blair in the UK. This phase of neoliberalism is characterized as more socially-interventionist than the previous phase
whereby the current phase is increasingly affiliated with social and penal policy-making,
concerning itself with re-regulation, discipline, and containment of the (typically lower
class) people who were marginalized and dispossessed in the previous phase (Peck and
Tickell, 2002). The social and penal policy incursions reflect the progression of the neoliberal project – which includes expanding and strengthening market logics, socializing
individualized subjects, and chastising non-compliant parties. It is also a reflection of the
recognition of the manifest failings of the previous phase of neo-liberalism (Peck and
Tickell, 2002).
Privatization in the WSS Industry
WSS service provision in developing countries has traditionally been provided by
the state. Private sector involvement was considered inappropriate because WSS services
were considered public goods designed to satisfy basic needs. Additionally, it was
traditionally believed that monopolistic tendencies were inevitable and inherent in the
private sector due to economies of scale in service provision. However, this orthodoxy
was challenged in the recessionary years of the 1980s leading to a new trend by the 1990s
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to increase PSP in the provision of water and sanitation.

Consequently, the 1990s

witnessed a substantial increase in water privatization, mostly driven by donor agency
pressures (such as the World Bank). By 1997, private investment had increased to
US$25 billion, up from US$297 million between 1984 and 1990 (Kirkpatrick, Parker,
and Zhang, 2006a: 145; Johnstone and Wood, 2001: 1). By the close of 2000, over 93
countries had privatized some of the piped water services. For the period between 1990
and 2002, there were 106 WSS projects in Latin America and the Caribbean and 73 in
East Asia and the Pacific, yet only seven in the Middle East and North Africa and 14 in
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Latin America, the Caribbean, East Asia, and the Pacific
make up over 95% of the total investment (Kirkpatrick, Parker, and Zhang, 2006a: 145).
Refer to Table 2 for an overview of the largest investments in WSS services in
developing countries between 1990 and 2002.
Table 2. The largest investments in WSS Services in Developing Services from 19902002
Country
Argentina
Philippines
Chile
Brazil
Malaysia
China
Romania
Turkey
Indonesia

Value (US$
Billions)
7.23
5.87
3.95
3.17
2.75
1.93
1.04
0.94
0.92

Source: Kirkpatrick, Parker, and Zhang, 2006a: 144.
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Number of Projects
10
5
13
33
6
44
3
2
8

The increasing trend in privatization witnessed during the 1980s and 1990s
reversed around the turn of the millennium. There had been a lot of optimism for
privatization, but this was replaced by widespread pessimism as projects were cancelled
or re-nationalized. The investor interest in such projects waned as well. It is important to
note that while there was a decline in the number privatization projects pursued and a
termination of some existing contracts, there was not a complete reversal in the trend. By
2001, the number of private sector projects was 44% of the level witnessed at the peak;
however, the number of projects was still three times higher than the level in the early
1990s (Harris, 2003: 6). Opponents of privatization cite the reversal in the trend as
evidence for the infeasibility of PSP in the WSS sector. However, proponents of PSP
claim that the reasons for the trend reversal are complicated and that it is not evidence
that PSP is not appropriate.
According to Johnstone and Wood (2001), the increase in PSP during the last two
decades of the 20th century was mostly stimulated by a dire need for increased capital
investment in WSS infrastructure in the rapidly expanding cities, particularly in the
developing countries. PSP in infrastructure was expected to lighten the burden that the
provision of infrastructure resources has on overstretched government budgets. It was
also believed that it would increase efficiency in service provision because of the motive
for profit and because it would give utilities clear-cut objectives and not the multiple,
clashing aims decreed by the state (Harris, 2003).
In many developing countries, the rapidly-growing cities coupled with a reduction
in assistance for WSS services from international development agencies and decades of
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poor public management of WSS services indicate that the public sources of finance are
no longer able to handle the costs of system rehabilitation and expansion (Johnstone and
Wood, 2001). By 2050, it is expected that 95% of humans will reside in urban areas of
developing countries (Davis, 2004: 6).

Three-quarters of these people will live in

‘second-tier’ cities and smaller urban areas, or cities that will have less than eight million
people (Davis, 2004: 7). The UN reports that, in second-tier cities, there is currently little
to no planning for the infrastructure necessary to accommodate these people (Davis,
2004). In light of the growing water and sanitation crisis and the inability of some state
and city governments to efficiently provide these services and at the same time keep up
with growing demand, privatization emerged as an attractive public policy option based
on the idea that the private sector could address growth and efficiency needs more
effectively than the public sector (Hall and Lobina, 2004).
Private ownership of assets is often considered to be more efficient in service
delivery when compared to the state. Privatization has four main objectives: (i) to attain
a higher allocative and productive efficiency; (ii) to increase the private sector’s role in
the economy; (iii) to improve the state’s financial situation; and (iv) to absolve precious
resources for appropriation in other important sectors (Prasad, 2006b; Savas, 1987).
More specifically, the rationale for the first goal is that the government, state or local, is
too large, too powerful, and too intrusive in people’s lives and therefore is a threat to
democracy.

Moreover, the government’s decisions are political and innately less

trustworthy than free-market decisions. The rationale behind the second objective is that
citizens should have more choices in public services; they should be given the power to
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define and address common needs and instill a sense of community by depending more
on family, neighbors, their place of faith, and ethnic and voluntary associations and hence
less on remote bureaucratic institutions. The rationale for the third objective is that
prudent privatization affords more cost-effective public services. Finally, the rationale
behind the fourth objective is that government spending is a large part of the poor fiscal
state of the economy and more of it should be allocated toward private firms. That way,
state-owned enterprises and assets can be better used by the private sector (Savas, 1987).
As Table 3 indicates, there are different degrees of privatization of WSS service
provision. At one end of the spectrum is a service contract, with the least private sector
involvement, and at the other end of the spectrum is sale, or full divestiture, with the most
private sector involvement.
Table 3. The Different Options for PSP and Responsibility in the WSS industry
Asset
Operations and
Capital
Commercial
Ownership
Maintenance
Investment
Risk
Service Contract
Public
Public and Private
Public
Public
Management Contract
Public
Private
Public
Public
Lease
Public
Private
Public
Shared
BOOT*
Private
Private
Private
Private
Concession
Public
Private
Private
Private
Shared Ownership Joint Corporate Joint Corporate Joint Corporate Joint Corporate
Divestiture
Private
Private
Private
Private
Option

Usual
Duration
1-2 years
3-5 years
8-15 years
20-30 years
25-30 years
Indefinite
Indefinite

*Build-Operate-Own-Transfer (BOOT)
Source: Johnstone and Wood, 2001: 13.
The Privatization Debate
In light of that fact that potable water allocation and sanitation services are two of
the most critical issues facing the world today, it is important to determine if the private
sector’s role in WSS provision is helping or exacerbating the problem. It is a hot topic
26

that has spawned a vast dichotomy in the literature with one extreme claiming that
involving the private sector is only worsening the problem, whereas the other extreme
claims it is imperative for the private sector to play a role in order to best address the
issue. There are also those scholars who fall in the middle, advocating PSP only under
certain circumstances and with strong regulatory oversight.
This dichotomy is the major concern of this study. Is it the nature of privatization
that prevents the expansion of WSS service provision, is it a combination of factors, or is
it independent of private sector involvement? One of the main areas where the private
sector has failed, and perhaps the public sector as well, is in the provision of services to
poor people (Bakker, 2003a). However, Budds and McGranahan (2003) contend that
neither public nor privately-operated WSS utilities are equipped to provide adequate
services to the majority of low-income houses because the impediments to provision in
poor areas can exist under both public and private control.
According to Swyngedouw (2004), water production, circulation, and
consumption, like other urban goods and services, are part of the political economy of
power that provides structure and consistency to urban life. Thus, the connection of
water to money and water’s life-giving properties and life-sustaining value places water
and the hydrosocial cycle into the power relationships of daily life and also subjects them
to strong social and spatial struggles along class lines, gender, and ethnic divisions for
access and/or control (Swyngedouw, 2004). In this view, the flow of money, water, and
power are materially linked. Controlling the flow of water in an area entails controlling
that area; interrupting the flow of water would bring an area’s metabolism to a standstill
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(Swyngedouw, 2004). Privatizing water often equates to the loss of the state’s control of
such an important resource (Gleick, et al., 2002).
For the reasons listed above, some have argued that water by its very nature is
difficult to commodify. Although water bodies often know no boundaries, water has
strategic political and territorial significance, has symbolic and cultural significance for
many religious faiths, and is a non-substitutable resource that is essential for survival
(Bakker, 2003a). Bakker (2003a), for instance, argues on the basis of this understanding
of water that the privatization of WSS services is inclined to entail re-regulation and
thereby boost the oversight functions and interventionist role of the state government. In
her view, applying ‘market environmentalism’ to water is very troublesome because of
water’s biophysical characteristics, making it very difficult to commercialize and
privatize, and perhaps, making WSS privatization ultimately futile. Her use of the term
‘market environmentalism’ refers to the profound changes occurring in most societies’
relationship to water – that is, the drive away from state control towards market
mechanisms in resource policy-making, regulation, allocation, and ownership. In short,
market environmentalism refers to using market means to achieve socio-environmental
ends. Notwithstanding the globalization of water privatization initiatives, Bakker (2003a)
calls water an ‘uncooperative commodity’ and contends that the commercialization and
privatization of WSS services is, at the very least, inevitably replete with difficulty.
Megginson (2005) cites that it is very difficult to make WSS service operations profitable
for both the service providers and affordable for the consumers, particularly in
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developing countries where large capital investments are often necessary to upgrade the
infrastructure.
If market involvement in the public goods arena is above all based on profit and
exit, then, according to the critics, it will worsen the inequalities that are usually present
in large metropolitan areas (Warner and Hefetz, 2002). Some scholars also contend that
market solutions cannot attend to issues associated with public goods’ coordination and
equality without some government intervention to internalize the externalities of uneven
fiscal capacity and need (Warner and Hefetz, 2002; Lowery, 2000).
Furthermore, one of the arguments that opponents of PSP in WSS service
provision cite is the negative effect of privatization on the poor (Bayliss, 2002; Gleick, et
al., 2002). Bayliss (2002) maintains that empirical evidence shows that privatization is
especially detrimental to the livelihoods of the poorest sectors by taking away
employment and income and excluding or reducing access to WSS services.
Privatization, in theory, aims to stimulate economic growth and growth is considered
imperative to decrease poverty levels. It is hard to deny the benefits of economic growth,
but there is no empirical evidence, anywhere, that privatization has had positive effects
on growth (Bayliss, 2002).
One of the reasons why privatization can harm the poor in particular is that
governments often have to make projects financially attractive to the private sector.

In

order to do so, there must be an incentive for investors, which often entails offering
increased concessions to lure investors with increased assets.

It also often entails

increasing tariffs to bring about a commercial return and increasing the price of services
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to the consumer. By definition private corporations seek to maximize profit and hence
they will not, in theory, provide services and make investments where they do not expect
to see a return on investment and profit (Bayliss, 2002).
J. F. Talbot, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of SAUR, the fourth largest water
company in the world and the former leader of the concession in the Dolphin Coast,
South Africa, is a stalwart proponent of PSP in WSS service provision and promulgates
the ‘failures’ of public provision of these services. Although he contends that public
sector provision is characterized by insufficient investment, poor management, lack of
maintenance, incompetent institutional structures, and political interference (Talbot,
2002: 8), he admits that the private sector cannot provide the poor with WSS services,
unless government subsidies, guarantees, and public sector investment are present
(Talbot, 2002; Hall and Lobina, 2003).
Privatization agreements can also be harmful to the public at large, and not just
the poorest sectors. Under certain circumstances, privatization of water resources can
take away local ownership of water systems, which can in turn disregard the public
interest. One of the most sensitive issues regarding water privatization is the loss of
control of water rights and shifts in allocation; this can be more contentious than the
economic issues presented by privatization. The main reason for this is that people,
across all cultures, feel very closely tied to their water resources and water normally has
deep cultural and religious significance; privatization of water resources tends to dismiss
the deeper existential significance that water carries (Gleick, et al., 2002).
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Gleick, et al. (2002) also contends that oftentimes privatization does not include
stakeholder participation or contract monitoring. Privatization is supposed to increase the
number of stakeholders to ensure the effective operation of the private sector and help the
private sector grow by encouraging investment. Evidence from developing countries
indicates that this does not usually occur. For example, privatization can allow the
private sector to stifle competition and frustrate regulation in order to maximize profits
(Bayliss, 2002).

In addition, thus far, there has been a disproportionate amount of

resources allocated toward facilitating financial constraints and regulatory oversight than
on stipulating guidelines for public access and oversight, monitoring the public interest,
arranging public participation, and ensuring transparency.

Any deficiencies in

monitoring progress, which may not necessarily be the fault of the private sector, can
bring about ineffective service provision, violations of water-quality policies, and
discriminatory behavior (Gleick, et al., 2002). The government should develop PSPs
through strong regulation (Bayliss, 2002).
Based on the concerns that privatization can worsen inequalities and neglect the
poor, Sclar (2000) advises state and local governments to be careful in their decisions to
privatize their WSS services. Water supply and sewerage services are both natural
monopolies because they both require huge amounts of fixed capital investments.
Consequently, it makes economic sense to construct one or several central plants for both
water filtration and for wastewater treatment that are large enough to serve entire
communities.

Having multiple water and sanitation plants would prove far more

expensive. Once the plants are in place, the learning curve is one where the transaction
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costs, both financial and in service quality, of frequently shifting management essentially
makes outside competition only a theoretical possibility.

It would require dire

mismanagement or a severe fiscal crisis to make the state agency want to switch
operators once the contract is already in place (Sclar, 2000).
A government is not necessarily making a fatal error by shifting a service from
the public to the private. It is important to consider the contractor’s or company’s
reputation for honest dealing and the proper expertise than simply awarding the contract
based on the contractor’s initial bid. In short, Sclar (2000) contends that the decision to
privatize should be based on a much more complex basis than simply a trust in the
‘beneficence’ of competitive markets.
Hall and Lobina (2004) argue that experience with private sector involvement in
WSS service provision has revealed the problems and limitations when political decisionmakers believe that the private sector can provide the services more efficiently and
effectively than the public sector. In fact, unlike in the 1980s and parts of the 1990s, it is
now no longer automatically assumed that the private sector delivers superior service
than the public sector. For example, Saal and Parker (2001b) investigated the UK’s
productivity and price performance after the privatization of its WSS services and
determined that there was no performance improvement. While the movement to transfer
WSS services from the public to the private sector gained momentum in the 1980s and
grew rapidly in the 1990s, the trend has since reversed (Harris, 2003; Hall and Lobina,
2004). The World Bank ardently pushed privatization during that time, but even the
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Bank now admits that its promotion of privatization was excessive due to ‘irrational
exuberance’ (Hall and Lobina, 2004: 268; World Bank, 2004: 1).
Opponents of PSP in WSS service provision also contend that there is no
evidence thus far that the private sector is superior at providing WSS services and
maintaining and expanding infrastructure (Bayliss, 2002; Lobina and Hall, 2000). The
private sector may, in theory, be better at management skills and providing incentives,
but this may not always be so in practice. International companies operating outside of
their borders with no experience in infrastructure development may not perform any
better than the state (Bayliss, 2002). Lobina and Hall (2000) challenge the notion that
PSP is the only possible stimulus for investment and rationalization. PSP, particularly in
developing countries, normally clashes with the public interest; publicly owned
enterprises (POEs) that remain active in WSS services are not fundamentally less
efficient and less cost effective than private enterprises. They maintain that POEs can
and do operate efficiently as modern, transparent, and publicly accountable enterprises
that accommodate commercial efficiencies conducive to social interests (Lobina and
Hall, 2000).
In the middle of the two extremes of the debate are scholars and global policy
entrepreneurs like Sachs (2005) who argue that the private sector, which is funded mostly
through private savings, should be responsible mostly for investments in businesses (e.g.,
in agriculture, industry, or services, and knowledge capital—new products and building
on scientific advances) and for household contributions to health, education, and nutrition
that complement the public investments in human capital. However, the government
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should keep control over general kinds of investments – like schools, clinics, roads, and
basic research, but leave highly specialized business investments to the private sector
(Sachs, 2005).
Sachs also contends that public investments are needed in urban areas. The
higher urban population density makes public investment feasible, and indeed necessary
for public health and economic reasons, to reach households through infrastructure grids
for water, sewerage, and power. Proponents of PSP in WSS service provision claim that
private markets in urban areas can provide these infrastructure services on the basis of
market prices. However, this claim typically overlooks the fact that a sizable proportion
of low-income households will be unable to purchase their basic needs at market prices,
and will therefore require significant public subsidies (Sachs, 2005).
One successful model for combining a market approach with state subsidies is
lifeline-tariff pricing. Under this model, all households (or all poor ones, if they are easy
to identify) are guaranteed a given supply of free infrastructure services, for example, 25
liters per person per day (about 6.6 gallons) or 6 kiloliters per household per month
(about 1,585 gallons) (Flynn and Mzikenge Chirwa, 2005: 67), like what was supposed to
happen in a program adopted by South Africa. The household would be required to pay
by a metered system for using additional water above the stipulated critical daily
minimum (Sachs, 2005). Anne O. Krueger, the First Deputy Managing Director of the
IMF, agrees that a safety net for the poor is necessary.

She notes, however, that

traditionally such programs to aid the poor have been unsuccessful as public spending is
often misdirected because it does not go to those who are most in need (Krueger, 2003).
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In line with the middle view point, there are scholars who argue that the debate over PSP
in WSS service provision should not focus on who owns the assets, but rather should
focus on how WSS services and infrastructure maintenance and expansion will be
financed. Rodriguez (2004) believes that if the debate continues to center on asset
ownership, then it will only result in the violent protests and reactions that were
witnessed in the second and third World Water Forums. He argues that it is more
productive to focus our resources on bridging the growing gap between the need for
services and infrastructure and the required financial resources. No matter if the private
sector is involved at all, there is a dire need for a new ‘financial architecture’ (Rodriguez,
2004: 110). Even under the best conditions, the funding available to cover investment
and operational needs of WSS services for the future is woefully inadequate, especially in
developing countries. In fact, it is estimated that US$100 billion is needed to fund water
and sanitation infrastructure around the world to address the growing needs and to
achieve coverage for all; essentially, about a 250% increase in the amount currently spent
is necessary (Rodriguez, 2004: 108). In addition, the future of non-recurring lending and
bond issues for PSP is very not very promising (Rodriguez, 2004). For these reasons,
Rodriguez (2004) argues that no one source of funding, public or private, is adequate.
Rodriguez (2004) also argues that it is imperative to concentrate on and accommodate
pricing and affordability of services, better allocate limited funds, subsidize services
properly, if at all, and access markets efficiently. PSP should not necessarily be the
answer; it should only be one of several potential solutions. He argues that indeed PSP
may be appropriate in some circumstances and we should not write off privatization
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entirely because of past failures; it is highly possible that the conditions under which PSP
are successful have not yet been realized and that the framework that governments need
to establish have not yet been developed (Rodriguez, 2004).
Megginson (2005) goes further and maintains that WSS services should, in
theory, be privatized, but that privatization can only be successful when competition is
promoted and when there is an actively-involved regulator and effective regulatory
regime. Furthermore, the change of ownership from the state to the private sector can
bring significant service improvements only if the charged prices are permitted to rise
significantly and consumers are capable of paying them (Megginson, 2005).
On the other extreme of the privatization debate are scholars like Anderson and
Hill (1997) who fully support private sector involvement in the WSS industry. They also
contend that the market can efficiently avert water shortages.

Water demands and

supplies respond well to price signals and demonstrate surprising price responsiveness or
elasticity (Anderson and Hill, 1997). Agriculture is the largest consumer of freshwater,
and increasing the price of water would encourage farmers to apply less water to crops by
using different irrigation technologies or different cropping patterns. If water prices are
kept low, however, as they normally are with water utility subsidies, then there will be a
higher demand on water resources (Anderson and Hill, 1997). The leftover water will be
subject to diminishing returns until the last portion used generates much less value than
the first.

Wasteful or inefficient water use in rural and urban areas is simply the

consumers’ rational response to low water prices (Anderson and Hill, 1997). Anderson
and Hill (1997) contend that whether or not markets can avert water crises depends on the
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interface between property rights and politics. Their argument is line with the neoclassical economic orthodoxy that the precision with which water rights are defined and
enforced will be a positive function of scarcity.
At the International Conference on Water and Environment (ICWE) in Dublin,
Ireland, in 1992, there were four ‘Dublin Principles’ adopted. The fourth principle states
the following:
“Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right of all human
beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past
failure to recognize the economic value of water has led to wasteful and
environmentally damaging uses of the resource. Managing water as an economic
good is an important way of achieving efficient and equitable use, and of
encouraging conservation and protection of water resources” (GWP, 2007: 1).
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, adopted this principle and saw the value in treating water
as an economic good. Hence, the UN adopted the neo-liberal stance on water policy.
The organization subscribed to the neo-liberal argument that in the past water resources
had not been managed efficiently, therefore, treating water as an economic good will help
address efficiency and shortage issues (GWP, 2007). However, Gleick, et al. (2002)
notes that the theory of allotting water across its conflicting uses disagrees with practice,
especially when there is no way to either measure or capture all of the costs and benefits
of a resource like water.
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Other pro-privatization advocates like Savas (1987) argue that private sector
involvement is more appropriate because the government spends too much money in
certain areas, like on salaries for its employees, and that this money would be better
allocated elsewhere. Savas contends that the private sector is better equipped to handle
some traditionally state-operated tasks. For example, private firms can afford to finance,
build, and operate wastewater treatment plants, whereas the government cannot afford it,
or chooses to divert its financial resources elsewhere (Savas, 1987).
Lee and Floris (2003) point out that infrastructure is exorbitant for WSS services.
Krueger, who represents the views of the IMF, argues that governments should always
impose user-fees in order to help finance the enormous investment needed in the water
sector. Water is unique in that it has an abnormally high ratio of fixed to variable cost
(Krueger, 2003). The maintenance, expansion, and replacement of aging infrastructure,
the measures required to avoid water leakages and other sources of waste, and the
technology required to properly dispose of wastewater require billions of dollars. The
funding needed is oftentimes too costly for state and local governments, and that is one
reason, justified or not, why privatization has emerged as a possible option to address the
funding concerns (Lee and Floris, 2003). The high cost of infrastructure and services
also means that the limited resources cannot be spent on other much-needed government
programs (Krueger, 2003).

Harris (2003) points out that the annual losses from

inefficient services and unsustainable pricing policies by the early 1990s were almost
equivalent to the annual investment in infrastructure, indicating a dire need for
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improvements. As a result, publicly-run utilities could not meet the increasing demand
for services and could not expand services to the poor.
Lee and Floris (2003) also argue that WSS services are best handled with private
sector involvement. They claim that places that exemplify effective and efficient water
service provision have private water sellers. They also claim that the notion that water
should be treated as a “free good” – that is, everyone has a right to access, regardless of
the cost – is problematic because water itself is only a small factor in the usefulness of an
efficient and acceptable water supply (Lee and Floris, 2003).
In addition, water supply can only be safe and reliable when the real cost is
enforced. The idea that water should be a free good has valid justifications: since water
has no substitute and everyone needs it for survival, the idea that it should be free of cost
sounds good in theory. However, making water a free good is not always practical
because it is not compatible with the reality of WSS service provision. Specifically,
water is a limited resource and must be garnered, stored, transported, treated, and finally
distributed (Lee and Floris, 2003). Lee and Floris go on to argue that once water has
been used, it needs to be collected again, treated, properly discarded, and, ideally,
recycled for future use. All of these processes demand a realistic price for WSS services
(Lee and Floris, 2003). Additionally, Krueger (2003) argues that it is wise to apply user
fees to water services and then separately give direct subsidies to those most in need. She
maintains that this would ensure that the poor would receive the resources that they need,
more so than they would with free services. She also believes that public expenditure
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control would be easier, as the government would no longer need to subsidize utilities for
those above the poverty level (Krueger, 2003).
According to Harris (2003), despite the trend reversal in PSP in the water sector
since the turn of the millennium, project cancellations and re-nationalizations have not
been that common. Between 1990 and 2001, only 48 private infrastructure projects in
different sectors (e.g., telecommunications, toll-roads, and water and sanitation) were
cancelled or re-nationalized, which is less than 2% than the 2,500 projects concluded
during that period (Harris, 2003: 9-10). Specifically for water and sanitation projects,
only 3.5% of projects were outright cancelled or re-nationalized between 1990 and 2001
(Harris, 2003: 10). Cook (2004b) cites that private water companies all over the world
have a reputation to uphold and have proven that they can be very effective at providing
services and maintaining infrastructure to help address the global water crisis.
Idelovitch and Ringskog (1995) contend that the public sector has largely failed to
provide reliable water and sanitation services. They believe that the public sector’s
shortcomings can be explained by its inability to operate efficiently and adequately
maintain existing infrastructure. One of the main reasons for this inability is the massive
investment required for water and sanitation systems. For example, it was estimated in
1995 that Latin America needed to invest US$5 billion annually in water supply and
US$7 billion annually in sewerage and sewage treatment rehabilitation and expansion for
the next decade, but the public sector does not have such financial resources (Idelovitch
and Ringskog, 1995).
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Others like Savas (2000) and Cook (2004a) claim that poor performance by
governments and government-owned enterprises (GOEs) have led to the desire to
privatize and adopt other far-reaching structural reforms. Some of the potential reasons
to seek privatization, according to Savas (2000: 111-112) include:
•

inefficiency, overstaffing, and low productivity;

•

poor quality of goods and services;

•

losses and rising debts of for-profit government enterprises;

•

a lack of managerial skills or acceptable managerial authority;

•

a lack of responsiveness to the public;

•

principal agent problems;

•

under-maintained facilities and equipment;

•

a lack of funds for needed capital investments;

•

excessive vertical integration;

•

multiple and conflicting goals; and

•

bureaucratic inefficiency.
The goals of privatization programs, however, should be outlined by the

government.

Savas (2000: 119-120) contends that the following objectives are

appropriate for privatization programs in developing countries:
•

reduce the cost of government;

•

develop revenues by selling assets and collect taxes from them;

•

reduce government debt, such as through debt-equity swaps;

•

supply infrastructure or other facilities that the government cannot otherwise
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provide;
•

procure specialized skills needed for technologically advanced activities;

•

reduce government interference and its direct presence in the economy;

•

lessen the role of government in society by building or strengthening civil society;

•

accelerate economic development;

•

decentralize the economy and broaden the ownership of economic assets;

•

display a commitment to economic liberalization and increase business

confidence;
•

promote the development of capital markets;

•

satisfy foreign lenders (including international bodies like the World Bank);

•

improve living standards;

•

reward political allies; and

•

devitalize political opponents (like labor unions).
Similarly, Wenyon and Jenne (1999: 177) state that PSP in the water industry will

be successful only if the following conditions are met:
•

reforms that affect the structure of the industry should take the possible loss of

economies of scale into account when dividing the area of provision into smaller units;
•

wherever feasible, service provision should cover entire river basins because of the

potential that it gives to companies to internalize environmental externalities;
•

there must be adequate and productive economic regulation to make sure private

operators are rewarded appropriately and there should also be incentives for the private
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company to reduce costs, as well as mechanisms that make sure some of the benefits of
efficiency improvements are felt by consumers;
•

adequate and enforceable drinking water standards and environmental regulations are

imperative to ensure that standards are enforced, to prevent contamination of water
sources, and to ensure that water resources are properly managed; and
•

it is absolutely essential to provide direct payments to the low-income groups so that

they can access services.
Savas (1987) contends that if contracting is extended to many public services,
then the government could potentially save enormous amounts of taxpayer dollars, while
still preserving public services. This equates to either forcing public service providers to
compete through improved efficiency with private firms, or crippling them entirely in
favor of private suppliers (Sclar, 2000).
Peter Cook, the executive director of the National Association of Water
Companies (NAWC) in the US, maintains that the private water companies execute
sound business practices and bring extensive experience to the water sector business.
The companies are usually big enough to have significant economies of scale, they
implement the best available technology, and can learn from experiences around the
world to ensure that the utility is as reliable, efficient, and secure as possible. He also
claims that private companies contribute economic benefits to the communities where
they operate because they often have to pay local, state, and federal taxes, as opposed to
municipalities, which normally do not have to pay taxes (Cook, 2004a). The private
sector can also boost operating efficiencies, which can then make more money available
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for capital improvements, take advantage of its access to commercial capital markets to
add to municipal financing, and administer its extensive experience in rate design to
ensure enduring viability of systems (Cook, 2004a).
One of the arguments that opponents of water privatization cite is that
international trade agreements that promote privatization, like the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), take precedence over national water protection laws and water
ownership. However, Cook (2004c) claims that this is not true and that when countries
become members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), they do not give up their
water rights and their national laws take precedence over international trade agreements.
The WTO states, “It is of course inconceivable that any Government would agree to
surrender the right to regulate water supplies, and WTO Members have not done so”
(WTO, 2007: 1).
There are also scholars who contend that the presence of “big business” is modest
(Haughton, 2002; Lee and Floris, 2003).

In developing countries, private direct

investment by multinational corporations (MNCs) in the WSS sector is actually limited.
There were less than US$2 billion invested by MNCs in the 1990s, and half of this
investment went to Latin America. In developing countries, the presence of small water
vendors that sell water via tank trucks, piped systems, and goat skins, for example, are far
more common than MNCs (Lee and Floris, 2003).
WSS infrastructure is very capital intensive because of its frequent expansion and
maintenance requirements. For example, in 2001, the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) estimated that the US would need an additional US$140 billion over the
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next 20 years for wastewater treatment infrastructure expansion and maintenance (Lee
and Floris, 2003). It is clearly more daunting in the developing world: the estimates of
the investment required in the developing world are astronomically higher than the US’
figures. For instance, in 2002, the World Bank estimated that the current investment in
global access to WSS services was US$15 billion/year and, to attain the World Summit
on Sustainable Development (WSSD) conference’s goals for drinking water, the figure
may be twice as high (World Bank, 2002).
What also sets developed countries apart from developing ones is the quality and
distribution of the services. In developing countries, large cities tend to have much better
WSS services than villages and rural areas because investment is biased toward the larger
and wealthier cities. For example, Mexican villages with less than 500 people received
water services for only 48% of the households and sanitation services for only 26% in
1994, yet cities with more than 80,000 people received water and sanitation services for
more than 90% of the population (Lee and Floris, 2003: 282). The quality of services in
developing countries is also lower. The majority of water and sewerage companies
administer services that fall below internationally acceptable minimum standards (Lee
and Floris, 2003).
The Case Studies
The Buenos Aires concession will be studied in detail to identify and critically
analyze the contending claims for why the project was cancelled prematurely. As review
of the literature above indicates, the parties on both sides of the debate feel equally
passionate about their stances. These arguments will be evaluated in the context of the
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Buenos Aires case and then compared to three other cases. The main purpose of the
comparison will be to assess key similarities to help determine if what happened in
Buenos Aires was an isolated incident. Keeping the above theoretical framework in
mind, the necessary preconditions will be determined that need to be present between the
market and politics for water and sanitation services to be treated as both public goods
and economic goods at the same time. The next chapter will describe how the study will
be conducted.
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CHAPTER TWO:
METHODS
Introduction
The theoretical framework and literature review in Chapter One begin with
background information on the key concepts that have helped shape how and why water
supply and sanitation (WSS) privatization projects have been adopted throughout the
world and how they have been perceived by the public. The broad theories at play
include liberalism, neo-liberalism and its role in promoting privatization, the debate over
private sector participation (PSP) in providing WSS services, and the importance of
sound water policy.

Explaining these broad theories is important because they are

directly related to the topic of WSS service privatization and provide a frame of reference
for evaluating the main case study and comparing it to other relevant cases.
After the broader concepts were explained in the first chapter, the Buenos Aires,
Argentina WSS privatization project was introduced as the main case study. The seven
study objectives under investigation will help explain what happened in Buenos Aires
and why the contract was rescinded 17 years prematurely.

The objectives are the

following: (1) identify what the consortium promised to the government of Argentina and
the citizens of Buenos Aires; (2) investigate why Aguas Argentinas, S.A. (AASA) was not
able to deliver on its contract obligations; (3) identify the specific role that the actual
privatization contract played in the failure to meet the promises; (4) investigate the role of
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the Argentine state in the failure of the water concession; (5) identify the role that the
various communities of Greater Buenos Aires who expected more reliable and affordable
water and sanitation services played in the cancellation of the concession; (6) compare
and contrast the events in Buenos Aires to three related water privatization schemes for
additional comparative insights into water privatization; and (7) determine if there is
indeed a role that the private sector can play in providing services essential to human
needs and if so, identify the institutional conditions under which private water companies
can have such a role.
In the third chapter, objectives one through five will be subject to investigation
and will also help to shed light on the contending explanations for why the Buenos Aires
WSS privatization contract was rescinded early. In Chapter Four, the results of the
comparative case studies and the similarities between all four case studies will be
presented. In Chapter Five, the results of the case studies will be analyzed to make
broader implications about PSP in the WSS service industry to determine the institutional
conditions, if any, that private water companies must operate under. Analyzing the
results of the objectives in Chapter Five will also provide the most accurate explanation
for why the Buenos Aires contract was rescinded early. In addition, the last chapter will
discuss lessons learned, limitations of the study, and possible future research prospects.
Addressing objective six will help determine if the Buenos Aires case is the
exception, and not the rule, to the outcomes of WSS privatization projects. It will be
compared to the WSS privatization projects that occurred in the Mexico City, Mexico,
the Dolphin Coast, South Africa, and the UK. The reasons why these three comparative
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case studies were chosen will be explained below and dissected thoroughly in Chapter
Four, the results of the comparative case studies.
To address objective seven, the results of the comparisons between the main case
study and comparative case studies will be brought together and evaluated. The results
will be analyzed in terms of the frame of reference laid out in the introduction and
literature review.

The empirical evidence from the cases will be compared to the

arguments posed in the pro- and anti-privatization debate.

The evidence will be

evaluated to determine which argument, i.e., the pro-privatization, anti-privatization, and
middle viewpoint arguments, is best supported in light of the theoretical framework.
Most importantly, the empirical evidence that will be used to address the seven objectives
will help in answering the primary research question, namely, what preconditions have to
be present between the market and the government in order for water and sanitation
services to be treated as both public goods and economic goods at the same time? It is
important to note that it may in fact be determined that there are no preconditions under
which this may be possible.
The Case Study Method
The comparative case study approach is appropriate for this study. A case study
can be defined as an empirical inquiry that examines a contemporary phenomenon within
its real-life context when the distinctions between phenomenon and context are not
clearly evident, drawing upon multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1984: 23). Yin (1984)
holds that conducting case studies is appropriate when the researcher is asking a ‘how’ or
a ‘why’ question; but case studies are appropriate for some ‘what’ questions as well. As
49

stated earlier, the research question in this study is: what preconditions have to be present
between the market and the government in order for water and sanitation services to be
treated as both public goods and economic goods at the same time? This question
concerns how water and sanitation services can be treated as both public and economic
goods at the same time, and hence this is essentially a ‘how’ research question. The case
study approach should also be used when the study does not require control over
behavioral events and when it focuses on contemporary events (Yin, 1984: 17). Indeed,
this study is not concerned with control over behavioral events and it focuses on
contemporary events, in this case, water policy, neo-liberalism, and the debate over the
appropriateness of PSP in the WSS service sector in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Furthermore, there are three possible kinds of case studies: exploratory,
descriptive, and explanatory. The following conditions distinguish the three different
kinds of case studies: (i) the type of research question that is asked; (ii) the degree of
control that the investigator has over actual behavioral events; and (iii) the extent that the
study is focused on contemporary, as opposed to historical, events (Yin, 1984: 16). The
study at hand falls into the exploratory case study category because the research question
is both a ‘what’ and a ‘how’ question (Yin, 1984). The study will investigate the case
studies to make observations about PSP in the WSS services industry, which is a form of
deductive reasoning. Explanatory or descriptive case studies, on the other hand, tend to
deal more with frequencies and/or incidences (Yin, 1984).
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The Comparative Case Studies
These three comparative case studies were chosen for specific reasons. First, the
Mexico City, Mexico, case was chosen because, although it is a developing country, the
majority of its population has access to potable water and sanitation services (Saade
Hazin, 2001). Although access to services is not universal, the government of Mexico
City intends to expand services until they are universal (Saade Hazin, 2001). Hence, it is
important to assess whether PSP has helped universalize services or has perhaps
exacerbated access. In addition, the Mexico City WSS contract is a service contract
(Saade Hazin, 2001), which entails the least private sector involvement and hence more
regulatory oversight and participation. Comparing different levels of PSP will help
determine if the results of the contracts are similar or different relative to different
degrees of private sector involvement. Perhaps privatization is more successful with less
private sector involvement, or perhaps it is not.
Another reason why the Mexico City case study was chosen is that Mexico, like
Argentina, is a developing country. It is important to assess if privatization has similar
outcomes in developing countries or if it can vary. Are the outcomes similar because of
the lower levels of income and weaker regulatory institutions that tend to be
characteristic of developing nations (Kirkpatrick, Parker, and Zhang, 2006b)?
In addition, Mexico and Argentina are both in Latin America and thus have more
similar historical backgrounds and cultures than either have with the other two case
studies. The success or failure of PSP may be dependent on certain historical and cultural
backgrounds.

If the contracts in Argentina and Mexico have had vastly different
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outcomes, then perhaps the success or failure of privatization is not contingent upon
history and culture. If there are indeed similarities in the outcomes of the contract, then it
may be reasonable to infer that what happened in Buenos Aires was not simply because it
was a concession, but simply because it involved the private sector. The Mexico City
case study will be compared to the Buenos Aires, South Africa, and UK case studies on
the following conditions: why the municipality decided to privatize its WSS services in
the first place, if the contract was rescinded and if ‘re-regulation’ ensued, what
multinational corporations (MNCs) were involved, whether or not service access was
improved, and whether or not the price of WSS services decreased, as they were
supposed to. Once all of the case studies have been evaluated, the results will be
compared and if the cases are similar, then the success or failure of privatization may not
rely on specific historical, cultural, and financial conditions, but may rely on the nature of
PSP instead. Furthermore, if that is indeed the case, it would be fair to infer that the
Buenos Aires case was not an isolated incident of PSP failure.
The Dolphin Coast, South Africa, was chosen as the second comparative case
study primarily because South Africa is the only country in the world whose constitution
(Act 108 of 1996, section 7[2]), in theory, guarantees its citizens access to a minimum
amount of potable water (Bakker, 2003b; Barlow and Clarke, 2004b; Hall, 2005).
Despite the passing of the constitutional right in 1996, universal access of WSS services
is yet to be achieved. Hence, it is important to determine if WSS service provision was
improved as a result of private sector involvement in the Dolphin Coast specifically. If
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not, then perhaps the drive to expand services will turn out to have been exacerbated by
private sector involvement.
The Dolphin Coast will serve as a useful case study because Sub-Saharan Africa
faces the most dire water shortage issue on the globe, so it is important to determine if the
private sector can play a role in mitigating the issue. If it is found that PSP has helped
universalize services in each of the case studies, then certainly PSP can be successful in
this regard. Furthermore, although the Dolphin Coast is, like Buenos Aires, a concession,
it is important to compare it to the Buenos Aires case to identify any similarities in
concession agreements. Additionally, South Africa is a developing country like Mexico
and Argentina. As in Mexico and Argentina, the citizens, in large part, do not have the
financial means to pay for expensive WSS services and it is also not as culturally
acceptable to have to pay for the services as it is in the UK. Furthermore, comparing the
developing countries to one another could also lend insight into the efficacy of the state
governments’ regulatory role in these cases. Perhaps state governments in developing
countries do not have as strong of a regulatory role as they do in developed countries and
thus may not be able to protect their citizens’ interests from private (and sometimes
conflicting) interests.
Like the other comparative case studies, this case will be compared to the Buenos
Aires, Mexico City, and UK case studies. As in the other case studies, the case of the
Dolphin Coast will be compared to the other cases by determining the following: why the
municipality decided to privatize its WSS services in the first place, if the contract was
rescinded and if ‘re-regulation’ ensued, what multinational corporations (MNCs) were
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involved, whether or not service access was improved, and whether or not the price of
WSS services decreased, as they were supposed to. If there are similarities, then perhaps
what happened in the Buenos Aires concession was not unique for private sector
involvement in the WSS industry.
After comparing the Buenos Aires case to the three other case studies, the
parallels between the cases will be laid out and analyzed. If it is determined that what
happened in Buenos Aires was not an isolated incident, then broad inferences can be
made about what private sector involvement entails in WSS service provision. Even if it
is determined that Buenos Aires was a unique situation, then it may be possible to infer
what preconditions must be present for WSS to be both economic and public goods.
Finally, the necessary preconditions will imply whether or not PSP is appropriate in WSS
service provision, and to what extent, if any.
Finally, the UK, focusing only on England and Wales and the privatization of its
10 regional water authorities (RWAs), will serve as an ideal comparative case study
because the UK is the birthplace of neo-liberalism and the experimentation with public
service privatization. It will be interesting to see just how the privatization scenario
panned out in the very country whose administration had so much faith in it and
promoted it so fervently.
Another reason why the UK case was chosen is that there is virtually universal
access to WSS services and citizens of developed countries, such as the UK, are
accustomed to paying some sort of fee for water services, even if the services are
provided by the state, and hence paying for these services is generally more culturally
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accepted. In other countries, however, especially in the Global South, otherwise known
as developing countries, citizens tend to feel that water should be free of charge. This is
important because Argentina is an example of a developing country where the citizens
believe water services should be free or at least inexpensive. By comparing Argentina
with the UK, and by comparing the UK with the other comparative case studies, it can
then be determined if PSP is perhaps more successful in regions where it is more
culturally acceptable to charge users for water and sanitation services.
In addition, the UK is the only developed country in the four case studies, and
thus, it can be compared to the other case studies to assess if the outcomes are similar or
different in developed and developing countries. In developed countries, the people tend
to have more income at their disposal and hence it is possible that PSP in the WSS sector
is more successful in developed countries where people are more capable of paying for
services.
Lastly, the UK experimented with full divestiture of its water authorities, meaning
it handed its assets ownership, operations and maintenance, capital investment, and
commercial risk to the private sector, effectively abdicating all of its control and
responsibilities. Although the Buenos Aires case was a concession, it is important to see
if there are similarities between the cases across the private sector involvement spectrum.
The UK case study will be compared to the three other case studies to identify any
similarities, including why the country decided to privatize its WSS services in the first
place, if the contract was rescinded and if ‘re-regulation’ ensued, what multinational
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corporations (MNCs) were involved, whether or not service access was improved, and
whether or not the price of WSS services decreased, as they were supposed to.
The four case studies have different historical and cultural backgrounds and the
citizens of the countries have, as a whole, different levels of income. The Mexico and
Argentina case studies are probably more similar to one another than they are to the other
case studies, but the cases are still different. If there are marked similarities between the
outcomes of the Buenos Aires and UK contracts and between the UK and the other
comparative case studies, then it is likely that the Buenos Aires case was not an isolated
incident.
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CHAPTER THREE:
RESULTS OF THE BUENOS AIRES CASE STUDY
Introduction
The water and sewerage service privatization from 1993 to 2006 in Buenos Aires,
Argentina, will be examined as the main case study in this chapter to address study
objectives one through five, but not six and seven, because only the first five are relevant
to the Buenos Aires case.

As indicated earlier, the five study objectives are the

following: (1) identify what the consortium promised to the government of Argentina and
the citizens of Buenos Aires; (2) investigate why Aguas Argentinas, S.A. (AASA) was not
able to deliver on its contract obligations; (3) identify the specific role that the actual
privatization contract played in the failure to meet the promises; (4) investigate the role of
the Argentine state in the failure of the water concession; and (5) identify the role that the
various communities of Greater Buenos Aires who expected more reliable and affordable
water and sanitation services played in the cancellation of the concession. As discussed
in Chapter Two, addressing these five study objectives will help shed light on why the
Buenos Aires contract was rescinded almost 20 years early. In the next chapter, the
results of the three comparative case studies will be presented and the similarities and/or
differences between the four cases will be outlined and analyzed in the final chapter, the
discussion.
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A Brief History of Argentina’s Water Services, Politics, and Economy
History of Water and Sanitation Services
The city of Buenos Aires was established in 1880 as Argentina’s capital (Del
Castillo Laborde, 2005). The city is composed of the federal district and surrounding
municipalities with anywhere from nine to eleven million residents in total (estimates
vary). Before 1995, there were 13 surrounding municipalities; after 1995, there were 17
(Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 186). The city is bordered by the River Plate (Río de la
Plata), a large river that provides the Greater Buenos Aires area with 92% of its crude
water needs (Del Castillo Laborde, 2005: 149).

Buenos Aires’s centralized water

provision began in the 1820s. In 1869, there was a series of yellow fever epidemics that
killed a large portion of the city’s population and as a result, systemic services for
drinking water and sanitation services began (Vilas, 2004a; Bakker, 2003b).
By the early 20th century, there were services throughout most of Argentina’s
provincial capital cities and some smaller provincial towns. The services were originally
provided by the Buenos Aires Water Supply Company, a private company that was given
a concession contract (Vilas, 2004a; Bakker, 2003b). However, in 1891, the company’s
contract was withdrawn as a result of the impact of the 1890 financial crisis on the
company’s accounts (Vilas, 2004a: 5). On December 30, 1892, Law 2927 established the
Commission for Sanitary Works. In 1909, a national plan for sanitation was instituted.
In 1912, Law 8889 set up National Sanitation Works (Obras Sanitarias de la Nación,
OSN) that was ordered to study, build, and manage water and sanitation services in
Argentina’s cities, townships, and other urban centers (Vilas, 2004a: 5). One of OSN’s
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key duties was to expand drinking water and sanitation services in Greater Buenos Aires.
OSN also provided technical, economic, and operational support to any other city that
requested it (Vilas, 2004a).
OSN managed services for about 70 years until the decentralization reform in the
early 1980s, at which point OSN’s service area was reduced to the Greater Buenos Aires
area that would become the concession’s service area about 10 years later (SchneierMadanes, 2005; Del Castillo Laborde, 2005).

OSN served as an adequate service

provider for a long period of time, especially in the 1940s (Schneier-Madanes, 2005:
152). By about 1980, however, the water supply and sanitation (WSS) industry became
plagued with a major crisis. Like many other Latin American cities, the metropolitan
area expanded faster than the water and sewerage network could keep pace; networks in
Buenos Aires were in a particularly bad state, in comparison to other cities (SchneierMadanes, 2005).
A number of other governmental agencies supplemented OSN; such agencies
included National Potable Water Services (Servicio Nacional de Agua Potable), which
provided drinking water to rural areas and Sanitation Works of Buenos Aires (Obras
Sanitarias de Buenos Aires), which supplied several cities in the Buenos Aires province
with drinking water. Municipal government agencies and cooperatives managed the
water and sanitation service provision in some other cities. In the 1940s, the sanitation
services system in Greater Buenos Aires underwent its greatest expansion when they
provided services to the downtown district and the 13 surrounding municipalities (Vilas,
2004a: 5). The downtown district and the municipalities formed a unified system of
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sanitation, the Metropolitan Sanitation Area, lasting until privatization occurred in the
early 1990s. In 1966, the rural water and sanitation services were transferred to a new
governmental agency’s command, National Service of Drinking Water and Rural
Sanitation (Servicio Nacional de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Rural, SNAPS) (Vilas,
2004a: 5).
OSN was divided into 161 separate water and sanitation authorities in 1980 by the
federal government. Thereafter, OSN was limited to the Buenos Aires’ federal district
and the surrounding municipalities. OSN also became a tripartite governmental agency
on behalf of the state of Argentina, the Province of Buenos Aires, and Buenos Aires City,
but physical assets were still considered to be the property of the federal government.
SNAPS was converted into the Federal Potable Water and Sanitation Cabinet (Consejo
Federal de Agua Potable y Saneamiento, CFAPYS) in 1988 and was charged with
management and development of water and sanitation services in the provinces. It was
transformed again in the early 1990s into the National Organization of Water and
Sanitation Works (Ente Nacional de Obras Hídricas de Saneamiento, ENOHSA) and was
responsible for financing water and sanitation projects throughout the country and
strengthening regulatory capacity at the provincial level (Vilas, 2004a).
After 1940, OSN provided almost universal service to the residents in the federal
district of Buenos Aires, but service was limited in the municipalities. Demand for
services increased by about 5-6% per year because of rapid population growth, mostly
fueled by immigration and altering land use patterns. Right before the privatization of
the WSS services began in May 1993, OSN provided water services to 99% and
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sanitation services to 58% of the federal district’s population. In contrast, water services
were provided to only 55% and sanitation services to only 36% of the suburban
population (Vilas, 2004a: 6). It is important to note that there were and still are marked
disparities in the level of access to services; the municipalities to the south of the city,
which also tend to be the poorer municipalities, have had much lower rates of service
coverage (Loftus and McDonald, 2001). Refer to Table 4 for OSN’s service coverage for
city and suburban residents and refer to Table 5 for the water and sewerage coverage in
terms of how many citizens were served and performance levels at the beginning of the
contract.
Table 4. OSN’s service coverage by 1993, directly before privatization

Population Served in the Metropolitan Area (%)
Buenos Aires City
Suburban Areas
Total Connections (millions)
2

Total Area Covered (km )
Source: Vilas, 2004a: 6.
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Water
70
99
55
1.2

Sanitation
47
58
36
0.7

500

400

Table 5. The water and sewerage coverage and performance levels at the beginning of
the contract
Water System
Number of Connections
Average Production (m3/month)
Treatment Capacity
Length of Water Pipe System (kilometers)
Total Population
Served Population
Sewerage System
Number of Connections
Served Population
Volume Collected (m3/month)
Volume Treated (m3/month)

1,170,000
108,950,000
3,640,000
11,000
8,580,000*
6,000,000
700,000
4,700,000**
82,232,000
3,413,000

*Quilmes was added to the concession service area in 1995, increasing the total
population to 9,300,000.
**The figures reported range from 4,663,670 to 4,900,000. The concession contract
states that 58% of the population was connected to the sewerage network – this gives a
population of 4,976,400 connected to the sewerage network.
Source: Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 186.
In the early 1990s, OSN produced between 112,500,000 m3/month (Vilas, 2004a:
6) to 108,950,000 m3/month (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 186) of drinking water,
including combined losses of 38% (in wastewater treatment plants and the distribution
network). Every year, approximately 850 million m3 of sewage was dumped directly into
the River Plate. Directly before privatization, approximately 60% of all households were
connected to the water network and about 40% of households were connected to the
sewage network in the Buenos Aires province, which left between four and five million
people without sufficient water and sanitation services (Vilas, 2004a: 6). However,
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another estimate is that OSN generated 3.7 million cubic meters of water every day,
reaching about 70% of Greater Buenos Aires’ population, or about 6 million residents,
and provided sewerage services to about 58% of the population (Crampes and Estache,
1996: 1).
OSN is estimated to have treated only 2-3% of the total effluents and about 1.5
cubic kilometers (km3) of effluents were dumped into the River Plate every day. There
were four pumping stations, three sewer mains at 60 km each, and approximately 7,000
km of network pipelines in the sewerage system. Another estimate is that OSN operated
nine pumping stations, two treatment stations, 370 km of water mains, and 19,000 km of
distribution pipes, and 77 km of underground tunnels (Crampes and Estache, 1996: 1).
OSN did not properly maintain the water and sewerage systems, perhaps because of a
lack of financial resources, and experienced water losses of up to 40% (Crampes and
Estache, 1996: 1). The vast majority of sewage collected by the system was and still is
dumped directly into the river without any prior treatment. Raw domestic and industrial
sewage used to flow into creeks and rivers crossing the metropolitan area and eventually
discharged into the River Plate, sometimes upstream of water intake; as of 2003, 10 years
after privatization, this situation had not improved much (Vilas, 2004a: 7). There was
only one wastewater treatment plant, the Southwest plant, having a capacity to treat
120,000 cubic meters (m3) of waste per day, and hence only about 5% of the total sewage
flow could be treated before being discharged as effluent into the River Plate (Vilas,
2004a: 7).
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Water was and still is purified at the San Martín and General Belgrano plants; the
San Martín plant is much bigger than General Belgrano and is one of the largest of its
kind in the world (Vilas, 2004a; Loftus and McDonald, 2001). Before privatization,
sewage was treated at two different plants in the southwest and north of the capital
district (Loftus and McDonald, 2001).
Since water and sanitation services were nowhere close to universal under OSN’s
control, there was clearly a lot of room for improvement. Financial constraints were one
of the main reasons why access to services, especially in the suburbs, was unacceptably
low. For example, the investment in the early 1990s had declined from 1.5% of gross
domestic investment in 1970 to 0.58% in 1990 (Vilas, 2004a: 7). As a result, the
necessary financial resources were further constrained, inhibiting the desperately needed
maintenance, renewal, and rehabilitation (Vilas, 2004a). Inefficient management was
another major reason for poor services. Specifically, the classification of customers was
outdated and inefficient because service rates were based on lot size and not water usage.
Furthermore, approximately 20% of OSN’s customers had water meters, but the majority
of the meters were broken or did not function well. Consequently, about 90% of the
water supply was unmetered and the average per capita usage, for those in the network,
was extremely high. Consumption rates were as high as 300-500 liters per day (Vilas,
2004a: 7). These rates include unaccounted for system losses, approximated at 40% of
the total production on 100 million m3 of water per month, as measured in 1992. On top
of this, OSN was overstaffed – there were a total of 7,500 employees, or about 8-9
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employees per every 1,000 connections; this is about five times higher than European
water companies (Vilas, 2004a: 7).
Despite OSN’s mounting problems, some believe that OSN was still an effective
and adequate provider and that the main reason for their short-comings was the economic
crisis and the ensuing lack of revenue for upgrades and service expansion (Loftus and
McDonald, 2001). On the other hand, others believe that OSN was simply an ineffective
government agency that needed to be relieved of its duties. Those who believe this
contend that the utility was inefficient and unresponsive to consumer complaints with a
long backlog of problems (Zérah, 2001).
OSN based its service rates on metered and unmetered services. As stated above,
the vast majority of consumption was unmetered (about 90%). The rates for unmetered
water usage and sewerage service were based on the customer’s geographic location, the
age and quality of the facilities where service was provided, the surface area of the
enclosed structure, and the land where the service was provided. These characteristics
were then multiplied by a general rate level (0.0279 pesos/m3 for residential customers
and 0.0558 pesos/m3 for nonresidential customers) (Vilas, 2004a: 7) and also multiplied
by coefficient K, designed to reflect operating costs. OSN frequently reset the K factor;
the change was to be approved by the executive branch of the federal government. The
tariff formula that OSN used was K * Z * TG * (SC * E) + (ST/10), where K was the
coefficient reflecting operating costs, Z was the customer’s geographic location, TG was
the general tariff level, E was the age and physical qualities of the structure, SC was the
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total surface area of the enclosed structure where service was provided, and ST was the
total surface area of the land occupied by the customer (Vilas, 2004a: 8).

Political and Economic History
Prior to the 1950s, Argentina had the second largest market in South America but
in the second half of the century, Spanish colonialism had left Argentina on the losing
end of unequal trade relations with the rest of the world and produced a small elite that
allowed foreign interests to overtake national interests. During the first half of the 20th
century, economists believed that Argentina would emerge as an economic superpower
and soon grow to come in second only to the US. However, since the 1950s, Argentina
has been plagued by economic instability and political upheaval. Many Argentines and
scholars alike blame Argentina’s unexpected and dramatic deterioration on President
Juan Domingo Peron who served from 1946 to 1955 and from 1973 to 1974 (Loftus and
McDonald, 2001: 180).
President Peron was a member of the Justice Party (Partido Justicialista) and a
populist who advocated reformist social policies and tried to balance the leftist social
change and conservative support of elite interests. He drew most of his support from the
country’s working class and created some progressive measures to help the poor and the
blossoming middle class. For example, his policies supported workers’ unions and he
passed several major measures that helped strengthen union power and as a result, helped
implement a force for change in the working-class (Loftus and McDonald, 2001). Some
scholars argue that the close ties of the union movement to the state were the major force
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that allowed for the advancement of neo-liberal policies in the 1990s under President
Menem (Loftus and McDonald, 2001).
After Peron’s first term in office, there was a series of coups and military
dictatorships.

Many Argentines believed that Peron’s populist social and economic

policies were to blame for the political unrest and economic instability. Peron was reelected in 1973 but died in 1974 from heart failure. His second and short time in power
did not improve the country’s situation. After he died, his third wife, Isabel, rose to
power. Her Presidency ended two years later during a coup that placed Argentina in a
new era of dictatorship that became the bloodiest period in the country’s history (Loftus
and McDonald, 2001). This period took place between 1976 and 1983 and is known as

La Guerra Sucia, or the “Dirty War.” Many people simply “disappeared” during this
period. In addition, union laws were suspended and torture was commonplace. The
people who disappeared are known as the desaparecidos, or “the ones who disappeared.”
Protest was nearly impossible and extremely dangerous; any person who was considered
a radical was threatened because the paranoid military besieged any suspected dissidents
and attacked underground guerilla movements. The military is responsible for murdering
thousands of the desaparecidos; they were kidnapped and sometimes killed simply
because they were suspected of being a threat to military rule, even when there was no
evidence connecting them to the guerilla movement (Loftus and McDonald, 2001).
The military rule finally came to an end in the early 1980s when the country’s
economic and social crises worsened. The last military general, Galtieri, tried to save the
military rule by seeking popular support by invading the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands in
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1982. However, his attempt failed and the era of military dictatorships collapsed. Then,
in 1983, the democratically-elected Raul Alfonsín came to power as the first civilian
president in over seven years (Loftus and McDonald, 2001).
Civilian reform began to improve Argentina, but its problems were far from over.
A debt crisis had been brewing and came to the forefront, essentially halting Alfonsín’s
attempts to bring Argentina out of its economic depression. High inflation and stints of
hyper-inflation ensued (sometimes as much as 4,000% a year) (Loftus and McDonald,
2001: 181). As a result of the on-going and worsening economic crisis, Argentines were
becoming increasingly disgruntled with the government’s ability to serve the people and
improve their situation (Loftus and McDonald, 2001). In 1989, Carlos Saúl Menem came
to power and, like Peron, was a member of the Partido Justicialista. This political party
had recently been unbanned in Argentina. While campaigning, Menem promised to
adhere to the Peronist doctrines of economic nationalism, state regulation of the
economy, economic growth via direct government investments and financing of the
private sector, and social justice to promote the working class by redistributing income
(Manzetti, 1999: 71).

However, he largely abandoned the Peronist doctrines once

elected. In addition, in order to defend the state against the mounting possibility of
political instability, Alfonsín and Menem reached an agreement to allow Menem to
assume power without first going through the required interim period (Loftus and
McDonald, 2001).
Menem’s Peronist campaign garnered support from the working class, made up of
mostly Peronists, and from the middle class who voted for Alfonsín in 1982 (Manzetti,
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1999).

Menem was careful enough to withhold specific details about his proposed

policies, but very few questioned his real intentions and most had faith in him because he
had flawless Peronist credentials. However, several years after taking office, many of
Menem’s original supporters were disappointed and angry with his broken promises and
the persistent and stubborn economic depression (Manzetti, 1999).
Menem, like any president faced with a crisis, had to make radical decisions and
propose drastic policy changes. He was also a president who had to garner credibility
and so decided to break decisively with the past. Menem’s attempts to gain credibility,
particularly in the West, thus considerably sped up the pace with which he passed
reforms and also made his reforms much more extreme (Llanos, 2002). His efforts also
meant that the reforms were more than economic decisions; they would often be carried
out without proper consideration of the constitutional limits on the use of presidential
power.

The delegation of power that Congress granted him also sped up the

implementation of the reforms (Llanos, 2002).
Under these circumstances, Menem set out to implement significant economic
reforms, which was a dramatic shift away from the Partido Justicialista’s policy platform
by promoting privatization and the shrinking of the state. This change was the beginning
of the era known as ‘Menemismo economics’ (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 179). The
Argentine treasury was depleted; the country was enduring the worst economic crisis in
the 20th century (Manzetti, 1999). Shortly before entering office, Menem realized that
the redistributive measures that he had strongly supported were not feasible and thus he
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turned away from his campaign promises to a much more defined and radically different
position (Manzetti, 1999; Llanos, 2002).
Given his Peronist credentials, many were surprised that he decided to embrace
the principles of neo-liberal economics (Llanos, 2002). His priority was to cure the
economic crisis (Manzetti, 1999). He called for an end to state interventionism and
promoted free market capitalism, privatization of state enterprises, fiscal adjustment, and
the opening up of the state economy (Llanos, 2002: 78; Manzetti, 1999). Only several
days after entering office, he realized the limitations imposed by the hyperinflation crisis
if he were to stick to his Peronist platform of state interventionism. It occurred to him
that his future ability to execute public policies and reacquire the state’s lost
governmental resources was only possible if structural adjustment policies were no
longer condemned and if market-oriented reforms were endorsed.

The structural

adjustment reforms were deemed necessary to acquire political resources; i.e., they were
considered necessary to fix the economic crisis, secure desperately-needed foreign aid,
address the public’s demand for solutions, and also win the support of the powerful
business class. Consequently, Menem quickly instituted several emergency measures and
introduced a program of structural reforms intended to end Argentina’s fiscal deficit
(Llanos, 2002).
These drastic policy changes were possible because by July 1989, Menem had a
very high approval rating of 82% (Llanos, 2002: 81) and he counted on his popularity to
implement his sweeping economic reforms. Thus, he craftily used public opinion as an
‘asset’ to stand up to opposition from powerful interest groups, bureaucracies, and
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reluctant politicians (Llanos, 2002: 81). Menem was even permitted to pass drastic
economic measures that were predicted to have some social costs. Llanos (2002) notes
that the reason why the public, by and large, approved of these reforms is not that the
measures were guaranteed to lead to a better future, but simply that the people were
desperate for change and did not want a repeat of the past. Argentina had endured a very
long and painful economic crisis, which was hastened by hyperinflation, and so the
people were eager for change. Hence, Menem’s high approval rating allowed him to
proceed with drastic market reform measures and secure a ‘blank check’ to deal with
issues as he saw fit, which was a rare opportunity to succeed in the policy-making
process (Llanos, 2002: 81).
Menem’s political party’s strongest ally was the working class and labor unions
and, ironically, Menem’s shift in policies later on proved to be detrimental to these allies.
After Menem began his dramatic reforms, the labor union movement went through
radical transformations and split up into three different factions. One faction was the
conservative Workers’ Confederation (Confederación General del Trabajo, CGT), the
group which was most closely aligned with Peronist interests. This faction believed that

Justicialistas’s (the Peronist party) policies best fulfilled the interests of the unions,
despite the Justicialistas’s newly adopted neo-liberal stance. The second faction, the
Argentine Workers’ Movement (Movimiento de Trabajadores Argentinos, MTA),
protested the CGT’s stance. MTA made considerable progress in radicalizing the labor
movement regarding the neo-liberal restructuring of labor markets, but they attempted to
do so within a unified workers’ movement. As such, MTA remains more closely aligned
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with traditional Peronism than the third faction, the Central Association of Argentine
Workers (Central de los Trabajadores Argentinos, CTA). CGT and MTA are considered
umbrella groups whereas CTA mostly consists of dissident unions, unemployed people,
and individual members (Loftus and McDonald, 2001).
Labor leaders were consulted by the state government, but many suspect that the
consultation was done only to ensure the unions’ cooperation with government policies
(Loftus and McDonald, 2001). Essentially, Menem’s administration transformed the
traditionally sour relationship between Peronism and domestic capital interests into a new
pact for profit (Loftus and McDonald, 2001; Manzetti, 1999).

Many labor leaders

flocked to the new alliance. As unemployment rates increased to 15% in the latter part of
the 1990s, the labor union movement realized new ways to survive by joining the
alliance. The labor movement, for the most part, found a new niche by raising money in
private financial markets instead of committing themselves to protesting the
government’s broad economic reform agenda (Loftus and McDonald, 2001). One of the
money-raising opportunities was directly linked to privatization – Program for Shared
Ownership (Programma de Propiedad Participada, PPP) that granted employees a 10%
share in the newly privatized industries; the shares were administered by the unions. All
in all, the labor movement reform dramatically altered the movement’s mission and
priorities and has led to a much smaller membership (Loftus and McDonald, 2001).
By 2001, the official unemployment rate was 15%, but after factoring in the rural
laborers who are not covered by the social security system, the urban informal sector, and
those who stopped looking for work, the figure came to over 40%. The official figure
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recognized by the government has not gone below 13% since 1995, the time when
Menem’s reforms became effective. In 1999, the economy declined by 3.2% and growth
figures for 2000 were a mere 1.5% (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 182).

The Privatization of the Water and Sanitation Services
In August 1989, Menem’s administration issued the National Administrative
Reform Law (law number 23, 696, decree 1105/1989), very soon after he entered office.
The law declared a state of emergency concerning the provision of public services. The
law permitted the “…partial or total privatization or liquidation of companies,
corporations, establishments, or productive properties totally or partially owned by the
state, including as a prior requirement that they should have been declared subject to
privatization by the Executive Branch, approval for which should in all cases be provided
by a Congressional Law” (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 183; Ministerio de Economía y

Producción, 2005a: 1).
Echoing the neo-liberal credo, the preamble of the National Administrative
Reform Law stated that the privatization process would stimulate production in the
Argentinean economy as the presence of private capital in public services would make
resources available that the state was unable to provide at that time (Llanos, 2002). This
decree gave Menem broad power to privatize the Buenos Aires water and sewerage
national company, OSN, without a public hearing. Menem claimed the reform was
exigent. Other presidential decrees followed, namely, law numbers 2074/90, 1443/91,
and 2048/91, which declared that the water privatization would be in the form of a
concession (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 183).
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During this period, almost all of the publicly owned companies were sold or
handed over to the private sector. The dire economic situation in Argentina demonstrated
that the state lacked the resources necessary to execute a social and economic transition
and that state companies were plagued with serious financial problems, including rising
deficits and unpaid debts and obligations. In the Menem administration’s view, the
desperate condition of the state was a good opportunity to try a practical response of
shelving ideologies and prejudices (Llanos, 2002). In doing so, it was believed that
private capital could engage in improving public financial conditions and hence bolster
the state’s economic capabilities (Llanos, 2002).
The 30-year water and sanitation concession contract began in 1993. A year after
it began, the World Bank advertised the contract’s success and zealously promoted
Buenos Aires’s WSS services contract as a model for the rest of the world. The foreign
water companies involved in Buenos Aires quickly followed suit, broadcasting their
success and launched an aggressive campaign to create water services markets around the
world. Beginning in 1994, however, the contract started to reveal problems, far more
than the World Bank’s researchers would have thought, especially when it came to the
rising costs of services to the public and the negative effects on the environment (Loftus
and McDonald, 2001).
The Menem administration’s financial minister, Domingo F. Cavallo, designed
Argentina’s economic restructuring program (Loftus and McDonald, 2001). Cavallo is a
Harvard-trained economist who emulated Milton Friedman and promulgated the
monetarist notions of the Chicago School of Economics. Consequently, he was strongly
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influenced by the Chicago School’s strategies to manage Argentina’s currency, the peso
(Loftus and McDonald, 2001). He adopted the Convertibility Law, which stipulated that:
(1) the Central Bank would not finance the government’s fiscal deficit; (2) the Central
Bank had to back 100% of the monetary base with foreign exchange and gold reserves,
initiating a ‘gold standard’ system; (3) create a new foreign exchange system that would
fix the parity of the US dollar at $1 per Argentine peso; (4) require any new devaluation
to get Congressional approval; and (5) rescind all indexation mechanisms from contracts
because they created the ‘inertial inflation’ effect (Manzetti, 1999: 73). Pegging the peso
to the US dollar was a move that replaced the Austral Plan created under President
Alfonsín (Loftus and McDonald, 2001). The convertibility was also designed to establish
conversion between national and foreign currencies via a federal law. This plan, coupled
with the bilateral agreements that Argentina adopted to promote and protect foreign
investment, set the stage for the privatization of public utilities, like water and sanitation,
with continuous deficit financing (Del Castillo Laborde, 2005).
The Austral plan essentially tried to curb rapidly rising inflation and still maintain
employment and economic activity levels. It froze prices and wages, developed a new
currency (the Austral replaced the peso), and it de-indexed the economy. It sought out
new fiscal measures because of the apparent link between inflation and the imbalance in
public accounts. As a result, deficits were decreased by the adoption of emergency
taxation measures, public expenditure was cut, and the efficiency in the management of
state enterprise was improved (Llanos, 2002). It is important to note that the Alfonsín
administration did attempt to implement a policy of privatization to try to resolve the
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economic crisis. This attempt did not prove successful, however, mostly because of the
limited political and institutional resources and because the presidential leadership was
consumed with the reconstruction of the post-authoritarian regime (Llanos, 2002).
By contrast, under Cavallo the state government was relieved of monetary
control. Under his plan, the Central Bank of Argentina could not distribute new paper
money without having its equivalent in dollar deposits. This plan effectively served as a
counteragent to inflation which decreased from over 3,000% to less than 20% in three
years (Brown, 2003: 263). Cavallo argued that privatization was absolutely necessary to
counter the massive inflation that grew to 4,923.6% in 1989 (Loftus and McDonald,
2001: 183).
Under Cavallo’s leadership, the World Bank and Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB) became heavily involved in Argentina’s water and sanitation industry by
the early 1990s. In 1989, the IADB lent OSN US$90 million (Loftus and McDonald,
2001: 183). As soon as Argentina announced its National Administrative Reform Law,
the World Bank invested in privatization and delegated private sector technical and
financial consultants from the United Kingdom to devise a plan for the future of Buenos
Aires’ water industry. The World Bank suggested and short-listed some water companies
after bids were submitted for the contract.

Next, the government delegated a

privatization committee, made up of representatives of the Ministry for the Economy and
Public Works, the Privatization Board, the Sanitation Workers’ Union of Greater Buenos
Aires (Sindicato Gran Buenos Aires de Trabajadores de Obras Sanitarias, SGBATOS) –
the main water sector union, and OSN (Loftus and McDonald, 2001).
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Once the government had made its decision to privatize the WSS industry, it did
not entertain alternative proposals. Indeed, alternatives within the privatization plan were
discussed, but the discussion was limited to the possibility of dividing the concession area
into competing concessions as recommended by the World Bank.

Essentially, the

privatization committee was formed to discuss how to privatize and not whether or not to
privatize. Almost no information about the privatization plan was released to the public.
Public input was not welcomed until June 2000, seven years after the contract was signed
and two years after the second five-year plan began (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 183).
Originally, the labor movement was one of the biggest opponents of the first
attempts to privatize in the mid- to late-1980s. They had called 13 general strikes to halt
the reforms. Menem and Cavallo took advantage of the support that their party still had
among labor since Menem had run on a pro-labor platform. Menem and Cavallo decided
to grant union leaders a seat in the privatization discussions to win them over. In
addition, the continued support of the employees who were transferred from OSN was
guaranteed by offering them a 10% share in the privatized companies, as stipulated in the
National Administrative Reform Law, through PPP. Such an offer was essentially a
bribe, because it sought to buy the former OSN employees’ acquiescence (Loftus and
McDonald, 2001). Artana, Navajas, and Urbiztondo (1997: 16), researchers with the
IADB, state, “Allocating 10 per cent of shares to workers through the Program for Shared
Ownership was intended to ‘buy’ the consent of former OSN workers for the concession
and has been a common practice in other privatizations undertaken by the federal
government” (also see Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 183-4).
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Even though the 10% share was guaranteed by law, some workers and union
leaders still felt pressured to cooperate, sometimes against their will, with the PPP to get
their share. Interviews with representatives from SGBATOS indicated that their support
was necessary and in fact when they cooperated, they earned their shares sooner than
those who were in sectors opposed to privatization.

It is evident that the bribing

mechanism worked very well – those in SGBATOS who were strongly opposed to
privatization altered their stance and became active supporters of it. However, in the end,
this process effectively halved union membership through job losses (Loftus and
McDonald, 2001).
In the privatization discussions, union leaders did have veto rights but they never
used them because all of the decisions were made by consensus, even the laying-off of
3,600 workers as a result of privatization (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 184). It is also
important to note that many of the union leaders had links to the Peronists in power and
were thus members of the political élite. As such, union leaders are, for the most part,
very different from union members because of their different interests. Furthermore, the
chief director of the regulator appointed to oversee the concession, the Tripartite Water
and Sanitation Works Entity (Ente Tripartito de Obras y Servicios Sanitarios, ETOSS),
was a former director of OSN. As the new director of ETOSS, he was expected to
regulate his former colleagues from OSN (Loftus and McDonald, 2001), which
undoubtedly presented a conflict of interest. Crampes and Estache (1996) contend that
since ETOSS was employed by former OSN employees, it was likely difficult for the
agency to accept its new and less powerful role in the WSS industry.
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An Environment Conducive to Privatization
The Menem administration successfully convinced the general public that
privatization was the solution to Argentina’s economic woes during the 1980s and early
1990s. Key government ministries argued that privatization was the only way to end the
hyperinflation crisis. In a 1993 document, the Ministry of Economic and Public Works
stated, “…the key to [privatization] was the realization that the economic model that
Argentina followed for decades was exhausted. The hyper-inflation crisis was useful to
make clear that it was impossible to achieve growth and stability on the basis of a
regulated economy closed to the outside world, with a deficit-ridden public sector
operating in many inappropriate areas” (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 184).

Union

leaders, a powerful ally of the new government, for the most part believed that the
privatization of many public services was inevitable and that fighting the program would
prove ineffectual (Loftus and McDonald, 2001). Ironically, the federal government also
argued that the Argentine state had too much power and that ceding some of that power
to the private sector could help ease the country’s many economic woes. Thus, a popular
slogan at the time was, “Shrinking the state strengthens the nation” (Vilas, 2004a: 4).
Despite the economic turmoil, Argentina’s water industry was not plagued by
debt prior to privatization, but it is important to note that the industry was not very
successful either. Indeed, many service and maintenance improvements were desperately
needed.

OSN was afflicted with under-investment as water leakage levels were

unacceptably high – sometimes as much as 40-50% (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 184),
summer water shortages were commonplace, and water pollution was a major issue
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because of the lack of sewage connections and deficient wastewater treatment.
Especially disturbing was that approximately 30-40% of Greater Buenos Aires’s
population did not have access to the water network (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 184).
Hence, Buenos Aires’s water industry was overdue for reform. However, critics of
privatization argue that the public sector could have, and should have, managed the
modernization of the system. Menem’s administration considered only privatization as
an appropriate policy response to the crisis besetting the country and the WSS sector.
Some have even speculated that in the few years leading up to privatization, the water
and sanitation industry’s services were purposely made worse to convince the public that
the public sector could not improve conditions (Loftus and McDonald, 2001).

Awarding of the Concession Contract
As indicated in chapter one, there are many different degrees of private sector
participation in the WSS service industry. The government of Argentina decided on a
concession contract. Electing a concession meant that the government did not have to
sell the utility completely and hence the fixed assets remained under public ownership. If
they had decided on a full divestiture instead, they would have had to sell the utility and
all fixed assets and therefore would have had to surmount a series of legislative hurdles.
In addition, the government was afraid that assessing the value of the underground pipes
would have proved too expensive and time consuming as well (Crampes and Estache,
1996). The government also opted to keep the water and sanitation services together
under one utility. They planned for a single private firm to take over the services for 30
years, which was considered an appropriate time frame to finance and complete the
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required investments in the WSS industry. The government would permit the contract to
be extended for one year, but at the end of term, they would require a new bid to be
organized (Crampes and Estache, 1996).

The main reason why the government of

Argentina opted for privatization in the form of a concession was that it believed that it
would decrease the financial burden on the state for operating services and that it would
reduce the price of water and sanitation services (Crampes and Estache, 1996).
The Argentine government put out the call for concession bids and information by
outlining the pre-qualification criteria and sending them out to likely bidders. Five
companies expressed their interest (Loftus and McDonald, 2001; Del Castillo Laborde,
2005), but only four submitted proposals because the two French companies decided to
offer a joint proposal (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 185). The four consortia which
submitted proposals were AASA, led by Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez of France, which
later changed its name to Suez, and then again to Ondeo; Aguas de Buenos Aires, led by
Thames Water PLC of England; Canal del Plata, led by Isabel II of Spain; and North
West Water International of England (Vilas, 2004a: 17).
There were two stages in the bidding process. First, the companies’ technical
proposals were evaluated and second, their financial proposals were evaluated (Vilas,
2004a; Del Castillo Laborde, 2005).

During the first stage, Canal del Plata was

disqualified because of an “unrealistic investment plan” (Vilas, 2004a: 17), leaving three
bidders in the second stage. In the second stage, the three bidders were evaluated based
on who offered the biggest tariff reductions. AASA won the bid because they offered a
26.9% tariff reduction; the second highest reduction was 26.1% offered by Aguas de
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Buenos Aires and the lowest tariff reduction, 11.5%, was offered by North West Water
(Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 185; Vilas, 2004a: 18; Zéhra, 2001: 2).
At the time the contract was won, the AASA consortium, led by Ondeo, also
consisted of the following companies: Sociedad Comercial del Plata S.A., Sociedad

General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. (AGBAR), Meller S.A., Banco de Galicia y Buenos
Aires S.A., Compagnie Général des Eaux A.A., and Anglican Water PLC. After the
contract was awarded to AASA, the share holdings that each company owned in the
concession changed several times and the companies involved in the concession changed
slightly as well (Vilas, 2004a: 18-9). In addition, the contract itself was renegotiated in
2000, leading to further changes in the shareholdings. After re-negotiation, Sociedad

General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. (AGBAR) did not own any more shareholdings;
Meller Economic Group’s shareholdings decreased from 10.8% to 5.2% and it changed
its shareholding name to Aguas Inversora; and the World Bank’s Corporación

Financiera Internacional joined the concession (Vilas, 2004a; Schneier-Madanes, 2005).
Refer to Table 6 for the share holdings in 1993 and 2000.
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Table 6. AASA’s shareholdings per company in 1993 and 2000
Capital Origin

1993 (%)

2000 (%)

France

25.4

34.7

Argentina

20.7

N/A

Spain

12.6

25

Meller

Argentina

10.8

N/A

Banco Galicia y Buenos Aires

Argentina

8.1

8.3

France

7.9

7.6

United Kingdom

4.5

4.3

Workers

10

10

World Bank

N/A

5

Argentina

N/A

5.2

Investor
Ondeo (Suez; Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez )
Sociedad Comercial del Plata
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona

Compagnie Général des Eaux (Vivendi)
Anglican Water PLC
Programa de Propiedad Participada
Corporación Financiera Internacional
Aguas Inversora*

*Meller Economic Groups
Source: Schneier-Madanes, 2005: 152.
AASA signed its contract with the Argentine government in December 1992;
services were then transferred from the state to AASA on May 1, 1993 (Crampes and
Estache, 1996), permitting it to manage the Buenos Aires water and sewerage network
for the next 30 years, until 2023 (Del Castillo Laborde, 2005: 150).

The contract

stipulated that AASA was to serve Buenos Aires’s federal capital area in downtown, as
well as the 17 surrounding municipalities, an area encompassing 1,200 km2 and
approximately nine to eleven million people (estimates vary) (Del Castillo Laborde,
2005: 150). For a visual representation of the coverage area, refer to Figure 1. Fourteen
municipalities were originally included in the contract, but there was an expansion of the
service area through adding the municipality of Quilmes in 1995 and dividing Morón into
three separate municipalities (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 186); the municipalities of
Hurlingham and Ituzaingó were originally part of Morón before the division (Vilas,
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2004a).

In addition, beginning in 1995, Quilmes bought water in bulk from the

concessionaire (Del Castillo Laborde, 2005).
Figure 1. The coverage area in Greater Buenos Aires served by AASA

Source: Vilas, 2004a: ANEX I.
Out of the nine to 11 million people in the service area, 54% lived below the
poverty line in 1993, corresponding to a monthly income of about US$200 per adult
equivalent. Approximately two million lived in 593 ‘deprived’ neighborhoods (OECD,
2006: 7). About half of the deprived neighborhoods were fully urbanized, meaning they
had low-standard dwellings built in the 1950s. These neighborhoods were referred to as

barrios armados. The other half of the deprived neighborhoods were either classified as
slums (villas miserias), or poor peri-urban neighborhoods (barrios precarios) that stem
from illegal land occupation, or planned settlements for the poor (OECD, 2006: 7).
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It is important to note that AASA’s contract did not cover the entire area served
by OSN nor did AASA embrace all aspects of water management. For example, the
sewerage and rainfall drainage in Buenos Aires City are the same system in old
neighborhoods where the first systems were built between 1870 and 1905 (Del Castillo
Laborde, 2005: 151).

The sewerage and rainfall drainage systems that were built

between 1915 and 1945 were served by different networks than the rest of the city. Right
after AASA’s contract began, the rainfall drainage system was re-assigned from OSN to
City Hall and, as a result, it did not fall under the jurisdiction of AASA (Del Castillo
Laborde, 2005: 151). In addition, the contract did not require AASA to provide services
to the slums (villas miserias) because they were not classified as urbanized. AASA was
also not committed to service the internal networks and end-user delivery in the barrios

armados condominiums either. As a result, AASA’s obligations to the poor residents
were limited to the barrios precarios (OECD, 2006).

Contract Obligations and Pricing Mechanism
AASA’s contract obligations were the following:

•

Uphold standards for water quality, continuity of services, water pressure, and flow

(Zéhra, 2001: 3);

•

Set targets for metering (approximately 1% of connections were metered at the start

of the contract), loss reduction, and network rehabilitation (Zéhra, 2001: 3);

•

Develop sewage treatment plants (Zéhra, 2001: 3);

•

Expand water services from 70% (at start of contract) to 100% by the end of the

contract (Zéhra, 2001: 3);
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•

Expand sewerage services from 58% (at start of contract) to 85% by the end of the

contract (Zéhra, 2001: 3);

•

Fulfill the expansion mandates specified in the five-year periods for each of the four

geographical zones into which the concession was divided (Zéhra, 2001: 3);

•

Comply with a five-yearly review of the tariff regime with re-negotiation permitted

only when unforeseen circumstances occurred outside the control of the concessionaire
(Zéhra, 2001: 3);

•

Negotiate employee contracts with the unions (the workforce had been reduced by

about 1,600 people right before privatization) (Zéhra, 2001: 3) (Vilas [2004a: 15-16],
however, states that a total of 3,600 people were laid off);

•

Invest approximately US$4 billion over the 30-year contract period with a significant

portion, US$1.2 billion, distributed within the first five years (Zéhra, 2001: 3); and

•

Operate and maintain the fixed assets (Crampes and Estache, 1996).
At the time the contract began, there were over 2.5 million people who were not

connected to the piped water network, or about 30-40% of the population (Loftus and
McDonald, 2001: 186). About 95% of the people not connected to the water network
received their water from individual wells with pumps or manual motors. Out of the
population not connected to the sewerage network, about 88% disposed of their
wastewater through septic tanks and cesspools; the remaining 12% dumped their
wastewater directly into rivers and tributaries, or into the ground (Loftus and McDonald,
2001: 186). Dumping sewage directly into the rivers or the ground, combined with those
using poor quality cesspools, and the presence of industrial pollution, made shallow
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ground water aquifers extremely polluted. This presented a major environmental health
risk because those not connected to the piped network relied on these aquifers for
drinking water (Loftus and McDonald, 2001).
Table 7 outlines the performance targets and obligations of the concessionaire
during the 30-year period. The numbers in Table 7 vary slightly across different sources.
At year 0 of the concession, the population with sewerage coverage ranges from 56 to
58% and between 90 and 95% for year 30 (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 189; Alcázar,
Abdala, and Shirley, 2002: 25; Vilas, 2004a: 13). Table 8 outlines AASA’s investment
plan and the five-year terms’ goals.
Table 7. Performance targets for the 30-year concession
Year of
Concession
0
5
10
20
30

Population Coverage
(%)

Sewerage Treatment
(%)

Water

Sewerage

Primary

70
81
90
97
100

58
64
73
82
90

4
64
73
88
93

Network Renovation
Unaccounted
(cumulative) (%)
for Water (%)
Secondary Water Sewerage

Source: Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley, 2002: 80.
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4
7
14
88
93

0
9
12
28
45

0
2
3
4
5

45
37
34
28
25

Table 8. AASA’s investment plan and five-year terms’ goals
Five Year Periods
First

Second

Fifth

Sixth

Total

Number of Water Treatment
Plants

37

29

20

6

10

0

102

Number of Lifting Stations
and Underground Rivers

109

48

58

7

9

0

231

Number of Water Networks

327

246

172

193

136

127

1,201

Number of Sewerage Networks

206

258

315

239

133

129

1,280

Number of Sewer Mains and
Pumping Stations

100

16

5

24

39

1

185

Number of Treatment Plants
for Sewerage and Wastewater

244

101

369

86

130

6

936

Total (US$ in millions)

1,023

698

939

555

457

263

3,935

Total (%)

25.9

17.7

23.8

14.1

11.6

6.9

100.0

Source: Vilas, 2004a: 12.
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Third Fourth

The service pricing was to be set by general tariff principles outlined earlier on
page 60 and was of a mixed type. The pricing would continue to incorporate the crosssubsidies employed under OSN, but only for retired persons and non-profit or religious
organizations (Crampes and Estache, 1996; Vilas, 2004a). During privatization, prices
for services were supposed to match the economic cost of each service (Vilas, 2004a). In
addition, AASA was to oversee the negotiation of private labor contracts with the labor
unions, since the workers were no longer employed by the state (Crampes and Estache,
1996).
AASA divided consumers into three categories: residential, non-residential, and
urban wasteland. The residential consumers were permitted to choose between metered
and unmetered service and the concessionaire was also permitted to make the option.
Metered service was required for non-residential consumers, bulk consumers, and
selected others. The metered customers from any of the three categories were to pay a
minimum fixed amount of 50% of the unmetered rate and the effective consumption
above the free-of-charge bi-monthly consumption accepted for each customer category
(Vilas, 2004a: 14).
The consumption rates were compounded by infrastructural and connection
charges. The infrastructural charges funded the water and sewerage network expansion
and the connection charges funded any new or renewed connections. AASA’s rate
system depended on the tariffs paid by new customers to fund the expansion of the
networks. Since most of the residents without piped connections were poor, however,
AASA’s system had a regressive effect and was also a source of social tensions (Vilas,
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2004a). The tariff calculation remained the same as OSN’s system where rates were
calculated as K * Z * TG * (SC * E) + (ST/10), where K was the coefficient reflecting
operating costs, Z was the customer’s geographic location, TG was the general tariff
level, E was the age and physical qualities of the structure, SC was the total surface area
of the enclosed structure where service was provided, and ST was the total surface area of
the land occupied by the customer. When privatization began, K equaled 1 (Vilas,
2004a: 8, 14).
AASA’s rate system went through two tariff revisions. One revision entailed
standard revisions based on shifts in goals in the investments of the Service Improvement
and Expansion Plan (Plan de Mejoras y Expansión de los Servicios, PMES). PMES was
developed to ensure the maintenance, improvement, and expansion of services and
infrastructure in the entire area covered by the contract (Vilas, 2004a). The revisions
were to be analyzed at the end of every five-year period, beginning with the second
period. The contract stipulated that in the case of the second five-year plan, starting at
the concession’s sixth year, the standard revision would only be allowed to introduce
reductions in tariffs. As such, the consumption prices were not supposed to be raised
during the first 10 years of the contract – i.e., not until May 2003. Furthermore, any
decision to increase standard revisions was to be based on detailed financial analyses of
required changes in investment goals or necessary capital. Most importantly, revisions
were not permitted if the concessionaire did not meet all of the service improvements and
expansion targets (Vilas, 2004a).
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However, major rate revisions, based on changing operating costs, were permitted
after the first five years. The first price review was set to take place after five years, after
the end of the first five-year term. At that time, there was a possibility that the rules
could be renegotiated in the event of unforeseen circumstances, or if new information
became available. However, any change would still have to abide by the decreased tariff
rate proposed by the winning bidder (i.e., display consistency between the timing of costs
and the evolution of tariffs and could only be revised for exceptional reasons if the
concessionaire fulfilled its goals) (Vilas, 2004a; Crampes and Estache, 1996). While
developing a business plan, technical consultants reviewed over 25 possible investment
scenarios that included performance goals that AASA could fulfill while still earning a
reasonable return on investment. For example, any population growth and/or increasing
water and sanitation service demands that were not accounted for were some of the
variables subject to analysis (Vilas, 2004a).

The Concessionaire’s Regulator, ETOSS
The government set up an independent regulatory agency, ETOSS, to regulate the
consortium by monitoring the quality of service, representing consumers, holding the
consortium to its contract obligations, and ensuring the contract was implemented fairly
(Loftus and McDonald, 2001; Zérah, 2001; Mehta and Cour Madsen, 2005).

The

members of its board of directors were appointed from the following levels: the
municipal level, by the mayor of Buenos Aires; the provincial level, by the governor of
the province; and at the national level, by the President. ETOSS had an annual budget of
US$8 million, funded almost entirely from the universal 2.7% surcharge on all water bills
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(Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 187; Zérah, 2001: 2). The agency had a staff of about 110
people, an increase from the original 70 employees.

Most of them were formerly

employed by OSN (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 187).
ETOSS has faced many criticisms from different parties. For example, some
believed that the agency’s members were appointed by AASA. There is evidence that the
agency was co-opted and bribed by the private sector thus it is believed that key
contractual obligations and failures were ignored to meet the contract agreements (Loftus
and McDonald, 2001).

As a result, some of the critics contend that ETOSS was

powerless in regulating AASA, a belief that was underscored by the fact that ETOSS was
not involved in the contract re-negotiation (Mehta and Cour Madsen, 2005).
On the other hand, interviews with AASA employees revealed that they felt
ETOSS had been too strict on them. For the most part, AASA regarded ETOSS as more
of a hindrance to its operations and service delivery than a critical part of the water
industry. One interviewee from AASA commented that s/he believed that ETOSS’s
employees were especially harsh because they felt that they had been sidelined by being
sent to work for ETOSS instead of AASA (Loftus and McDonald, 2001).
It is important to note that the poor relationship between ETOSS and AASA was
exacerbated by the government which demonstrated a severe lack of respect for ETOSS.
Any of ETOSS’s decisions that were seen as threatening to the dominance of private
capital were often vetoed by the state government. For example, the government revised
the consortium’s contract in 1997 by considerably watering down AASA’s obligations
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and yet ETOSS, as the regulator, was not permitted to be part of the re-negotiation
(Loftus and McDonald, 2001).
ETOSS was also criticized by the World Bank. Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley
(2002), researchers with the World Bank, claimed that ETOSS was too political. They
argued that ETOSS typically delayed decisions since a consensus had to be reached
amongst the differing interests of the six-member board. Decisions were often not made
by deadlines and there were usually disagreements, even between two representatives
from the same level of government (Loftus and McDonald, 2001). Another criticism was
that ETOSS’ employees needed to garner the proper skills for the organization to be an
effective regulator and that when they did not have the appropriate skills for a task, they
should have consulted international experts (Crampes and Estache, 1996).

Results of the Contract
The privatization of the WSS services did indeed bring improvements to drinking
water service provision, although there was not nearly as much improvement in sanitation
services.

Despite the improvements, however, there were failures in terms of the

fulfillment of contract obligations, especially regarding water treatment and related
environmental issues (Vilas, 2004a; OECD, 2006).

In addition, contract goals were

often not met on time, if at all. AASA’s performance record is better in terms of
investments in network renewal, rehabilitation, and maintenance.

The performance

record of investment and expansion goals, however, is not very good (Vilas, 2004a).
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The following are AASA’s key achievements during the first 10 years of the
contract, in terms of water and sanitation services:

•

The capacity of the San Martín drinking and Belgrano water purification plants were

updated and expanded to process 3 million m3 and 1.5 million m3 of crude water,
respectively, daily (Vilas, 2004a: 6, 25). As of 1998, the capacity for the San Martín
plant was increased by about 29% and by about 61% for the Belgrano plant (IADB, 1998:
51). Also as of 1998, the total water supply production increased by 38% from 3.55
million m3 per day to 4.91 million m3 per day (IADB, 1998: 51);

•

A 15 km-long underground river was constructed to carry water to approximately 1.5

million inhabitants in the western municipalities;

•

Four new pumping stations were constructed in the southern and western

municipalities;

•

A 40% enlargement of and technical upgrading to the Southwest Sewage Purification

Plant;

•

Construction of the first phase of the San Fernando Purification Plant;

•

Construction of the new transforming station in the Wilde Purification Plant;

•

Construction of 25 lifting stations for sewage collection (Vilas, 2004a: 25);

•

Water supply coverage increased from 70% in 1993 to 87% in 2001 (OECD, 2006: 8)

•

2,700 additional kilometers of water network pipes were added (OECD, 2006: 9);

•

Sewerage coverage increased from 58% in 1993 to 64% in 2000 (OECD, 2006: 9);

and

•

1,270 additional kilometers of sewerage pipes were added (OECD, 2006: 9).
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In addition, Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2001) found that there were
strong improvements in service extensions after the privatization of the WSS services.
The efficiency and output of services improved and child mortality rates dropped because
of the increased access to clean water.

Di Tella, Galiani, Gonzalez-Rozada, and

Schargrodsky (2006) contend that the concession increased efficiency and profitability in
Buenos Aires’ water industry. They also point out that AASA significantly raised its
investments, resulting in 1.5 million new water network connections and 580,000 new
sewerage connections by 1998 (Di Tella, Galiani, Gonzalez-Rozada, and Schargrodsky,
2006: 5). By 1998, therefore, 78% of the population had access to the piped water
network and 61% had access to sewerage services (Del Castillo Laborde, 2005: 163).
Additionally, in comparison to the counterfactual without privatization, the total
welfare in Buenos Aires rose by US$1.7 billion; 80% of the increase went to consumers
(Di Tella, Galiani, Gonzalez-Rozada, and Schargrodsky, 2006: 5). At the same time,
however, the public popularity of the concession declined from 36% in 1993 to 18% by
1997 and negative opinions rose from 33% to 52% during the same time period (Di Tella,
Galiani, Gonzalez-Rozada, and Schargrodsky, 2006: 5). However, public opinion poll
values vary slightly. Table 9 demonstrates how positive public opinion of privatization
declined from 1988 to 1997; over the same time period, negative opinions increased
(Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley, 2002).
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Table 9. Changing public opinion of privatization in Greater Buenos Aires
Opinion
Positive (1)
Neutral
Negative (2)
No Opinion
(1)/(2)

1988
25.5
20.6
38.6
15.4
0.7

1989
59.4
15.9
16.4
8.4
3.6

1990
38.3
24.4
34.4
3.0
1.1

1991
39.0
26.5
29.3
5.3
1.3

1992
26.4
25.0
43.6
5.0
0.6

1993
36.4
25.6
33.3
4.7
1.1

1994
29.9
29.2
36.2
4.7
0.8

1995
24.3
31.6
42.7
1.4
0.6

1996
16.7
27.7
52.2
3.4
0.3

1997
18.1
26.9
51.9
3.1
0.3

Source: Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley, 2002: 72.
As of 2004, there was a 9,350 km-long network for sewage collection and two
purifying plants for pre- and primary treatment, processing approximately 80,000 million
m3 of sewage per year (Vilas, 2004a: 25). Despite these improvements, however, the
sewerage structure of the whole concession essentially stayed the same. The sewage
effluents from over five million residents were still being dumped directly into the River
Plate in the area of the Berazategui municipality, which has only a basic preliminary
purification plant, the Wilde plant (Vilas, 2004a).
In terms of the unfulfilled contract obligations for sanitation, there was an
imbalance between providing water services and sanitation services.

Water supply

services were favored over sanitation services because providing water supply is less
expensive than providing sanitation services. However, it is important to note that AASA
was not solely responsible.

There was an imbalance between water and sanitation

services before privatization began. Yet, the redefined contract goals and increasing
tariff levels did not do much to address the imbalance (Vilas, 2004a).
It is evident that AASA favored the expansion of water services over sanitation
services. Not only is supplying water more of a pressing issue, but it is also less
expensive than providing sanitation services. Some scholars argue that the expense is
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why water supply is favored over sanitation services. As a result of this bias, there was a
lower cost/benefit ratio, leading to tension between collective and public goods (e.g.,
public health and the environment) and market and entrepreneurial goods (i.e., profit rate)
(Vilas, 2004a). ETOSS issued many sanctions and fines to AASA for unfulfilled goals.
The consortium’s failures were partially a result of the federal government’s tolerance of
AASA’s persistent requests for contract revisions, goal re-definitions, and tariff increases
(Vilas, 2004a).
AASA’s record for serving the poorer residents of Buenos Aires is particularly
unsatisfactory. Between 1993 and 1998, no more than 400,000 poor residents were
connected to the water network, fulfilling less than 20% of the contract goal (OECD,
2006: 8). Furthermore, service expansion was much worse for sanitation services: only
about 100,000 new connections were established in the poor neighborhoods, far short of
the 2.3 million required by contract (OECD, 2006: 8). A report by the OECD (2006)
contends that it is clear that AASA dedicated the majority of its efforts and resources to
the wealthier municipalities.
Delfino and Casarin (2001: 9) found that water and sanitation service prices
increased by 11% directly after privatization. They also determined that, by 2001, only
69% of the poorer families benefited from the privatized services whereas 89% of the
wealthy benefited. The poorer households had to devote an average of 2.7% of their
income to the services, whereas the wealthy had to devote only 0.5% (Mulreany,
Calikoglu, Ruiz, and Sapsin, 2006: 25). Mulreany, Calikoglu, Ruiz, and Sapsin (2006)
found that in 1997, the piped water network reached 76% of the residences in Greater
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Buenos Aires. They also found that only 55% of residences declared expenditures for
water.

The difference between these two numbers means it is possible that some

households may have been abstaining from the water supply or getting water illegally. It
is uncertain if households can for certain claim to have access to the piped water network
and hence weakens the claim that privatization effectively increases access for all
members of a community (Mulreany, Calikoglu, Ruiz, and Sapsin, 2006: 27).
In addition, the government labor force was reduced as a result of privatization.
OSN was overstaffed, like many other state agencies in Argentina, having employed
approximately eight to nine people for every 1,000 WSS connections (Vilas, 2004a: 15).
In the initial plans, 7,600 people were supposed to be re-assigned to the concessionaire.
The World Bank and privatization consultants, however, claimed that half of that number
would have been enough for efficient operation. As a result, many workers were laid off.
Out of the 7,600 employees, about 1,600 accepted voluntary early retirement; the federal
government funded a US$40 million severance package for these workers. An additional
2,000 employees were laid off as part of a similar voluntary retirement program that was
funded by US$50 million AASA severance package.

Finally, approximately 70

employees were re-assigned to ETOSS. Overall, as a result of the changes, the number of
employees was reduced by about 50% to fewer than 4,000 (Vilas, 2004a: 16).
Crampes and Estache (1996) also contend that, despite what Vilas (2004a and
2004b) and Loftus and McDonald (2001) claim, as of 1996, the maintenance system was
renovated and the backlog of repairs dramatically decreased.

Also as of 1996, the

renovation resulted in decreasing the water losses from 40% to 25%, thereby allowing
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coverage to increase by 10% without increasing production (1996: 2). They also note
that service coverage had increased by 8% and that the prices for services were initially
decreased by 27% and that although prices increased in 1995, the prices were still 17%
lower than the rates charged by OSN (1996: 2). They also cite that while almost 3,600
people were laid off from OSN, labor productivity had almost tripled by 1996.
However, it is important to note that Crampes and Estache (1996) do not take into
account the fact that prices had increased dramatically directly prior to privatization.
Vilas (2004b) claims that the prices for services were artificially increased for the two
years prior to privatization to make the contract more attractive to potential bidders.
Some critics of the contract even contend that the fact that there were very few bidders –
five in the first stage – and the consequent ranking of bids is evidence that there was
coordination between the bidders. Another claim is that there was predatory pricing from
the very beginning and that the bidders and government agreed that the contract would be
renegotiated at a later date (Vilas, 2004b). In addition, while prices may have gone down
at first, they increased after 1996.

Contract Re-negotiations
The contract specifically stated that service rates could not be revised to minimize
entrepreneurial risk for the concessionaire. Furthermore, the contract would not provide
compensation for any losses from a lack of foresight, inefficiency, or negligence on the
part of AASA (Vilas, 2004b). Despite these stipulations, however, eight months after the
contract begun, AASA requested a contract revision due to unforeseen operating costs.
ETOSS decided to admit the petition. It made a deal that required AASA to expand
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services sooner than the contract originally stipulated and in return, AASA could raise the
general service rate by 13.5% (Vilas, 2004b: 36). As a result, the basic connection fees
for water increased by 83.7%, by 42% for sanitation services, and other charges rose
between 38% and 45% (Vilas, 2004b: 36).
Part of the increases in service rates were due to the introduction of a substantial
infrastructure charge – which eventually helped prompt public unrest and the contract’s
early termination. The high connection fee was too expensive for the poorest residents,
and even after it was replaced by a bimonthly fee to be absorbed by all customers
regardless of when they were connected to the service, it is evident that it was still too
expensive for the poor. Specifically, the connection fees were cut from the US$208-297
fee for water and the US$284-319 fee for sewerage (Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley, 2002:
85) to US$120 for water or sanitation (a connection fee was charged for both separately).
AASA allowed the connection fees to be paid over five years, interest-free, for an
average of US$4 per month (OECD, 2006: 9; Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley, 2002: 87).
The average bill for residents in poorer areas was decreased by about 74%, from US$61
to US$16, yet it is evident that the bills were still not affordable for the poor (OECD,
2006: 9).
The re-negotiation allowed AASA to make a large profit during the second
contract year, after having registered deficits in the first year. In the second year, it
collected US$350 million, US$50 million of which represented a net profit (Vilas, 2004b:
36). ETOSS claimed that AASA had not fulfilled its end of the bargain as services and
investments had not been expanded as required by the new contract. For example, within
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the first three years of the contract, AASA’s investments were only 45% of the amount
required by contract (Vilas, 2004b: 36). While contract obligations were by and large not
fulfilled, the price of services increased.

Table 10 provides a comparison of the

bimonthly charges for services before and after the contract re-negotiation that was
passed in August 1997.
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Table 10. Comparison of average bimonthly charges, in Argentine pesos, before and
after the contract re-negotiation passed in August 1997
Before Contract
After Contract
Average Charges for Already Connected
Renegotiation (before Renegotiation (after
Residential Customers
1997)
1997)
Water and Sewerage Services

30.00

30.00

Regulatory Fee (2.67%)

0.80

0.80

Universal Service and Environmental
Improvement (SUMA) Charge

N/A

6.00

Value Added Tax (VAT) (21%)

5.46

7.72

Total

37.26

44.52

After Contract
Before Contract
Renegotiation (before Renegotiation (after
1997)
1997)

Average Charge for a New Customer
(Water Only)
Water Services

6.00

6.00

Regulatory Fee (2.67%)

0.16

0.16

SUMA Charge

N/A

3.00

Created a Connection Charge (CIS) Charge

N/A

4.00

Infrastructure Charge

44.00*

N/A

VAT (21%)

10.53

2.76

Total

60.69

15.92

*Average monthly payment for the first two years.
Source: Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley, 2002: 88.
According to the concession contract, by the end of the second five-year period,
8.3 million people were supposed to have had access to drinking water and 6.9 million to
sanitation services (Vilas, 2004a: 26). According to Vilas (2004a), the concessionaire
fell short of its obligations: about 7.4 million had access to water, falling 11% short of the
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obligations and slightly less than 5 million had access to sanitation services, 14.5% short
of the goals. That means that about 900,000 people who were supposed to have had
access to the piped water network and about one million who were supposed to have had
access to the sewerage services by 2003 still had no services (Vilas, 2004a: 26). By the
end of the second five-year period, the unfulfilled obligations affected over 6.1 million
people with regards to primary treatment of wastewater, which was a serious threat to
public health (Vilas, 2004a: 27). The investment deficit at that time was about US$280
million at the 2003 exchange rate (Vilas, 2004a: 27).

However, despite these

shortcomings, Table 11 demonstrates the response time for water and sewerage service
complaints decreased substantially after privatization.
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Table 11. Service indicators for the Buenos Aires water system before and during the
contract

Before Concession
(1992)
Water Complaints (number)
43,800
Response Time (hour)
144
Sewage Complaints (number)
99,400
Response Time (hour)
240
Customers with Pressure Greater
17b
than 8 wcm in Greater Buenos Airesa
(%)
a
wcm = water column meters where 10 wcm = 1 atmosphere.
b

c

During Concession
(1995)
143,739
48
164,911
30
54c

May 1993.

April 1996.

Source: Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley, 2002: 94.
Other contract re-negotiations followed. The next one was the 1997-1999 renegotiation (Vilas, 2004b). The Argentine government permitted further rate adjustments
that translated into a higher price for services. The rate adjustments were based on an
average of US prices that were fixed by the Producer Price Index of Industrial
Commodities and the Consumer Price Index of Water and Sewage Maintenance (Vilas,
2004b).

This new arrangement violated the Convertibility Law which specifically

outlawed this kind of arrangement, yet the Argentine government permitted it anyway. It
is important to note that Argentina had lower inflation rates than the US but, in order to
bring in larger profits, AASA imported US inflation rates (Vilas, 2004b).
It is also important to note that the re-negotiations allowed for reduced expansion
obligations, which had the highest negative impact on poor residents since many of them
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were excluded from services in the first place (OECD, 2006). By the time the contract
ended, only 25% of the poor neighborhoods in the service area had access to the water
network (OECD, 2006: 10). The OECD (2006) report states that neither ETOSS nor
AASA had a pragmatic plan for how to service the peri-urban areas when the contract
began.
Menem’s second term in office ended in December 1999. Two weeks prior to
leaving office, Menem pardoned AASA’s US$10 million in fines levied by ETOSS
(Vilas, 2004b: 37). In addition, the government permitted the construction of a large
wastewater treatment plant and decreed that a major sewerage project could be
postponed. This project was one of AASA’s most important obligations and it was
supposed to be built during the first five years of the contract (Vilas, 2004b).
Another adjustment to the contract was made in January 2001.

AASA was

permitted to impose an annual cumulative incremental rate increase of 3.9% until 2003,
even though it had been suspended in the final year, awaiting contract re-negotiation
(Vilas, 2004b: 37). In return for the rate increase, AASA agreed to meet its expansion
obligations that it had promised in the 1997 re-negotiation. Surprisingly, the Argentine
government did not penalize AASA for repeatedly breaching its contract and allowed
further rate increases, even after Menem left office and Fernando de la Rúa became the
new president (Vilas, 2004b).
Under the de la Rúa administration, AASA continued to delay on fulfilling its
obligations. It was not until the regulatory environment changed under the newly elected
Nestor Kirchner administration, in mid-2003, that AASA began to meet its goals. Critics
105

argue that AASA’s strategy was to increase rates before making investments so that it
could reduce risk. However, others argue that AASA’s contract shortcomings, such as
poor water pressure and purity and unmet deadlines, notwithstanding increased service
rates, is evidence that it had misappropriated funds (Vilas, 2004b).
Tables 12 and 13 demonstrate how AASA’s record was much better in the
wealthier municipalities of Buenos Aires. Table 12 refers to the population figures on
access to water and sewerage services, according to municipality and Table 13 shows a
comparison of access to water and sanitation services and poverty levels, according to
municipality.
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Table 12. The population served with water and sewerage services by the 10th year of the
concession (the end of 2002)

Municipalities

Total Population

Buenos Aires City
Suburban Northern Zone

2,725,094
1,412,990
272,050
289,872
300,385
149,994
400,689
2,219,769
305,676
171,388
156,284
1,251,547
334,874
2,754,745
327,589
451,042
587,760
512,508
243,477
116,001
516,368
9,112,598

Vicente López
San Isidro
Tigre
San Fernando
San Martín
Suburban Western Zone
Morón
Hurlingham
Ituzaingó
La Matanza
Tres de Febrero
Suburban Southern Zone
Avellaneda
Lanús
Lomas de Zamora
Almirante Brown
Esteban Echeverría
Ezeiza
Quilmes
Total Concessioned Area

Source: Vilas, 2004a: 27.
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Water
Sewage
Population
Population
Served by
%
Served by
2003
2003
2,722,035
99.89 2,630,488
1,254,696
88.80
708,282
271,679
99.86
258,645
284,184
98.04
185,747
174,810
58.20
22,096
144,523
96.35
64,408
379,500
94.71
177,386
1,255,685
55.57
885,614
226,381
74.06
130,704
55,368
32.31
5,238
12,925
8.27
346
670,080
53.54
493,577
290,391
86.88
255,749
2,169,423
78.75
771,392
325,855
99.47
184,263
447,361
99.18
116,797
557,370
94.83
127,977
233,342
45.53
69,183
86,411
35.49
19,639
11,054
9.53
3,383
508,030
98.39
250,150
7,401,839
81.23 4,995,776

%
96.53
50.13
95.07
64.08
7.36
42.94
44.27
39.90
42.76
3.06
0.22
39.44
76.37
28.00
56.25
25.89
21.77
13.50
8.07
2.92
48.44
54.82

Table 13.

Access to drinking water and sewerage services and poverty rates by

municipality in 2001
Access to Water Access to Sewerage
Poverty (%) (in
Services (%) (in Services (%) (in
2001)
2001)
2001)
99.89
96.53
7.80
Buenos Aires City
88.80
50.13
12.30
Northern Zone
Vicente López
99.86
95.07
4.80
San Isidro
98.04
64.08
8.30
Tigre
58.20
7.36
20.30
San Fernando
96.35
42.94
16.10
San Martín
94.71
44.27
13.00
56.57
39.90
15.40
Western Zone
Morón
74.06
42.76
7.70
Hurlingham
32.31
3.06
12.60
Ituzaingó
8.27
0.22
10.80
La Matanza
53.54
39.44
20.00
Tres de Febrero
86.88
76.37
8.70
78.75
28.00
16.70
Southern Zone
Avellaneda
99.47
66.25
10.70
Lanús
99.18
25.89
11.70
Lomas de Zamora
94.83
21.77
17.20
Almirante Brown
45.53
13.50
19.30
Esteban Echeverría
35.49
8.07
20.40
Ezeiza
9.53
2.92
26.10
Quilmes
98.39
48.44
17.60
Municipalities

Note: numbers in bold are average access rates.
Source: Vilas, 2004a: 29.
While AASA increased its service rates multiple times, it also received loans from
the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the European Investment
Bank.

AASA’s loans increased more than four-fold between December 1994 and

December 2000 from US$128.4 million to US$561.8 million (Vilas, 2004b: 38). The
World Bank’s IFC alone loaned the concessionaire US$911 million between 1993 and
1997 (Vilas, 2004b: 38). Critics of AASA’s execution of the contract contend that the
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large inflow of financial resources is evidence that its contract failures are not a result of
a lack of capital. They insist that AASA must have wasted its revenue on objectives that
did not help it fulfill its obligations (Vilas, 2004b).
When it was forced to fulfill its contractual obligations, AASA opted instead to
indebt itself to the international market and therefore avoid the higher interest rates in the
Argentine market. In doing so, AASA did not have to give up its own capital to pay for
the financial excesses of the concession, but it also made AASA vulnerable after an
economic crisis occurred in Argentina at the end of 2001. The crisis prompted the
Argentine government to rescind the Convertibility Law and devalue the peso in early
2002. Hence, after reaping a large profit margin between 1994 and part of 2002 (there
was a deficit in the first year), by April 2002, AASA was plagued with a debt of US$700
million (Vilas, 2004b: 38; Olleta, 2007: 11). Table 14 is a summary table that outlines
the contract obligations that were not fulfilled by AASA by the end of the second fiveyear period (by the end of 2002).
Table 14. Contract obligations not fulfilled by AASA
Required by Contract

Amount Fulfilled (by
the end of 2002)

Service (Population with Access to
Water Services)

88%

79%

Service (Population with Access to
Sewerage Services)

74%

63%

Primary Wastewater Treatment

74%

7%

US$2.2 million

US$1.3 million

Investment

Source: Vilas, 2004b: 39.
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Despite falling short of its contractual obligations, AASA still brought in millions
of dollars in profits. Table 15 shows figures for AASA’s net billing, operating costs, and
resulting operating surplus from 1993 to 2002 (not including the loans AASA took out
from the World Bank and European Investment Bank). The numbers reported are in
thousands of pesos and have also been converted to US dollars (in parentheses); the
exchange rate assumes 2002 Argentine pesos. Opponents of privatization criticize AASA
for not fulfilling obligations while it was busy realizing such a large profit margin (Vilas,
2004a).
Table 15. AASA’s Statement of Performance, 1993 (year 1) to 2002 (year 10)
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Net Billing (pesos)

260,270,000
(US$262.4
million)

332,415,000 374,663,000 393,041,000 726,802,000 515,976,000 534,163,000 579,602,000 601,617,000 612,426,000
(US$377.7 (US$396.2 (US$732.7 (US$520.1 (US$538.5 (US$584.3 (US$606.5 (US$617.4
(US$335.1
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)

Operating Costs (pesos)

263,575,000
(US$265.7
million)

243,218,000 246,910,000 245,116,000 475,102,000 314,668,000 291,395,000 309,819,000 371,293,000 405,267,000
(US$248.9 (US$247.1 (US$478.9 (US$317.2 (US$293.7 (US$312.3 (US$374.3 (US$408.5
(US$245.2
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)

Operating Surplus (pesos)

-3,305,000
(US$-3.3
million)

89,197,000
(US$89.9
million)

127,753,000 147,925,000 251,700,000 201,308,000 242,768,000 269,783,000 230,324,000 207,159,000
(US$128.8 (US$149.1 (US$253.7 (US$202.9 (US$244.7
(US$272
(US$232.2 (US$208.8
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)
million)

Source: Vilas, 2004a: 33.
While some claim that the WSS service privatization was successful as a whole,
others cite it as an example of a clear failure (Prasad, 2006b). For example, Loftus and
McDonald (2001) claim that the argument that privatization has helped decrease poverty
in Buenos Aires is at best misleading because despite some significant increases in the
expansion of services, the consequences of the concession have been felt most by the
poorest citizens. It is clear that the relationship between the concessionaire and the
Argentine government made a turn for the worst, since the government cancelled the
contract in March 2006. Some claim that the project was an utter failure from the
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beginning, while others claim that the political and economic conditions at the time were
not conducive to the success of the contract.

The Buenos Aires’ Citizens’ Role
There were social conflicts over the WSS service rates and various additional
charges, which stimulated user and resident involvement in the regulation and even in the
service provision. According to Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU),
the participation of community organizations in Buenos Aires helped terminate the
contract almost 20 years early (Corral, 2007).
In 1994, obligatory user representation was added to the national constitution, but
some regulatory agencies, including ETOSS, ignored the law or fiercely resisted it. In
December 1998, the First Hearing on Water occurred, which was a watershed moment
that represented the important change in the concession’s regulation and in privatized
utility services in general (Scheier-Madanes, 2005). As a result of the social conflict over
service rates and charges, two important and converging developments occurred: (1) civil
society organizations, non-governmental organizations, and local governments actively
involved themselves and gained increasing power and importance and (2) service users
gained increasing, but gradual, recognition by the government and regulators (ScheierMadanes, 2005).
There was a major conflict over the newly introduced infrastructure and
connection charge (CIC). The charge was in the range of US$400 to US$600 for new
water connections and US$1,000 for new sewerage connections in addition to a
connection fee, which had to be paid in anticipation of future labor costs (Scheier111

Madanes, 2005: 160-1). A law passed in 1943 requires a mandatory connection to the
water and sewerage networks for all residents residing within the networked areas
(Scheier-Madanes, 2005; Zérah, 2001). The residents falling into the lowest income
groups were often unable to pay the CIC, however, and as a result, many of them did not
pay their bills. In addition, many of the poor residents felt it was unnecessary to connect
to the network since most of them satisfied their water needs with groundwater and had
already invested in drilling for water (Scheier-Madanes, 2005).
The CIC and law requiring residents to connect to the network stimulated
neighborhood protests, starting in 1995. The protests primarily began in the western and
southern industrial municipalities of La Matanza and Lomas de Zamora, two of the
lowest income areas. The residents compared the higher service rates charged by AASA
with that of the Work for Third Parties (Obras por Cuenta de Terceros, OPCT) system’s
rates. The OPCT system began in the 1950s and was created so that those who lacked the
infrastructure to connect to the wider network could receive services (Scheier-Madanes,
2005).
There were also neighborhood associations that worked to hinder projects and
prevent the service provider from entering their communities. One example is when 300
people created a human barrier to halt engineering work on a project.

In another

example, a neighborhood association helped ensure that one contract re-negotiation
process, mediated by ETOSS, was very difficult and required many lawyers for both
sides. As a result, the re-negotiation required project and financing changes before it
could be passed (Scheier-Madanes, 2005).
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Besides protesting, there were other kinds of resistance from residents. Residents
filed formal complaints with ETOSS, demonstrated their discontent on the streets,
performed sit-ins in front of AASA’s regional headquarters, organized presentations for
television, and publicly condemned AASA and ETOSS. Another tactic residents used
was to stop bill payments to demonstrate their dissatisfaction; for example, there were
80,000 unpaid bills in 1996 (Scheier-Madanes, 2005: 161).

In addition, on several

occasions, there were several violent mobilizations and so many complaints that the local
offices decided to close and the company closed operations for a time (Scheier-Madanes,
2005). It is important to note that public utility companies are not often in a permanent
supplier position and hence it is not wise for them to engage in conflicts with their staff
and customers alike.

Public utility companies should also realize that they cannot

successfully operate in an area where a significant proportion of the residents are
excluded from the service for a long period of time; it will likely lead to a dangerous
situation (Scheier-Madanes, 2005).
ETOSS and AASA responded to the conflict over the infrastructure charge from
residents not connected to the system by transforming the charge to a “new universal
service and environmental charge” (SUMA), which would be absorbed by all customers
(Scheier-Madanes, 2005: 161). More specifically, the additional charge was absorbed by
customers already connected to the network in order to help cover the cost of connecting
those not yet connected, who were typically the poorest residents (Scheier-Madanes,
2005). SUMA was made up of two different charges: the universal service charge (SU),
which was supposed to fund the network expansion, and the environmental charge (MA)
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which was supposed to fund environmental investment (e.g., sanitation facilities)
(Scheier-Madanes, 2005). SUMA increased customers’ bills by 13% (Scheier-Madanes,
2005: 162).
As a result of the CIC conflict, new user groups were organized, mostly in the
form of local community organizations.

For example, the Users and Consumers’

Federation (Comisión de enlace de usuarios y consumidores del conurbano, CECUC)
was organized during the conflict in La Matanza.

CECUC and other community

organizations believed that the water and sewerage bills needed to be paid, but they also
felt that the service rates needed to be fair and hence they devoted their efforts to that
cause (Scheier-Madanes, 2005).

There were other local community organizations that

were created before 2003, but some of them were not officially recognized. Besides
concerning themselves with the service rates, some of them also dealt with the rising
water table (three million people were affected in Lanús, Lomas de Zamora, and other
areas) and rising water pollution as well, particularly in Avellaneda and Quilmes
(Scheier-Madanes, 2005: 163).
In October 2000, approximately 2,000 water co-operatives met in Buenos Aires
and in March 2001, they founded the Federation of Drinking Water Cooperatives of the
Province of Buenos Aires (FEDECAP). Soon thereafter, the provincial government
regained control of the water utility, with the help of the workers. The utility was
previously run by Azurix, a subsidiary of Enron (Muńoz, 2005). According to Muńoz
(2005), FEDECAP and the restoration of state control over the utility symbolized a very
important moment in the movement to recover public space and social control.
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Customer participation increased so much that there was an outburst in December
2001. The commotion helped oust the Alianza government and more local community
groups emerged and participated in extraordinary social and political activity. Groups
held regular and frequent meetings and there were demonstrations against the municipal
and national authorities and also in front of ETOSS’ offices in 2002 and 2003.
Newspapers, such as Urban Interaction (Interacción Urbana), even got involved in the
demonstrations (Scheier-Madanes, 2005).
The political and social environment was in a state of uncertainty and chaos in
2002 and radical movements developed, calling for an end to AASA’s contract. For
example, the radical movements joined together to form a cabildo abierto, a type of
neighborhood committee dating back from the colonial times, used to demand
independence. The cabildo abierto was most active in Morón. There was also the selfsummoned neighbors movement (vecinos autoconvocados), which was a group of people
who waited so long to be consulted that they decided to summon themselves and take
action. This group was concerned with issues regarding privatization. For example, it
formed a huge protest movement in the southern concession area, particularly in Quilmes,
and expressed its discontent with the rising water table, which it blamed on AASA
(Scheier-Madanes, 2005).
There is a long tradition of local community organizations in Buenos Aires.
Local organizations have been involved with the development of local infrastructure
since the beginning of the 20th century.

However, during the military dictatorship

between 1976 and 1982, these types of organizations were persecuted.
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The ensuing

economic and social crises of the 1990s significantly weakened social networks.
However, in recent years, there has been an evolution of new groups, including ones
demanding that water be regarded as an “essential need” (Scheier-Madanes, 2005: 164)
and according to Scheier-Madanes (2005), this emergence must be placed within the
Argentinean political and social context.
Local community organizations have regained their power since the 1990s. For
example, consumer associations were given formal recognition under the constitutional
reform of 1994 and the Consumer Protection Law of 1998. Traditionally, the groups
have been comprised of middle class residents and professionals. Since the privatization
reforms began, however, their scope of activity has increased. They have started to
demand influence over service providers, particularly over water companies. Although
they were not actively involved in the CIC conflict, as it did not directly affect them, they
were actively involved in opposing the SUMA charge. The groups began advising
consumers and users and acted as a liaison with service providers. It is important to note
that user associations are different from consumer associations in that user associations
tend to be more radical than traditional consumer organizations, particularly because they
believe that safe drinking water and sewerage service access should be a universal right
(Scheier-Madanes, 2005).
There were 13 officially recognized associations in 2001, and, as such, they were
legally entitled to receive subsidies. All of the groups, except the Consumer Action
Group, have developed recently, i.e., since the turn of the millennium. A few of the
groups are directly related to political parties or to labor unions and most of the groups
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originate from cooperative movements or areas of the city. One of the most powerful
groups, the Users and Consumers Union, is a national association and has been able to
lobby Parliament and ETOSS. The success of these associations has helped stimulate the
organization of new consumer and user associations, all of which combined to form the
new water rights movement (Scheier-Madanes, 2005).
The users and consumers groups’ protests over the SUMA charge forced ETOSS
to set up a public water hearing. The very first hearing took place in December 1998. In
attendance were representatives from professional and technical organizations, AASA,
consultants, workers’ trade unions, the media, and the legally recognized community
organizations. Also involved were many unregistered associations, such as neighborhood
committees and user federations (Scheier-Madanes, 2005). Shortly after the meeting,
ETOSS established a “users’ commission” to act as a consultation group (ScheierMadanes, 2005: 165). Then, in June 2000, there was a second meeting held to discuss the
water network’s expansion plan. At this meeting, the users’ groups defended users’
rights (Scheier-Madanes, 2005).
Indeed, it was unprecedented that ETOSS and AASA began to hold stakeholder
meetings, however, it is evident that the meetings served more to hold discussions over
the conflicts rather than seek resolutions to the conflicts. Although the meetings did not
directly alter the decision-making process, they did give the groups visibility relative to
the conflicts and served to stimulate the interest of the public, elected officials, and the
media (Scheier-Madanes, 2005). The groups’ participation also proved to ETOSS and
AASA that “the knowledge they have of the contract is startling. They are up to date in
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everything that is under legal consideration (contract deadlines, rate increases,
construction techniques)…” (Scheier-Madanes, 2005: 165). It is also important to note
that AASA adopted the ‘client/costumer’ concept, which was a significant change. This
new concept helped foster a communications policy that was concerned with the new
principles of water supply, the value of water, and the necessity of avoiding waste.
Although these changes seemed very positive, residents were still skeptical.

They

believed that the ‘client/costumer’ concept did not hold much value since AASA held a
monopoly on the WSS services. They felt that the users were more accurately ‘captive
users’ because they had limited participation (Scheier-Madanes, 2005: 165).

End of the Contract
After Menem left office in 1999, the de la Rúa administration proved unable to
improve the worsening state of affairs plaguing the concession.

The Argentine

government had called for contract re-negotiations to accommodate for the country’s
economic turmoil. Foreign companies criticized the government, citing a lack of legal
security.

The relationship between Argentina and foreign economic actors became

hostile because the government and citizens viewed them as exploiters of users who
continually failed to satisfy their own investment commitments (Olleta, 2007).

By

January 2001, the government decided to allow one more tariff increase of 3.9% to help
fund the service network expansion and other investment projects (Olleta, 2007: 11).
However, after January 2001, the Argentine courts began to recognize users’
complaints about the services and tariff increases and ETOSS began to levy very heavy
fines against AASA for delaying the construction of new infrastructure (Olleta, 2007).
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Most significantly, in December 2001, Argentina’s economy collapsed and the peso was
devaluated as a result. For the next few years, Argentina endured a severe economic
crisis, bringing with it political, institutional, and social collapse (Olleta, 2007). These
events marked the beginning of the end of the concession.
The economic collapse at the end of 2001 led to the end of AASA’s large influx
of profits; as inflation increased, AASA’s debt accumulated.

Argentina issued

Emergency Law 25.561 in 2002 in an attempt to redefine its contract relations with
privatized firms by calling for a revision of the contracts in force (Olleta, 2007: 11).
Decree 293/02 terminated AASA’s privileges. For example, it no longer allowed AASA
to dollarize its prices and index them in line with variations in the US’s price figures
(Ministerio de Economía y Producción, 2002; Hall, 2003; Olleta, 2007). Moreover, by
this time, Argentina’s judicial system had already ruled that AASA’s practices violated
the Convertibility Law. The law also froze water tariffs for six months (Olleta, 2007). It
is reported that this crisis caused Ondeo to lose US$500 million and cost the company
more than 8% of its international water business (Hall, 2003: 4).
The January 2001 contract re-negotiation clearly did not solve AASA’s problems
that had been caused by the currency devaluation. Toward the end of the six month
freeze on tariffs, AASA estimated that its losses added up to 500 million Euros (about
US$660 million, assuming 2007 Euros) (Olleta, 2007: 11) and it informed the Argentine
government that it would likely pursue legal action to retrieve its lost revenue under the
1993 bilateral treaty for the protection of investment that had been signed between
Argentina and France.
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AASA responded by warning that the government would have to grant it at least a
minimal profit or else it would terminate the contract and sue Argentina. In anticipation
of a dispute, AASA started to lobby the French government and held diplomatic meetings
with French government representatives and national authorities (Olleta, 2007).

In

addition, as a condition of fulfilling its contract obligations, AASA tried to require the
government of Argentina to meet what could have been considered unrealistic demands
given Argentina’s economic situation. For example, they called for an exchange rate
insurance that would have made Argentina shoulder over half of the firm’s external debt,
contracted with domestic and international banks and multilateral institutions like the
IDB and World Bank (Olleta, 2007).

The Argentine government declined such an

agreement and on April 10, 2002, AASA defaulted with a debt of US$700 million
(Olleta, 2007: 11).
By September 2003, when President Nestor Kirchner entered office, the
relationship between the state and AASA became even worse.

The administration

reexamined every privatization contract and it was becoming increasing likely that some
of the contracts could be returned to the state (Olleta, 2007). AASA’s failure to meet
some of its obligations meant it was a candidate for contract termination. International
Financial Institutions (IFIs), like the World Bank, accused Argentina of deliberately
delaying talks because they claimed it was reluctant to negotiate. It became evident that
in order for Argentina to repair its relations with IFIs after the economic collapse,
Argentina would have to meet the private companies’ demands, but it refused to do so
(Olleta, 2007). It is also evident that the IFIs favored the private companies. For
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example, the IFIs wanted to reestablish an investment climate in Argentina and decided
to restructure AASA’s private debt with them by reducing AASA’s debt by 35% (Olleta,
2007: 12).
Since the Argentine state would not comply with AASA’s demands, Ondeo
threatened to end the contract and sue Argentina for 20,000 million pesos (about US$6.8
billion, assuming 2005 Argentine pesos). Ondeo warned Argentina that returning the
WSS industry to the state would have dire consequences for Argentina’s investment
climate. In September 2005, Ondeo and AASA’s other major share-holder, Aguas de

Barcelona, made the final decision to end the contract, citing that after two years,
Argentina would not negotiate on new tariffs (AFX International Focus, 2005a; Latin
America News Digest, 2006; Olleta, 2007; Corral, 2007).
Argentina then threatened to sue AASA if it discontinued service provision before
its official resignation date; the state sought out a new operator in the meantime. Finally,
on March 21, 2006, Argentina informed AASA that it had instead decided to terminate
the contract and return the operations of the services to the state, citing AASA’s repeated
breaches of contract (Olleta, 2007). The government had searched for a new company to
take over the industry, but six months later, it could not find one (Newbery, 2006).
Newbery (2006) claims that when the government realized that it would likely not find a
new company, it decided to rescind the contract before AASA would vote to cancel the
contract (as it did in September 2005).
AASA’s contract was officially rescinded by decree 303/2006, “Public Services,”
by the national executive power under the Nestor Kirchner administration. The decree
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stated, “The concession contract between the state of Argentina and Aguas Argentinas,
S.A. is hereby rescinded, by fault of the concessionaire. Operations and provision of
services will be transferred to the state immediately” (Ministerio de Economía y

Producción, 2006a: 1). Decree 304/2006, also issued on March 21, 2006, established the
state-owned water and sewerage company, Argentine Water and Sanitation (Aguas y

Saneamientos Argentinos, AySA), to replace AASA. AySA has been in operation ever
since (Ministerio de Economía y Producción, 2006b; Latin America News Digest, 2006).
Ondeo claims that the government would not let it negotiate to raise service tariffs
to help offset increasing costs (Latin America News Digest, 2006). It also claims that the
contract failed largely because financial and political factors prohibited it from collecting
profits; the WSS service sector had low rates of return on investment (approximately 5%)
and as a result, the industry proved unprofitable (Amparo Lasso, 2006: 1; Newbery,
2006).

Ondeo also cites the economic circumstances at the time as unfavorable,

ultimately leading to the termination. Jacques Labre, director of institutional relations for
Ondeo, stated, “In Argentina there was a big macroeconomic shock and the devaluation
of the peso that caused the tensions on the application of some of the contract clauses”
(Amparo Lasso, 2006: 1). Labre also claims that in Latin America, huge infrastructure
investments are necessary, which cause the service rates to go up significantly (Amparo
Lasso, 2006).
The government, however, contends that AASA did not, by and large, fulfill its
contractual obligations, abused its power, and wanted to increase tariffs only to increase
its profit margin (Latin America News Digest, 2006; Amparo Lasso, 2006). They also
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contend that AASA continually requested service rate increases. Service rates were
frozen in 2002 to stop inflation from rising after the state converted utility tariffs to pesos
from US dollars and after the economy and currency crashed, Argentina denied AASA’s
requests to increase rates after that because they claimed the increases were exorbitant.
During the period when the service prices kept increasing, more and more residents
protested against AASA and demanded that its contract be terminated (Amparo Lasso,
2006; Newbery, 2006). Kirchner stated that Ondeo spent a lot of money on media
matters to convince the public that it was a victim in the conflict, but critics contend that
Ondeo is responsible for under-investment (AFX International Focus, 2005b).
In early 2005, AASA filed a law suit with the World Bank’s International Center
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (Olleta, 2007; World Bank, 2007). Ondeo
filed a lawsuit with the World Bank’s arbitration tribunal to reclaim the US$1.7 billion it
had invested in the industry since 1993 (Amparo Lasso, 2006: 2). Then, in May 2006,
Ondeo accused the Argentine government of taking its assets in Argentina after the
government cancelled the concession.

Ondeo demanded compensation because it

claimed the contract’s failure was the government’s fault (Amparo Lasso, 2006).
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CHAPTER FOUR:
RESULTS OF THE COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES

Introduction
The water and sewerage service privatization in Mexico City, Mexico, the
Dolphin Coast, South Africa, and the UK will be examined as the comparative case
studies in this chapter to address study objective six, but not objective seven (recall that
objectives one through five were addressed in Chapter Three), because only the sixth
objective is relevant to the comparative case studies.

The sixth study objective is:

compare and contrast the events in Buenos Aires to three related water privatization
schemes for additional comparative insights into water privatization. As discussed in
Chapter Two, addressing the sixth study objective will help shed light on private sector
participation (PSP) in the water supply and sanitation (WSS) industry and after
comparing them to the main case study, broader implications of PSP for the WSS
industry can be discussed. In the next chapter, the results of the main case study and the
three comparative case studies will be compared and contrasted for additional insights.

The Mexico City Case Study
Mexico embarked on a fairly ambitious privatization program in the 1990s that
effectively reduced the state’s participation in what was considered a highly regulated
economy. In 1982, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) generated 14% of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), brought in net transfers and subsidies equal to 12.7% of the
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nation’s GDP, and made up 38% of fixed capital investment (Megginson, 2005: 19). Ten
years later, the government had privatized 361 of its 1,200 SOEs and consequently, the
need for subsidies had been almost completely eliminated (Megginson, 2005: 19).
Beginning in the early 1990s, the Federal District (Distrito Federal, DF) in
Mexico City decided to implement a set of WSS service contracts with private sector
partners (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002; Wenyon and Jenne, 1999). A service
contract privatizes very specific activities, such as bill collection, meter installation,
meter reading, and pipe repairs. There is much less private sector involvement than in a
concession or a full divestiture. That said, this type of contract is not considered the most
effective way for the private sector to realize a profit because the government retains
authority over the investment (Wenyon and Jenne, 1999). Wenyon and Jenne (1999)
note that service contracts are most effective when the private sector deems it too risky to
make any major investments; when there is no satisfactory independent regulation; and
when there are no other guarantees present to balance the investment risk. They also note
that Mexico City’s decision to implement a service contract is an indication that the city
was not fully ready for WSS service privatization and therefore allowed for a slow
introduction of private sector involvement, thereby decreasing political and public
resistance.
Upon privatizing the potable water services, the Mexican government effectively
decided to no longer view water and sanitation services as a public right that was
supplied and subsidized by the government, but rather as an economic asset to be subject
to private appropriation (Marañón, 2005). When privatization began, the infrastructure
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and networks were in dire need of rehabilitation because the infrastructure had been
deteriorating and operating inefficiently, mostly because the pricing system under the
state had been based on fixed tariffs (Marañón, 2005).
Mexico City’s service contracts were different from other service contracts in that
it involved four private sector operators and each operator’s contract was implemented in
three stages stretching over a 10-year period. The Mexican government decided to
involve multiple operators because it predicted that this arrangement would stimulate
competition for improved performance by using comparisons and benchmarking
(Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).

Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002: 139)

contend that Mexico City’s unique approach to privatization makes it a good case study
in that can help reveal if the ‘gradualist’ approach to PSP is more effective than more
radical forms of privatization. In addition, the city’s approach probably helped to address
pricing problems and bolster regulatory capacities gradually after securing private
partners, thereby lessening the possibility of politically costly price shocks (Haggarty,
Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
However, it is important to note that there are also risks involved with incremental
reforms. For example, it is often difficult for politicians to support long-term plans, as
they often have short-term agendas which are driven by political and economic cycles.
Also, the most difficult decisions in the implementation of the long-term plans are usually
deferred until later in order to postpone politically unpopular actions to future
administrations, all the while permitting the current administrator to take credit for
initiating the reform (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
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By 1991, about 40% of the water supplied to households in Mexico City was lost
via leaks in the piped network as a result of inadequate infrastructure maintenance and
faulty installations in households (Saade Hazin, 2001: 160). The escalating cost of
providing water services in the rapidly growing metropolitan region, coupled with the
water losses, overburdened the government’s financial capacity to provide WSS services
to all its citizens. As a result, privatization of the water and sewerage services became a
more attractive policy option to the government to provide services to the growing
population and decrease the financial burden on the state (Saade Hazin, 2001).

Historical and Economic Background Leading to Reform
Prior to the water sector reform, there was a macroeconomic crisis from 1982 to
the early 1990s that helped promote major policy reforms. In fact, the reforms had been
planned for many years prior to being implemented and once implemented, it became a
much more limited set of plans that postponed complicated political decisions to a later
date (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002). The Mexican economy had been booming,
but it suddenly came to a halt in 1982. During the three decades prior to 1982, easy
foreign credit that was fueled by large amounts of petro-dollars had served to bolster the
inefficient and overextended Mexican state (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2001). The
petro-dollars were used to repair the national infrastructure and stimulate Mexico’s
economy.

However, in 1982, the petro-dollars vanished seemingly overnight and

plunged the country into an economic crisis (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
The petrodollar crisis is traced to one decade before 1982 when the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decreased oil production and increased the
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world price of crude oil from about US$3 per barrel to over US$12 per barrel (Feldstein,
1991). In the 1970s, Mexico became a major oil-exporting nation and international banks
easily granted Mexico loans to fund capital investments (Hirschman, 1987; Watkins,
2008). In the 1970s to early 1980s, there was turmoil in the oil industry, particularly
because of Iran’s fluctuating oil supply in the global market.

Iran decreased oil

production in 1979, which made the global price of oil increase and then a few years
later, increased oil production, which made the global price of oil decrease. The higher
price of oil, on top of rising inflation in the US (due to the increase in oil prices) and
increasing interest rates from international banks that loaned money to Mexico for capital
investments, led to Mexico’s economic crisis in 1982 (Watkins, 2008).
Then, in 1983, GDP decreased by more than 4% and inflation increased to more
than 100%. In 1986, the GDP decreased again and inflation remained at levels between
50 and 130% (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 140-141). Then President de la
Madrid’s (1982-1988) administration tried to stop the economic decline by promoting a
large-scale privatization project (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002). Later on, the
peso devaluation in 1994 led to further economic troubles and threatened the state’s new
neo-liberal foundation and alliance with the private sector (Kleinberg, 1999).
Toward the end of de la Madrid’s term, the country’s inflation escalated to over
130% annually, despite several austerity programs. The former Minister of Budget and
Planning, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, won the presidential election by a slim margin.
Salinas was a member of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the same
political party as de la Madrid. It was a surprise that a member of the PRI party had won
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because the rapid urbanization in Mexico and the economic crisis had led to a crisis in the
PRI – although, it is important to note that while Salinas won the popular vote, he did not
do well in the urban areas and in the Federal District in particular.

Salinas’

administration sought to expand and improve urban services as a response to the crisis.
Salinas appointed Manuel Camacho Solis as the mayor of the DF in 1988 (Haggarty,
Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
After Salinas entered office, the economy was still in very poor condition; the
economic growth rate hovered at slightly over 1% and inflation was over 100% in 1988
(Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 141). Under such dire circumstances, Salinas’
administration decided to push the reforms promoted by de la Madrid further and faster.
In 1989, Salinas’ administration decided to permit the divestiture of all public enterprises
in the sectors that were not specifically termed ‘strategic’ in the constitution. As a result,
private participation was pursued in areas where it had never been considered before,
including telecommunications, roads, energy, and water (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga,
2002).
The National Water Commission (Comisión Nacional del Agua, CNA) divides
water resources by granting different concessions among users.

For urban public

services, the municipality or the state oversees the concession to tap a water source, how
much to extract, and the conditions for discharge. The state or municipality has the right
to seek private participation to run the services. However, the state retains the ownership
of the infrastructure required for the services (Barkin and Klooster, 2006).
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The administration decided to target the water sector for early reform. In 1989,
the government promoted a new federal water law that sought to increase water use
efficiency by decentralizing the management to the state level water commissions
(Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).

Barkin and Klooster (2006) note that

privatization of water resources was actually inhibited by Mexico’s constitution. Despite
this, in 1992, Salinas’ administration passed a water law that: (a) codified the concept of
water as a commodity, and not a public good; (b) supported market mechanisms to
manage water resources; and (c) encouraged local participation in water management.
The state water commissions were set up and given control over and responsibility for the
water services within their jurisdictions.

The reform of service providers was also

decentralized, thereby encouraging private participation (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga,
2002).

Mexico City’s Water Sector
The majority of Mexican citizens are served by public agencies for their water
and sanitation needs. It is widely known that many of the state and municipal agencies
function poorly and that the efficiency indicators in Mexico are, on average, well below
the indicators for other Latin American countries and are much farther below those of
other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.
While proponents of PSP may be quick to point out that this is because these are public
agencies, Barkin and Klooster (2006) contend that the main issue is the institutional
framework in Mexico, or more specifically, the rules and organizations, that authorize the
conditions for their operations.
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Mexico City’s water and sanitation systems have been rife with problems for a
long time. Some of the main problems include weak and inefficient arrangements for the
management of the services, inadequate maintenance, habitual under-pricing of services
relative to their real costs, and inadequate billing and collection performance. It was
believed, in theory, that these issues could be resolved with a carefully-designed program
that would involve private sector involvement. There were other problems with the
sector, including unsustainable management of water resources in the Valley of Mexico
and surrounding states, but it was thought that this issue would not respond as well to
PSP.
Raw water resources available to supply the DF are limited by the land’s
topography. Mexico City was built on top of the former Aztec city of Tenochtitlan on the
floor of drained lake beds in the mountain valley. The city has had alternating periods of
water shortages and flooding (Saade Hazin, 2001; Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
In response to these issues, engineering projects have tapped into the underlying aquifer,
bringing in water from more and more distant river valleys that lie one kilometer (km)
(about 0.62 miles) in altitude underneath the city.

Mining into the aquifer is also

designed to drain wastewater and floodwaters away from the city (Haggarty, Brook, and
Zuluaga, 2002).
Before the water reform, management of the water and sanitation system was
divided up between three different institutions each of which reported to a different part
of the District government. Under the Secretary of Works and Services, the primary
network fell under the responsibility of the Hydraulic Construction and Works (Dirección
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General de Construción y Operación Hydraulica, DGCOH).

DGCOH’s main

responsibility was to construct and operate the primary network and water treatment
plants, though it also contributed significantly to the construction and repair of the
secondary network. The second institution was comprised of the Federal District’s 16

delegaciones, political sub-units which reported to the Secretary of Government and
Mexico City’s Mayor, and was responsible for the operation and maintenance of the
secondary distribution networks (Noll, Shirley, and Cowan, 2000). There was often not
enough supply to meet demand within all of the delegaciones, especially in the poorer
areas of the city, and so the delegación water departments were responsible for rationing
as well.

The third institution, the Federal District’s Treasury, oversaw billing and

collection (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002) note that, due to such fragmentation of
responsibilities, the operations were weak and provided a good opportunity for the
private sector to improve operations. They also contend that the tremendous pressure on
freshwater sources could have been relieved by water conservation and leakage repairs,
yet little action was taken in this regard. In fact, per capita water consumption, measured
by total water consumed by the city over the population covered, was high, even by
developed country standards. In 1993, it was estimated to be about 379 liters per person,
per day (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 145), but this number also accounts for the
high physical losses in the system (Saade Hazin, 2001). Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga
(2002) argue that the high consumption rates are also probably due to lax billing and
underpriced tariffs that did not accurately reflect the true costs of the services. The
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exceptionally high water losses were due to poor infrastructure maintenance, poor
regulation, and land subsidence because the pipes shift and break as Mexico City sinks
(Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
Mexico City decided to pursue PSP to address the operational and maintenance
issues, the overstaffing, and the poor billing and bill collection (Haggarty, Brook, and
Zuluaga, 2002). The DF decided on a service contract, which entailed less private
participation than other types of contracts, for three main reasons. First, there were
political reasons: some of the members of the city’s administration would have lost
political popularity by pursuing a contract that would have involved more PSP. Second,
the subject of water is very political in Mexico, in general, and especially in the Federal
District; as a result, tariffs for services had been set well below the real costs. The
citizens believe that water services are a right, despite the fact that the Salinas
administration viewed them as commodities. Hence, the administration elected a water
reform that would avoid politically unfavorable decisions (Haggarty, Brook, and
Zuluaga, 2002). Third, a concession or divestiture was deemed inappropriate because
there would have been too much risk involved (Marañón, 2005; Wenyon and Jenne,
1999).
Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002) claim that the main reason why the DF
pursued private participation in the water sector in the first place was that the government
was disappointed with previous efforts to reform the public companies and did not want a
repeat of the errors of the past. The de la Madrid administration experimented with
performance contracts to improve public enterprise performance, however, by the early
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1990s, it was clear that the program did not help much, if at all, so the government
decided to experiment with PSP instead. Similarly, Mayor Camacho attempted public
sector reform in the DF under the Efficient Water Use Program (Programa de Uso

Eficiente del Agua, PUEDA). PUEDA was implemented in 1986, and in its attempt to
improve the operation of water services, it executed a user census, installed residential
meters, and encouraged more efficient water use, mostly with improved technology, such
as more efficient toilets and faucets. However, it was determined in 1992 that the
program was advancing too slowly.

Many believed this was due to inter-agency

coordination problems, insufficient funding, and lack of interest by users because of the
low water tariffs (and hence less incentive to conserve resources) (Haggarty, Brook, and
Zuluaga, 2002).
The low price of services is evidence of the public’s sensitivity to water services.
Water tariffs had only been increased five times between 1970 and 1990 and paid for less
than half of the operating costs (Noll, Shirley, and Cowan, 2000). The result was that
setting tariffs well below operational costs caused operational deficits and forced the DF
to seek funding from the federal government that was eager to fix this issue. The legal
restrictions on disconnecting consumers from the water network also underscored the
highly politicized nature of water services. In the Mexican constitution of 1917, Article
27 permits the government to authorize water rights to private persons. However, federal
health legislation passed in the 1930s prohibits the government from completely
disconnecting residential users due to nonpayment. In fact, no residential customers in
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the DF have had their services so much as reduced due to nonpayment (Haggarty, Brook,
and Zuluaga, 2002).
In July 1992, the Federal District Water Commission (Comisión del Agua del

Distrito Federal, CADF) was established to oversee the administration, operation, and
maintenance of the infrastructure that provided water, sewerage, and drainage services in
the DF. The responsibilities overlapped with the three agencies of the CNA mentioned
earlier. The overlaps were acknowledged in the decree that established CADF and the
agencies were ordered to work with CADF to slowly transfer their responsibilities to
CADF (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002). Once created, the CADF also assumed
responsibility for the billing of the 20,000 largest users in the DF, comprised mostly of
industrial and commercial customers.

These users only made up about 2% of the

customer base and used only about 20% of the total volume of water, but made up 53%
of the billing collections (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 155; Noll, Shirley, and
Cowan, 2000). CADF focused on them because they were much easier to identify,
measure, and compelled to pay their bills. It is important to note that the residential
consumer base, on the other hand, accounted for 75% of the water consumption in the DF
and yet Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002) contend that CADF’s focus failed to foster
more rational use of water among these users.
In 1992, more than 22% of the service connections were not registered, resulting
in commercial losses (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 147). It was also found that
some registered customers were not paying their bills at all. Approximately 53% of
registered users had meters, but most of the meters were not read regularly. One estimate
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determined that, at best, only 62% of customers were regularly paying their bills in 1992
(Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 147).

Labor productivity, in part due to

overstaffing, was also inefficient by international standards (Haggarty, Brook, and
Zuluaga, 2002).
However, it is important to note that not all of these issues could be fixed by
private sector participation alone. The tariff system was in desperate need of change as it
gave little to no incentive to customers to conserve water. The Federal District’s water
and sanitation systems were ripe for reform, but as Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002)
note, different factors made a concession contract unlikely. For example, the water
shortage issue had been recognized since the 1930s and yet the Federal Government
decided to absorb the costs for addressing this issue. Moreover, the Federal District’s
payment for bulk water delivered from alternative sources did not accurately cover the
investment costs and furthermore, the DF had not been charging the opportunity cost for
water taken out of the aquifer (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).

Mexico City’s Service Contracts
Even though the DF embarked on four service contracts and the reform did not
require any sudden changes to existing agencies, the contracts had ambitious goals. The
goals were as follows: (1) bill all consumers based on metered consumption; (2) optimize
the use of resources; (3) attain cost recovery; (4) cut down on aquifer extraction; (5)
improve the overall efficiency of the water sector; and (6) effectuate sustainable
improvements in services quality. The goals were supposed to be easily attained via a 10
year service contract for each private consortium. It was expected that the contracts
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would ameliorate the financial performance of the DF’s water system by implementing
more efficient billing and collection and by reducing leakage rates (i.e., ensuring more
water is actually delivered to the customer) from 37% to 24% of total production over the
span of the contracts (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 155).
Mexico City was divided up into different zones which would each be under a
different contract. In each region, a private consortium was awarded a 10-year service
contract.

As mentioned earlier, such a system was set up in order to stimulate

competition between the consortia and to lessen the risk of contract failure if a contractor
fell short of its obligations. The division of the DF was not done at the beginning; the
consortia were to assume that they would serve at least one-fourth of the DF’s population
and were required to prepare a table of discounts and surcharges in case they were given
a larger or smaller zone. The regions were planned to include roughly the same number
of people and also had a minimum number of customers (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga,
2002).
The contracts included a list of tasks that dealt with maintenance and operation of
the secondary water distribution and drainage systems and various related tasks, such as
establishing customer service centers. The contract tasks were organized into three
stages. The Federal District government gave each contract bidder a work program that
included a projection of volumes of each task by delegación and semester for every year
of the contract lifetime. The contractors were obliged to fulfill the tasks on the list by the
end of the contract period; before completing all of the tasks, the CADF was to release a
specific execution order (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
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The following are the contract obligations, divided into the three stages:
Stage 1: Initial activities

•

Chart the secondary water distribution network;

•

Conduct a customer census; and

•

Install meters for all customers (Marañón, 2005; Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga,

2002).
Stage 2: Customer-oriented tasks

•

Standardize billing, which would involve meter reading, maintenance, and dispersing

bills;

•

Set up customer care-centers and telephone care-centers;

•

Share the role in bill collection; and

•

Connect new customers (Marañón, 2005; Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).

Stage 3: Network-oriented tasks

•

Maintain and operate the secondary water and drainage networks;

•

Detect and fix visible and invisible leaks (water and drainage); and

•

Renovate and extend the secondary network (water and drainage) (Marañón, 2005;

Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
The tasks in Stage 1 were designed to gather reliable information on both
customers and consumers and the condition of the network and accurately inform
operators and consumers with information on consumption levels. Stage 2 was designed
to increase collected revenues, educate consumers on the careful use of water and the
importance of timely payments, and ensure billing of all consumers.
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Stage 3 was

designed to improve efficiency and the quality of water distribution and drainage, reduce
water losses through leaks, and cut operating costs (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga,
2002). The tasks in the first stage were to be completed between 1993 and 1995; the
tasks in the second were to be completed between 1994 and 2002, and the tasks in the
third stage were to be completed between 1995 and 2002, though the timeline was not set
in stone. The objectives in each stage were set up so the politically controversial tasks,
such as laying people off, would be addressed in the later stages (Haggarty, Brook, and
Zuluaga, 2002).
In October 1992, CADF held an international bidding process. The bids were
then submitted by February 1993, the announcement of the winning bidders was made in
March 1993, and the contracts were signed in September 1993 (Saade Hazin, 2001;
Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).

The national law required the consortia to

maintain majority Mexican ownership (Saade Hazin, 2001). The bidders proposed price
lists for each of the required actions in each of the 16 delegaciones. CADF used a
computer model to input the bidders’ prices and help determine how many zones to
create and how to best configure them. Four zones were established: Zone A (north),
Zone B (north-central), Zone C (southeast), and Zone D (west) (Haggarty, Brook, and
Zuluaga, 2002). Table 16 lists the boroughs in each zone and Figure 2 provides a visual
layout of the boroughs.
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Table 16. The division of the 18 boroughs by zone

Zone
A (north)
A (north)
A (north)
B (north-central)
B (north-central)
B (north-central)
B (north-central)
C (southeast)
C (southeast)
C (southeast)
C (southeast)
D (west)
D (west)
D (west)
D (west)
D (west)
D (west)
D (west)

Borough (Delegación )
Gustavo A. Madero
Azacapotzalco
Cuauhtémoc
Benito Juárez
Coyoacán
Iztacalco
Venustiano Carranza
Iztapalapa
Tláhuac
Xochimilco
Milpa Alta
Tlalpan
Magdalena
Contreras
Álvaro
Obregón
Cuajimalpa
Miguel Hidalgo

Source: Marañón, 2005.
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Figure 2. The 18 boroughs in Mexico City’s Federal District

Source: Universidad de Barcelona, 2008: 1.
In total, there were seven bidding parties.

The bidding consortia were the

following: Servicios de Agua Potable (SAPSA), Industrias del Agua (IASA), Tecnología

y Servicios de Agua (TECSA), Agua de México (AMSA or AGUAMEX), GMD and
Biwater, Tribasa and Thames, and Geo and Aguas de Barcelona.

The four winning

bidders were SAPSA, IASA, TECSA, and AMSA. SAPSA was to manage Zone A,
IASA was to manage Zone B, TECSA was to manage Zone C, and AMSA was to
manage Zone D (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002; Marañón, 2005).
SAPSA was comprised of Mexican companies Ingenieros Civiles Asociados
(ICA) and Banamex, and the French company Vivendi (Compagnie Général des Eaux).
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IASA was comprised of the Mexican company Socios Ambientales de México and the
British company Severn Trent.

TECSA was comprised of the Mexican companies

Bancomer and Bufete Industrial, the French company Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez
(Ondeo), and the British company Anglican Water PLC. AMSA was comprised of the
Mexican company GUTSA and the British company North West Water International
(Gutiérrez and Ramírez, 2005).

Results of Mexico City’s Service Contracts
The Mexico City water contracts expired in 2003 (Marañón, 2005). The contracts
are generally perceived positively although there were some problems as well. The main
successes of the project include the establishment of an updated registry of the networks
and users, meter installations, the shift from fixed quotas to measured consumption, and
the rise in the volume of consumption and of revenue collection in real terms. Another
major success is the treatment of the users by the companies: in general, the users
received adequate attention, mostly due to the introduction of customer service offices
and call centers (Marañón, 2005).
When the water reform began, the residents of Mexico City had good rates of
connectivity to the water network for developing country standards. As of 1990, 95% of
the residents had access to potable water inside their homes or on their lots through the
piped water network (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 143). More than 85% had
access to direct sewerage connections at that time as well (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga,
2002: 144). Even so, neighborhoods in the southeast, at the periphery of the service area,
had major leakage, pressure, and outage problems. As of 2000, about 172 out of 499
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districts in the southeast had no service for at least six hours per week (Noll, Shirley, and
Cowan, 2000: 20). The public sector was, for the most part, able to keep pace with
connecting new customers (Noll, Shirley, and Cowan, 2000) and the reform did help
expand water and sewerage service coverage. Table 17 provides statistics on water and
sewerage coverage in 1990 and 1995.
Table 17.

Water and sewerage coverage in the Federal District in 1990 and 1995

(percentages)

Water Services
Inside the home
Inside the lot
Total Direct Water Coverage
Standpipes
Total Water Coverage
Sewerage Coverage
Direct Sewerage Coverage
Septic Tank
Total Sewerage

1990

1995

71.50
23.50
95.00
1.30
96.30

76.76
20.41
97.17
0.71
97.88

85.70
6.80
92.50

91.30
4.80
96.10

Source: Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 143.
One of the most significant accomplishments of the water sector reform was an
improvement in information about the water distribution system and client base. The
contractors put together an electronic map of the entire water system for overall planning
and also conducted a customer census that permitted the previously unregistered
connections and meters of many customers to be incorporated into the customer base
(Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002). The water census was completed in 1996 and it
demonstrated an average increase in existing but unregistered connections of
approximately 22% (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 167).
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Another positive outcome of the water reform is that almost 1.2 million meters
were installed. By June 1998, 64% of users were billed on a metered basis and an
additional 16% were billed based on the average of the metered customers in their zone
(Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 167).

This is a substantial improvement

considering that before the reform, since there were many unregistered connections, at
least 22% of consumers did not receive any bills or if they did, it was based on a fixed
rate, and not on usage (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 167). The improvement,
however, was not as good in the southeastern zone, Zone C, which is also the poorest
area with the poorest water and service quality. Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002:
167) contend that this was due to metering and billing difficulties. By August 1998, a
mere 37% of the users received a metered bill. In order to tackle these issues, the newly
installed meters could be read electronically and were hence less prone to failure
(Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
The price for services did not increase much while Salinas was still in office,
which could be perceived positively or negatively.

His administration planned the

reforms so that they would not be too politically costly. As a result, service prices were
not increased anywhere close to the real costs. There were also no incentives to lay off
supporters in the different water agencies and the government did not give up control
over water investments to the private sector. Furthermore, the private sector was to
assume responsibility for the revenues and maintenance in the third phase of the contract,
but this phase coincided with an increasing threat that the opposing party would gain
control of the Mexico City government and so the shift was put on indefinite hold (Noll,
144

Shirley, and Cowan, 2000). Noll, Shirley, and Cowan (2000) contend that the tariff
increases in 1996 are due to the increased metering, better billing collection, and
reductions in unregistered connections, not from price increases.
The billing issue in the DF improved after the contractors assumed responsibility
for meter reading and billing. The total number of bills issued increased by about 26%
between 1992 and 1998 and the amount billed to customers increased by 205% in
nominal terms (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 169). However, the information on
bill payment has not improved much, but Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002) note this
is attributable to the water sector’s fragmented administration. There are numerous
locations where customers could pay their bills, but only the Treasury’s offices could
collect payment data for the whole system. After the contractors took over billing duties,
there was no information sharing on billing for the first year, so contractors distributed
bills without knowing which users paid where. It was not until 1998 that the Treasury
sent information on payment receipts to the contractors, but the information was still
received late. That, coupled with mistakes in manually processing payments, made it so
that payments were often not matched with their corresponding invoices (Haggarty,
Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
It is important to note that while the contracts improved billing, they did not
increase the incentive for users to pay their bills. The water companies were paid only to
distribute bills and not for collecting payments. They, therefore, did try to remind and
encourage users to pay their bills and while this would have been somewhat helpful, the
DF Treasury was still in charge of collection (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002). The
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fragmentation of responsibilities between the private sector and the government had led
to inconsistent incentives and as a result, the total bills collected did not improve much.
To be sure, in nominal terms, they did increase by more than 150% between 1994 and
1998, but in real terms, they only increased by 7% in the same period (Haggarty, Brook,
and Zuluaga, 2002: 170). In fact, the collection rate, defined as the total bills collected
divided by the total amount billed, actually decreased during the contract period, which is
due to the increased billing activity by the private sector that the government agencies
responsible for collection did not match up to (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
Table 18 shows that the amount of pesos recovered still increased from 1992 to 2002, due
to the increased billing activity. Table 19 shows that the operational costs recovered
increased overall from 1993 to 1998 as well.
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Table 18. The progression of collection of charges for potable water service in the
Federal District, 1992-2002

Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

Amount Recovered (millions of pesos)
In Real Terms (1990 Real Index
Nominal
Base)
(1990 = 100)
471.0
354.2
100.0
572.0
298.3
112.4
712.0
463.1
130.7
769.0
329.1
92.9
1080.0
362.0
102.2
1508.3
436.8
123.3
2053.5
501.4
141.6
2505.0
544.6
153.7
2788.4
556.3
157.1
3159.9
603.9
170.5
3000.0
551.3
155.7

Source: Marañón, 2005: 173.
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Table 19. Operational Cost Recovery in the Federal District Water System, 1993-1998
(in thousands of 2002 pesos)
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Relative data
Physical efficiencya
Efficiency of measurementb

62.6
49.1

63.0
80.0

64.5
86.0

66.3
88.5

68.0
90.3

69.2
90.1

68.9
90.2

Efficiency in chargingc
Overall efficiencyd

64.8
19.9

63.5
32.0

76.0
42.1

81.7
47.9

79.3
48.7

83.1
51.8

76.9
47.8

686.6

690.6

691.9

720.2

752.8

752.2

757.5

Volume of water produced (millions of m )

1096.9

1096.1

1072.8

1086.3

1107.0

1087.0

1100.0

Efficiency of measurement
Number of users billed (thousands)
Meters installed (thousands)
Number of bills based on meter readings (thousands)
Number of bills issued (thousands)

1477.5
737.2
725.6
1478.2

1620.2
1051.6
1260.6
1575.7

1644.0
1137.3
1408.3
1637.6

1681.1
1187.1
1505.1
1701.2

1720.0
1228.6
1552.8
1720.0

1769.1
1255.9
1582.7
1756.0

no data
no data
1590.0
1800.0

1.1
1.7

1.5
2.4

2.1
2.7

2.5
3.1

2.8
3.5

3.2
3.8

3.0
3.9

Absolute data
Physical efficiency
Volume of water supplied to users (millions of m3)
3

Efficiency in collection
Amount collected (billions of Pesos)
Amount billed (billions of Pesos)

Source: Marañón, 2005: 173.
a

Volume of water delivered/volume of water produced

b

c

Number of bills for metered service/number of bills issued

Amount charged for water/amount collected

d

Physical efficiency; physical measurement; physical collection
In terms of the quality of water services after the reforms, the results are mixed.

On the positive side, it is reported that the private companies have responded more
quickly to consumers’ questions on billing and meter readings and to complaints about
leaks and lack of water services. In addition, 24 customer service centers with telephone
hotlines were established as a result of the reform (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
On the negative side, however, there were still service issues, such as poor water quality
and interrupted services, particularly in Zone C and the southern part of the city.
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However, Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002) point out that water service reliability
fell in the hands of the delegaciones which means that the private companies had minimal
effect. In 1998, some areas in nine of the 16 delegaciones continually endured routine
service outages, but the number of people involved and the severity of the outages varied
considerably. Two of the worst instances involved the delegaciones of Tlalpan and
Iztapalapa. In Tlalpan, 43 of the 192 neighborhoods were only getting water two or three
days a week and only for eight to 10 hours a day and about 30% of the population were
affected (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 172). In Iztapalapa, some neighborhoods
only got water services one day a week for as few as six hours and about 40% of the
population were affected (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 172).
The operating costs of the water sector did not decline as was the hope. Instead,
the costs in real terms increased during the reform period.

The reforms did not

substantially affect the budgets allocated to DGCOH and the delegaciones; DGCOH had
an average of 90% of the operating budget from 1992 to 1998 (Haggarty, Brook, and
Zuluaga, 2002: 174). DGCOH was not obliged to decrease its operating budget and
hence it is not surprising that costs did not fall. In addition, since the operating costs did
not decrease and water tariffs did not increase, the system did not cover its operating
costs on its own, even though the cost recovery level improved somewhat from 64% in
1993 to 71% in 1998 (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 174). Shortly after the
contract began, there were problems related to significant tariff increases (Wenyon and
Jenne, 1999). However, Wenyon and Jenne (1999) claim that the rise in tariffs is likely
the result of the original tariffs being too low.
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The contracts had negative effects on the poorest sectors of the DF. Although the
reform improved billing efficiency and the tariffs, for the most part, it increased the
billing amount for some poor households, but it did not, for the record, provide better
quality services or even the prospect of such improvements. Before the reform, billing
was often based on flat rates for different zones and the users in the lowest tax zone (and
likely the poorest people) had not been billed at all (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga,
2002). By 1998, more bills were based on actual metered consumption (after meters
were installed), increasing the bills or creating bills for the lowest consumption groups,
which were normally the poorest sectors. At the same time, the middle and upper
classes’ bills remained the same or were lowered (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
Milpa Alta, one of the poorest delegaciones, serves as an example of how the
billing changed. In 1991, the water tariff was zero and hence many people were not
billed at all because it was the lowest rated tax zone. By 1998, however, users were
charged approximately 12 pesos (US$1.49, assuming 1998 Mexican pesos) every two
months (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 181). It is important to note that in this

delegación, even in 1998, billing was not based on consumption.

Before water

privatization, most low-income consumers throughout the DF were billed a flat rate of 10
pesos (US$1.10, assuming 2002 Mexican pesos) every two months (Haggarty, Brook,
and Zuluaga, 2002). As a result of the reform, many low-income users now receive bills
on a flat rate and thus their consumption patterns have probably not changed as there is
no incentive (but they tend to consume less anyway). In most poor areas, the major effect
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of the reform has been that many people now receive higher water bills for the same
quality of service (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
Water service tariffs were proposed by CADF, but approved or disapproved by
the Federal District’s Assembly. During the initial years of the reform, the tariffs did
rise, but as Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002) note, they decreased for most
residential users after that.

For example, between 1996 and 1998, metered tariffs

declined, even in nominal terms, for those consuming between 30 and 100 m3 per
bimester (i.e., a period of two months), who are usually residential consumers in the
middle and upper socioeconomic classes (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 163).
However, it is important to note that it is too difficult to determine how many users
recognized the decreased tariffs because very few users’ bills were based off meter
readings in 1996. At that time, most metered bills were based off historical readings
(Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002). Before the reform, almost 53% of registered
users had meters, but because of technical issues and corruption, most consumers paid a
flat fee, or were billed based on historical readings. However, it is important to note that,
at the same time, nonresidential consumers had increasing rates in real terms for each
contract revision. Nonetheless, since non-residential resource use makes up only about
one-quarter of the total consumption, the average real metered prices had decreased
(Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
Despite the positive outcomes of privatization, there were problems as well. The
winning bidders’ contracts were signed in September 1993, but their contracts did not
start until May 1994. Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002) contend that this ended up
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delaying the reforms, which may have been due to a contract dispute, but there are
conflicting accounts about this period. In addition, when the opposing political party
came into power in 1997 and sought to renegotiate the contracts, it further delayed the
reforms. Mayor Camacho was expected to become the next PRI presidential candidate
and as such was not going to endanger his political career by advancing reform measures
that were expected to generate antagonism from powerful allies and strong labor unions.
However, unexpectedly, President Salinas announced that Donaldo Colosio was the PRI
candidate on November 28, 1993, and Mayor Camacho decided to resign the next day.
His sudden resignation worked to slow the progress of the water reforms even more until
a new mayor was appointed (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
A couple other factors helped hinder the water reforms. CADF took some time to
outline the operational details, both internally and with the contractors, of how the
execution orders would be issued and paid (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002). The
Mexican peso was devaluated in December 1994, which also acted to hinder the reforms.
As a result, the water companies significantly slowed down the meter installation because
the budget to buy imported meters was suddenly insufficient at the new exchange rates.
All in all, the delays caused the reforms to be about two years behind schedule and the
timeline for the contracts had to be revised. Then, in 1998, contract re-negotiations led to
further delays (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002) maintain that the lack of clear and effective
monitoring and enforcement arrangements in the Federal District had hindered the
implementation of the contracts. Although CADF did not have enforcement power, it
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was the closest thing to a regulatory body in the water reforms since it designed and
monitored the contracts (but it did not set the tariffs). CADF also lacked budgetary
autonomy, as its budget was allocated from the DF’s budget. CADF did not receive any
direct benefits from increases in bill collections. As a consequence, when CADF did not
get its budget allocation, as was the case in 1996-1997, it could not issue any new
executive orders (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
The contractors all stated that, had they been given a longer term and more
precise executive orders, they could have accomplished more (Haggarty, Brook, and
Zuluaga, 2002). Most execution orders were good for only about two months and after
expiring, the private companies were supposed to, in theory, wait for new orders before
beginning new tasks. The contractors also noted that most of their tasks, such as billing,
collection, and customer service, were processes and not distinct tasks that would have
been inconvenient and expensive to stop when an execution order expired. As a result,
contractors often continued to complete their tasks and pay for the expenses involved
with the work while waiting for new orders to be issued and also be paid for new orders
(Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).
The fact that CADF had little authority in managing the privatization process
meant that the necessary responsibility could not be transferred to the contractors as was
planned. For example, between 1996 and 1997, the government decided to delay the
consolidation of sector management under CADF as was originally planned because it
feared that the ensuing unemployment would prove politically costly. The reforms were
supposed to result in labor redundancies in the delegaciones and hence, the government
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did not want to anger labor unions by adding to already increasing unemployment in a
competitive political climate (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002). The government
also decided not to initiate certain parts of the second stage of the contract, such as
passing new connections to contractors, and further stalled transferring operation and
maintenance to the private companies.

One of the consequences was that newly

connected customers were not getting their bills. Since the information regarding the
new connections was not transferred on time, or at all, to the contractors, and there was
less funding from execution orders to cover the costs, they could not directly bill
customers. This caused financial difficulties for at least one contractor (Haggarty, Brook,
and Zuluaga, 2002).
There are two main reasons why real metered tariffs decreased between 1996 and
1998. When the peso was devalued in December 1994, it eventually decreased to about
half of its former value against the US dollar. The 1995 water tariffs had been agreed on
in 1994, and hence they did not account for the high inflation that resulted from the
devaluation. In an attempt to address the decreasing real prices, the DF assembly passed
a substantial increase in the tariffs for 1996, but when the new rates went into effect, the
economy was in such a bad state that price increases were not favored (Haggarty, Brook,
and Zuluaga, 2002).
In 1996, the majority of residences were not having their meters regularly read.
In any case, the price changes coupled with users’ bills which more accurately reflected
their usage led to a price shock for many consumers. Predictably, there was a public
outcry over the tariff increases after the peso’s devaluation. It proved too politically
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difficult to justify increasing water tariffs in such an economically instable period, with
rising inflation, falling wages, and decreasing purchasing power. Fearing that the middle
and upper class citizens would join up with the left-wing political party that was
dominated by lower income groups, the PRI decided to focus its attention on keeping the
support from the middle and upper classes. The DF Assembly then issued substantial
water tariff cuts for the middle and upper classes, who also consumed more resources. At
the same time, since the PRI had effectively neglected the needs of the lower income
groups, the metered rates for the lower income groups (who consumed less than 20 m3
per bimester) actually increased (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002: 165). In addition,
there were price increases of approximately 19% in the same year for non-metered
residential consumers, most of whom were lower income residents (Haggarty, Brook, and
Zuluaga, 2002: 165).
The first democratically elected government of the DF came into power in
December 1997. They were skeptical about the water sector reform contracts and at first
stated that the contracts had not been designed well. There were fears that the new
administration would cancel the contracts outright, but after they carefully reviewed
them, they decided to maintain them, but they did add to the tasks for stage three and also
adjusted the prices applicable to the execution orders in the third stage (Haggarty, Brook,
and Zuluaga, 2002). The administration compelled the contractors to charge market rates
that usually corresponded to the lowest bidders’ rates on almost all actions in the contract
for stage three. In addition, the administration established prices for the new tasks that
they wanted to add to stage three. Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002) note that reform
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in stage three did progress, but the contractors were not given full control over the
operations and maintenance of the secondary network, as had been planned.
In sum, Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga (2002) contend that the water services in
the Federal District fared much better than before the private sector became involved,
despite some disappointing outcomes, particularly for the poorer sections of the region.
There is now much improved information on the users, because many more meters have
been installed and read with greater accuracy, and the contractors proved more
responsive to consumer complaints. Haggarty, Brook and Zuluaga (2002) claim that
these improvements would probably not have been achieved without PSP. Previous
attempts to reform the public agencies were not successful, partly because of the lack of
political will to constitute a unified and restructured government water services program.
This view is supported by Marañón (2005) who also contends that as a whole, the PSP
experience in the DF was positive.

Despite these positive reviews, however, it is

important to remember that the contracts failed to make strides in efficiency, decrease
operating costs, increase revenues, significantly cut waste, and improve service coverage
in the poor areas (Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga, 2002).

Community Involvement. The community played an active role in expressing its
discontent when the service prices increased, but it is important to note that the extant
literature does not disclose other information on community involvement in the contract.
Perhaps this is because the service contract involved minimal private sector involvement
and because the prices did not increase for the middle and upper class customers.
Community involvement would likely have been stronger if the bills had increased for
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more than just the low income groups. The local government purposely took some steps
to make politically palatable moves because it feared that increasing prices would
damage its political future. As the next section will show, the other two comparative case
studies had greater community involvement, which led to different outcomes.

The Dolphin Coast, South Africa Case Study
Privatization emerged as a policy option under the Apartheid regime before the
African National Congress (ANC) came to power in 1994. The privatization alternative
to SOEs gained momentum during the mid-1980s when privatization was gaining
popularity throughout the rest of the world.

Not only did the global popularity of

privatization play a part, but South Africa’s unique economic and social structures during
Apartheid also played a major role. During Apartheid, there was strong state economic
intervention, a unique industrial structure, and a strong focus on the concentration of
capital (Schwella, 2003).

During his presidency (1978-1989), P. W. Botha first

announced the country’s intention to experiment with privatization in February 1988.
His administration identified the following four industries for privatization: the South
African Iron and Steel Foundation (ISCOR), the Phosphate Development Corporation
(FOSKOR), the South African Transport Services (later named Transnet), and the South
African Post (SAPO) and Telecommunication (Telkom) Services (Schwella, 2003: 293).
The Nationalist Party government stated that it would maintain slightly more than
half of the ownership of the privatized industries, citing that this would allow locked up
government funds to be released for alternative purposes. The state tried to make it clear
that its motives were not to unleash market forces (Schwella, 2003). The Apartheid
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government needed to relieve pressures imposed by international sanctions, decreased
growth and increasing defense, and garner much-needed funding for security purposes
(Schwella, 2003).
However, the privatization program did not satisfy the government’s financial
needs. Some reasons why privatization was not successful at that time include the poor
state of stock markets worldwide after the 1987 financial crash, the poor state of the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and the boycotts and sanctions against South Africa in
international financial markets that severely limited the potential for foreign investment.
Once the ANC came to power in 1994, it largely abandoned its socialist economic
platform and pursued a neo-liberal economic program that promoted free market
capitalism to remedy the injustices of Apartheid (Carty, 2003; Schwella, 2003: 294).
Megginson (2005) notes that although nationalization and the redistribution of wealth
were central ideologies of the ANC for decades, the Mandela and Mbeki administrations
almost completely abandoned these policies and carried out partial sales of SOEs, yet the
word ‘privatization’ still remains taboo in South Africa.
After Apartheid ended and the ANC came into power, it adopted a new
constitution and many observers anticipated great changes in South Africa. Many were
hopeful that natural resources, like freshwater, would be accessible to everyone,
regardless of their race or socioeconomic class. However, after South Africa adopted
almost Thatcherite free-market policies, the opposite occurred (McKinley, 2004). In
1997, the Water Services Act (WSA) was passed, stating that all South Africans have a
constitutional right of access to basic water and sanitation services. The government
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ordered the construction of pipes to bring water within 200 meters of every household
(Francis, 2005: 149). However, the WSA also cleared the path for privatization of water
services (Francis, 2005).
In October 2000, the South African government passed legislation that guaranteed
all citizens access to adequate water: 25 liters (about 6.6 gallons) per person, per day, and
as much as 6,000 liters (about 1,585 gallons) per household, per month, as a minimum
regardless of income (Budds and McGranahan, 2003: 106). The many flaws of this
program will be discussed later.
According to Narsiah (2002), there are political imperatives that dictate
privatization initiatives (Narsiah, 2002). Depending on the specific nature of the political
imperative, one can expect pragmatic, tactical, or systemic privatization. Narsiah (2002)
argues that there was systemic privatization under the ANC in South Africa. This type of
privatization aims to remold the society by fundamentally shifting the economic and
political institutions and by altering economic and political interests. It also aims to
convince people that the government’s role should be reduced, government oversight and
enforcement infrastructure lessened, and that interest group politics should be
fundamentally changed in order to promote and encourage economic growth. Narsiah
(2002) also contends that South Africa’s Growth Employment and Redistribution
(GEAR) policy put South Africa on the path of market-oriented growth instead of
nationalization and redistribution. Furthermore, the Apartheid regime had forged close
relations with capitalist countries like the US and the UK and international financial
institutions (IFIs) like the IMF and World Bank. In fact, before the end of the Apartheid,
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the government of F. W. de Klerk (1989-1994) had endorsed the neo-liberal ideology
promoted by these countries and IFIs (Narsiah, 2002), thereby constraining the ANC’s
policy space.
Thus, despite the ANC’s socialist platform, when it assumed power, it embarked
on an ambitious privatization program. Privatization happened on a large scale in the
WSS industry. For instance, concessions were signed in Nelspruit, the Mpumalanga
Province, Queenstown, the Eastern Cape Province, and the Dolphin Coast in Kwa-ZuluNatal. The housing sector was also privatized (Narsiah, 2002). Narsiah (2002) notes that
privatization effectively transferred the means of production, if not actual private
property rights, of these basic services to capitalists. This represented a fundamental
reversal of policy for the ANC and for the new democratic South Africa.
When the ANC came to power, water and sanitation service provision throughout
South Africa were in desperate need of expansion and upgrading. Under Apartheid,
many communities, especially poor black African communities, had virtually no formal
water or sanitation services. In 1994, for instance, it was estimated that 12 million South
Africans lacked access to clean water near their homes and 21 million lacked sanitation
services (Hemson, 2000: 39). Throughout the country, only one in seven people had
access to adequate sanitation services and less than half of the rural population could
access a safe water supply (Hemson, 2000: 39). This means that when the ANC came
into power, South Africa had the tremendous task of building an extensive water and
sanitation network from scratch.
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Water service delivery, along with affordable housing, is considered one of the
most important indicators of progress in post-Apartheid South Africa because during
Apartheid, disadvantaged black African communities often did not have basic water
service provision (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002). It was estimated that post-Apartheid
South Africa needed over R100 billion (US$17 billion, assuming 1999 South African
rand) over a span of ten years for infrastructural investments (Hemson and Batidzirai,
2002: 5).

Those in favor of public-private partnerships (PPPs) claimed that

municipalities had neither the appropriate institutional framework, nor the financial
means to address this issue alone and would find it especially hard to access private
sector finance to supplement their resources (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002).

The Water Sector before the Concession
The Dolphin Coast area is approximately 50 kilometers (31 miles) north of central
Durban along the north coast in the province of Kwa-Zulu-Natal. The Borough of
Dolphin Coast (BoDC) (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002) and Dolphin Coast Transitional
Regional Council were established on February 1, 1995, grouping together 11 towns and
settlements over an area of about 160km2 (62 square miles) (Kotze, Ferguson, and
Leigland, 1999: 624). The water concession contract with Siza Water Company began in
1999. The details of the contract will be explained in the next section.
Figure 3 provides a visual representation of the Dolphin Coast. At the beginning
of the contract, the population was anywhere between 28,000 (Kotze, Ferguson, and
Leigland, 1999: 624) and 35,000 people (Stalk and Alexandersen, 2004: 50), but it peaks
at about 56,000 during holiday periods (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002: 19). Because of
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the fluctuating population, there is usually a surplus capacity in water service provision
(Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002).
Figure 3. Map of the Dolphin Coast municipality

Source: DolphinCoast.com, 2008: 1.
The BoDC was later changed to the KwaDukuza Local Authority. Its name was
changed again and nowadays the Dolphin Coast is referred to as the Ilembe District
Municipality (Robbins, 2004). The concession area, part of the former BoDC, remains a
small subset of the Ilembe District municipality, with a population of about 45,000 as of
2005 (Farlam, 2005: 22). The Ilembe District municipality is the current Water Services
Authority (Ilembe District Municipality, 2007).
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Kwa-Zulu-Natal has a coastal and shadow corridor between Durban and Richards
Bay; the Dolphin Coast is located within the corridor. The geographical division between
the coastal zone and the immediate interior also doubles as a social division between the
poorer and wealthier areas (the poorer area is in the west and the wealthier area is in the
east) (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002). Most households in the western side earn less than
R800 per month (US$67, assuming 2002 South African rand) and most in the east side
earn more than R3,500 per month (US$292, assuming 2002 South African rand)
(Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002: 20). The poorer area has a high level of unemployment,
social deprivation, and a predominantly black African population. Before the water
reform, the western area often had no formal water and sanitation services and used only
about 10% of the total water services. The wealthier area, in contrast, often enjoyed first
world living conditions and used the vast majority of the water supply (Hemson and
Batidzirai, 2002; Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999). Hemson and Batidzirai (2002)
note that if the concession modeling (which will be explained below in the next section)
had been based only on population figures and not the number of households, then the
expected profit would have been lower.

163

Up until March 1996, the water and sanitation services in the Dolphin Coast were
provided by the Port Natal Joint Services Board (Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999).
When the Board was abolished in 1996, the local government had to assume
responsibility for service provision and deal with some major service delivery challenges,
such as the following:

•

In the formal towns, the infrastructure was in very poor condition and service

provision was inadequate. There were few services, if any, in the informal settlement
areas that accounted for 50% of the population.

•

Only a small number of maintenance and operation staff members were transferred

over to the new company and no technical or management staff members were
transferred.

•

The municipality’s population had increased to more than 40,000 residents by 1997

and over two years the demand for services had almost doubled.

•

The population growth projections estimate that there will be 250,000 people in the

municipality by 2020. As a result, it was estimated that an investment of about R200
million (US$4.275 million in 1997 South African rand) would be necessary for upgrading
water and sanitation services (Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999: 625).
In other words, the water sector in the Dolphin Coast desperately needed to be
restructured to accommodate these projects. A study of service delivery options revealed
that radical restructuring was necessary to avoid overall rapid decline in water and
sanitation service quality and levels (Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999).

More

specifically, significant capital investment was necessary to replace major assets and
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fulfill service delivery backlogs. There were also substantial revenue shortfalls mostly
because of high levels of non-payment. The Dolphin Coast had used up most of its
capacity to borrow enough money to make the necessary investments (Kotze, Ferguson,
and Leigland, 1999).
Furthermore, the water and sanitation network did not reach many of the people in
the municipality. For example, in the town of Nkobongo, there were only two communal
standpipes that serviced about 4,600 people. The situation was considerably worse in the
informal settlements which had no water reticulation to the existing households. By
1996, the water reticulation system of the entire town was in a severe state of decay with
high water losses (30% as of 1997 due to the use of old pipes) (Hemson and Batidzirai,
2002: 66). When the Dolphin Coast inherited the water network in 1996, there was a
poorly equipped and small staff of 22 people who oversaw the distribution of bulk water
and the sewerage treatment works. It was estimated that about R17 million (US$4.7
million, assuming 1996 South African rand) in investment was required for the system,
but the total municipal budget was only about R12 million (US$3.3 million, assuming
1996 South African rand) (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002: 33). In addition to this, the
population of the Dolphin Coast was expected to grow rapidly, and so this made the need
for service expansion more critical (National Business Initiative, 1999).
Due to the urgent and dire need for service expansion and investment, the poor
condition of the existing network, and the increasing population, the municipality
realized that it did not have the financial means to expand and upgrade the services. It
had budgetary constraints and declining funding from the new national government. In
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addition, like many other South African municipalities, the Dolphin Coast did not have
access to private capital markets directly because the markets considered its borrowing
needs low and the municipality had insufficient creditworthiness relative to private
corporate borrowers.

Under these circumstances, the municipality designated the

Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) to lead a detailed investigation of the
feasibility of PSP and service delivery options in November 1996 (Kotze, Ferguson, and
Leigland, 1999).
It was decided by the DBSA that a concession contract was best for improving
management and attracting capital investment without resorting to a full divestiture
(Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002).

The municipality also believed that pursuing a

concession would allow the concessionaire to make enough of a profit to give it an
incentive to employ all its expertise in expanding and upgrading the services. The local
government decided to permit the private companies to reach rates of return that they
viewed as reasonable in relation to the management services and investment provided
(Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999). At that point, the Dolphin Coast sought out a
suitable private partner for a public-private partnership (PPP) with a long-term
concession contract (Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999).

The Concession
As mentioned earlier, PSP in the Dolphin Coast had actually begun before the
ANC assumed power For instance, municipal services such as refuse removal, street
sweeping, and parks and gardens maintenance had already been outsourced.

On

November 27, 1996, the Dolphin Coast government decided to seek out a private partner
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for water services, believing that it would result in management efficiency and access to
cheap capital (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002).
On December 13, 1996, the municipality posted an advertisement in Business

Day, South Africa’s main financial newspaper, to announce its intention and summon
interest from potential companies.

Business Day has a very wide coverage in the

financial community and, as such, advertising in this newspaper ensured the best
response from potential bidders, including from both South African companies and
MNCs. The proposals received were then reviewed according to the criteria in the

Request for Proposals (RFP) (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002). The RFP was prepared
with assistance from the DBSA in February 1997. The RFP provided the interested
parties with information about the current service system, plans for new projects (e.g.,
service expansion to low income housing), and the terms that the winning bidder would
be expected to abide by and possible terms under which the services would be considered
(Robbins, 2004).
A total of 15 companies responded to the advertisement. The government invited
formal proposals from the shortlisted companies: Dolphin Coast Water Services
Corporation, SAUR International, the Umgeni Water/Compagne Generale des Eaux
Consortium, and Water and Sanitation Services South Africa Pvt. Ltd. Then, detailed
bids were requested from three of the four consortia. Umgeni Water was disqualified
because of an apparent conflict of interest (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002). The proposals
were assessed by a technical panel of municipal officials and were assisted by expert
advisors appointed by the DBSA. The panel then made its recommendations to the
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executive political structure of the BoDC, which finally allowed officials to proceed with
negotiations with the preferred bidder, SAUR International (Robbins, 2004).
The main criteria used to evaluate the bids were the capabilities and experience of
the consortiums and consortium partners, technical operational responses, and detailed
financial projections in terms of investment, pricing, and company structure (Robbins,
2004). SAUR International was chosen as the preferred bidder because (1) it would
source foreign direct investment, (2) it could apply its expert WSS services knowledge to
improve services and efficiency, (3) its size would allow it to achieve economies of scale
through alignment with other operations, (4) its information technology and software was
appealing, (5) it had a black empowerment partner, and (6) it had a community social
upliftment clause in the bid (Robbins, 2004: 17).
It was made clear to the contract bidders that the tariff levels could not be
increased if rates of return were later judged to be insufficient (Kotze, Ferguson, and
Leigland, 1999). While preparing for the concession contract, DBSA experts continued
to advise the Dolphin Coast Council. In addition, officials from the Dolphin Coast
attended various workshops and seminars to help them execute contract negotiations
successfully and help supervise the implementation after signing. In January 1999, the
officials from the Dolphin Coast attended a two-week study tour of six cities in the US
where they were educated on monitoring concession contract compliance (Kotze,
Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999).
On January 29, 1999, the Dolphin Coast Transitional Local Council awarded Siza
Water Company a 30-year contract. The contract was to commence on April 1, 1999
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(Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002: 45). At the end of the 30 years, the contract can be
terminated or renewed, awarded to another company, or the municipality can resume
service provision. Siza Water can also choose to end the contract early, but there would
be a fee (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002). This was the very first long term water and
sanitation concession contract in South Africa’s history (Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland,
1999: 623).
Siza Water Company was the preferred bidding concessionaire, led by SAUR
(Société d'Aménagement Urbain et Rural, Company for Urban and Rural Development)
which included four South African partners. SAUR Services Ltd. is a South African
subsidiary of the French water operator SAUR International and it holds 58% of the
shares (Ueckermann, 2006: 14). The other four partners in the consortium and their
shares are as follows: Metropolitan Life Ltd. with 23% of the shares, Women’s
Development Bank Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd. with 5% of the shares, the Investment
Progress Group Holdings (IPG) with 5% of the shares, and NANO Investment Holdings
(Pty) Ltd. with 5% of the shares (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002: 48). The government
required the concessionaire to have local partners for Black empowerment purposes and
to keep some operations within the confines of South African law. This move was seen
as politically favorable because in the past private sector involvement in government
functions had been dominated by whites and foreign companies (Hemson and Batidzirai,
2002).
The concession permitted Siza Water to manage the water supply and sanitation
sector in the Dolphin Coast area between the KwaDukuza municipality and Siza
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(Ueckermann, 2006). In 1999, the contract was estimated to be worth about R300
million (US$61.7 million, in 1998 South African rand) in new investment (Kotze,
Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999: 623). SAUR Services was required to maintain 25%
shareholding percentages in the project companies (Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999:
636).
The contract requires the concessionaire to assume overall responsibility for the
WSS services, which include operation, maintenance, and management, and invest the
capital needed to expand services as detailed in the contract. The municipality, however,
was to keep ownership of all fixed assets. The concessionaire is entrusted with the assets
for the 30-year contract period and at the end of the contract, all assets are to be returned
to the municipality in a specific condition. The concessionaire was prohibited from
selling any assets without the Dolphin Coast Council’s permission (Kotze, Ferguson, and
Leigland, 1999). The concession agreement also outlines conditions under which Siza
Water can cut off services to customers. The conditions include illegal connections
(those that are not authorized by the company) and delays in bill payment (Robbins,
2004).
The initial contract negotiations were drafted by the BoDC and its advisors and
Siza Water Company. The original contract was modeled after similar WSS services
concession contracts (Robbins, 2004). The following is an excerpt from the original
contract agreement:
“Subject to the terms and conditions of the Contract, the COUNCIL hereby grants
to the CONCESSIONAIRE, the following exclusive right and authority during
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the term of this Contract to: process, use, manage, operate, occupy, and have free
and unencumbered access to the Works; redesign, upgrade, and expand the
Works; supply the Water Services directly to Customers; charge each Customer
directly for the supply of Water Services and to apply all monies so collected as it
deems fit; and save as otherwise stated in this Contract, operate within the
Concession Area as a private sector water services provider pursuant to the Water
Services Act and in each case to do such other things which are necessarily
incidental thereto” (Robbins, 2004: 17-18).
The other contract stipulations are the following.

The concessionaire is to

maintain significant shareholding percentages in the companies (i.e., 25%) (Kotze,
Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999). Any changes to the contract must be approved by the
Dolphin Coast Council, whose name later changed to the Ilembe District Municipality.
The concessionaire is to implement employee share participation schemes as well. In
addition to the overall responsibility for WSS services and required capital investments,
the concessionaire was to enter into a subcontract with a separate company, Saur
Services, which would operate the facilities (Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999).
Recall from the previous chapter that these contract stipulations are very similar to those
of the Buenos Aires concession contract. The similarities between these two case studies
will be analyzed in the next chapter.
The concessionaire has financial commitments in addition to its responsibility for
capital investments. Siza Water’s performance against contract targets is supported by a
R5 million (US$850,000, assuming 1999 South African rand) performance guarantee.
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This guarantee increases annually according to the local Consumer Price Index (Kotze,
Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999: 636). Upon signing the contract, the concessionaire paid
an implementation fee of R200,000 (US$34,000, assuming 1999 South African rand) to
the Dolphin Coast Council. In addition, it is required to pay a yearly concession fee of
about R554,850 (US$94,000, assuming 1999 South African rand) to the council. This fee
increases annually in accordance with the Consumer Price Index and can be renegotiated
after five years (Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999: 636).
The concession contract guarantees that all municipal workers involved in water
and sanitation service provision continue to be employed under the same or better
conditions of service. The contract also states that programs must be established for staff
training and development and new remuneration policies, such as equity schemes.
Additionally, the contract requires measures for the use and development of small
contractors, the growth of local businesses and professionals, and the development of
small enterprises.

The concessionaire is also required to contribute annually to

community development funds and the contributions are to increase in accordance with
inflation (Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999).
The Ilembe District Municipality Council (formerly the Dolphin Coast Council) is
responsible for monitoring the activities and performance of Siza Water Company to
ensure it complies with the contract’s stipulations. The council used the implantation and
concession fees to set up a contract compliance office to monitor the performance. The
council also approves the tariffs for the WSS services according to tariff escalation
formulas as detailed in the contract (Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999). Siza Water is
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not in charge of this because raising tariffs involves very complicated negotiations that
take many factors into account, but its interests are fully accounted for (Hemson and
Batidzirai, 2002). The contract is divided into Five Year Plans. At the end of each five
year period, tariffs are reviewed to re-evaluate the factors used in the previous five-year
period and make any necessary changes.
Water tariffs are determined by a complex formula, which is the following:
WPI = F = aF1 + bF2 + cF3,
where WPI is the Water Price Index, F is the formula, a is the pro rata average
contribution of bulk water to all expenses in the Five Year Plan; b is the pro rata average
contribution of operating costs to all expenses in the Five Year Plan; c is the pro rata
average contribution of capital costs as expressed in the depreciation account, existing
debt repayment, and financing costs to expenses in the Five Year Plan; F1 is the index for
bulk water supply; F2 is the index for operating costs; and F3 is the index for capital costs
(Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002: 151-2).
The Ilembe District Municipality Council also approves the quality and level of
service provided and the capital investments proposed by the concessionaire to meet its
obligations. The investments are required to be consistent with the municipal capital
investment plan. Finally, the council oversees how services are to be provided and how
complaints are to be addressed and can levy fines if the concessionaire does not meet any
of its performance targets (Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland, 1999).
The contract divided the customers into four categories. Siza Water does not
provide services to level one service consumers – these people obtain their water from
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rivers or bulk suppliers and have no sanitation services. Level two service customers
have communal standpipes and a ventilated improved pit latrine (VIP) for each
household. Level three service customers have a 200-liter (about 53 gallons) water tank
and a septic tank for each household. Level four service customers have a full water
connection with at least one flush toilet for each household (Hemson and Batidzirai,
2002).

Results of the Concession
The contract is still active and hence one cannot judge whether it has been a
complete success or failure yet. However, there is already sufficient evidence to judge
how it has been operating. When combined with evidence from the other case studies,
the results thus far of the Dolphin Coast case can justify considering the broader
implications of PSP in the WSS industry.
Thus far, most studies contend that the concession has been a partial success.
Services have been expanded and service targets have been fulfilled in the wealthier
areas. However, the poorest areas have generally not benefited from the concession. In
fact, they have endured high water bills, many whom cannot pay, have had service cutoffs for non-payment, have not always been provided with the free water guaranteed to
them by the new constitution, and some have even been forced to obtain water from
unsafe sources, like rivers, which directly led to the cholera outbreak of 2000-2001
(Farlam, 2005; Hall and Lobina, 2006).
Consequently, the best assessments seem to indicate that the results of the
contract are mixed with some scholars contending that there have been many successes
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while others point out shortcomings and problems. Whereas the local government and
Siza Water Company view the concession positively, level two and level four customers,
and unions view it negatively. In the middle, the Councilors believe that for the most part
the contract has been operating well, but there is room for improvement. The Councilors
are elected representatives who reside in the local communities and serve as liaisons
between the people and the decision makers in the local government (Hemson and
Batidzirai, 2002).
On the positive side, at the beginning of the contract, the water tariffs were lower
than the existing tariffs for virtually all residents. Moreover, at the beginning, under the
city’s plan for cross-subsidization, sewerage charges were higher for many hotels and
other commercial parties, but most residents paid less (Kotze, Ferguson, and Leigland,
1999). In addition, it is evident that the concession has successfully transferred all the
operations to the private sector, transferred the personnel, and has overcome political
opposition to the new sewerage charges. It is also reported that water leakages in the
network that spans 166 kilometers (103 miles) are now down to 11% (Cascal, 2007: 1)
from 30% in 1997 (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002: 66) after the replacement of some of
the very old water pipes.
Other positive outcomes include the opening of two customer service offices that
allow customers to contact the company. No such customer care centers existed before.
Customer service has substantially improved, for some customers, since the contract
began. The concessionaire also began distributing newsletters that accompany bills. The
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newsletters seek to provide information, such as how to conserve water and report faults,
and serve as a platform to reach all customers (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002).
Regarding the community, feelings over the concession vary but on the whole
they are mostly negative. Whereas the Councilors are optimistic, the unions, customers,
and Siza Water’s employees have reported negative outcomes. The Councilors tend to be
somewhat skeptical about the criticisms made by community members. Regardless of
the differing opinions, it is clear that the residents in the concession area view the costs of
their water services as higher than residents from surrounding communities.

Their

service costs are especially higher than the costs in the nearby Durban Metro area mostly
because of the additional sewerage charge that had been previously hidden in the
municipal rates (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002).
When the contract was being planned, opposition came mostly from the unions,
but their opposition subsided when government ministers and the ANC intervened and
tried to address their concerns.

The concession agreement had to make substantial

accommodations to union demands. Two of the most active unions are the Congress of
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Municipal Workers’
Union (SAMWU) (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002). Even after government intervention,
COSATU and SAMWU protested the final signing of the concession agreement, arguing
that the concession violated the National Framework Agreement (NFA), which is an
agreement guiding the restructuring of municipal service provision. These unions claim
that the final version of the contract shocked everyone else except for those government
officials involved in planning the contract (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002). The unions’
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position was bolstered in February 1999, when Public Services International (PSI)
demanded that the South African government withdraw the deal to privatize, citing
SAUR’s anticompetitive and corruptive practices (Barchiesi, 2001).
Since the contract began, the biggest source of opposition has been from the poor
communities and Siza Water’s employees. Residents, particularly the level two and poor
level four customers, have complained that their water bills are now the most expensive
household expenditure. This is very similar to what happened in Buenos Aires. Recall
that the low income customers, who faced increases in service prices, were very unhappy
with the price increases and showed their displeasure; this similarity between the case
studies will be analyzed in the next chapter. They also claim that they receive very high
water bills that do not reflect actual usage, that they started receiving monthly charges for
water and sewerage services, and that there are service problems. Community members
contend that they are often not consulted about service changes and even believe that Siza
Water, the local government, and Councilors do not genuinely care about their interests
(Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002).
Members of the poor communities (the level two and the poor level four
customers) are very unhappy that the service levels have not lived up to their
expectations. There are two main levels of service: level four and level two. Level four
consists of indoor plumbing and water-born sewerage whereas level two consists of
ventilated latrines and community standpipes that use pre-paid water cards.

The

concessionaire originally spread level four services to many households, but cut off
services, or reverted them back to level two if bills were not paid (Farlam, 2005). As of
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2005, service prices for level four customers have increased by 119% from pre-contract
levels and, for level two customers; the volumetric water price has increased by 80%
(Farlam, 2005: 22).
The vast majority of consumers feel that they were not adequately consulted by
the Dolphin Coast Council before the contract began and some blame their
representatives for misleading them. They contend that they were not told they would
face monthly charges and higher service prices; many were only informed that Siza
Water would provide services.

All customers, particularly those with low income,

believe that they should have been made aware of the information and issues before the
contract began. Since the contract began, consumers have actively lobbied to have the
monthly water and sewerage charges dropped. Most of the poorest residents, including
levels two, three, and some level four customers, cannot afford their water bills and as a
result, often cannot pay their bills and therefore set up illegal connections to the water
network (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002).
The level four residents in the Nkobongo Township are particularly unhappy with
the concession. Before the contract began, they obtained their water from community
standpipes and allegedly paid US$0.25 for every 25 liters (about 6.6 gallons) of water.
After the contract began, Siza Water installed water connections in some of the low-cost
housing in the township and also changed the communal standpipes to accept token cards
instead of money. Many residents want to pay their water bills, but because of higher
prices often cannot afford their bills. Some complain that they continue to receive bills
even after their service has been cut off, must pay very high prices for service
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reconnection (e.g., R1100 [US$92, assuming 2002 South African rand]), and that they are
charged for more than their actual water usage. They also report poor quality service and
even that their water taps are located in their toilets (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002).
The most alarming result is that PSP has still not done much to expand the
network to reach those without access. The Ilembe District government reports that
currently about 50% of the municipality’s population lack access to adequate water
services and 75% lack access to adequate sanitation services (Ilembe District
Municipality, 2007: 1).
Siza Water’s employees’ opinions are varied, but there are more negative than
positive feelings. Hemson and Batidzirai (2002) interviewed some of the workers and
found out that the workers transferred from the public to the private sector were generally
unhappy. They feel as if they were forced to transfer and claim that although Siza Water
had promised benefits, such as covered transportation costs, the company did not follow
through and even went back on its promises. Some contractors, such as plumbers, feel
that their contracts are not clear and that they have found hidden tasks in their job
descriptions. They even report that Siza Water has conned and tried to take advantage of
them. The workers who came from outside the municipality, however, had a more
positive view of the private company. Some of the workers came from Umgeni Water in
Durban and were happy to be transferred to a large international company such as SAUR
(Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002).
In terms of the price of services, the results have not been favorable for the
customers. Some scholars, like Robbins (2004) and Hemson and Batidzirai (2002), have
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been concerned that Siza Water, for economic reasons, has been more concerned with
investing in the wealthy side of town because although this side only accounts for 20% of
Siza Water’s customers, it brings in 80% of Siza’s revenue (Hemson and Batidzirai,
2002: 124). Indeed, the concession still has a tremendous amount of work to do to in
terms of widening the water network to the areas that previously had no connections.
The concessionaire also must deal with the opposition to the higher prices it is charging
the poor for services (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002). Hemson and Batidzirai (2002)
argue that thus far, contract decisions have been largely based on private sector
participation, cost reduction, and recovery, instead of on a pro-poor policy.
During its first financial year, Siza Water reported a R2 million loss
(US$340,000, assuming 1999 South African rand), but this is contradicted by their 104%
profit margin for the first year (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002: 55). Due to the division of
shareholdings, Siza Water had not made a profit at first, but SAUR saw a 21% return on
its investment during the first year (Farlam, 2005: 23). Nevertheless, by 2001, Siza was
unable to pay its concession fees in part because Umgeni Water, responsible for water
treatment and production, increased bulk water costs by 20% (Farlam, 2005: 22). As a
result, in June 2001, Siza Water sought contract re-negotiation, citing financial problems.
The company reported that its income fell short by about R12 million (about US$1.8
million, assuming 2004 South African rand) per year (Lobina, 2005: 61).
Even though Siza Water felt it necessary to ask for re-negotiation, it had not kept
up with the increasing demand for services and also refused to pay the promised R3.6
million (about US$475,000, assuming 2001 South African rand) lease payment to the
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municipality (Lobina, 2005: 64). SAUR did not feel it was appropriate to make its
contract payments to the city and requested a contract re-negotiation to raise water tariffs,
claiming that their net profits were insufficient. In addition, it is evident that Siza Water
is only investing in extending water services, when it is also required by contract to invest
in maintaining and upgrading services (Hall and Lobina, 2006).
Despite the unmet contract requirements, the local government awarded Siza
Water with a contract re-negotiation in its favor in 2001. The acting municipal manager
stated that the only other alternative to re-negotiation would have been to “go off to the
contract guarantor (a bank) and take back the performance bond” (Lobina, 2005: 64).
The re-negotiation allowed them to halve their annual concession fee until 2006 (Bond,
2006), reduce investment from R25 million to R10 million (from US$3.95 million to
US$1.58 million, assuming 2006 South African rand), and increase water prices for
connected households by 19% and by 80% for water standpipe users (Farlam, 2005; Hall
and Lobina, 2006: 21).
Even after the contract re-negotiation, Siza Water was not bringing in profits, yet
its parent company, SAUR, reported a 21% return on its investment because Siza water
pays it a fixed management fee every year (Hall and Lobina, 2006: 22). Consequently,
Siza Water has made little to no investment in new connections. In fact, it was reported
that in the poorest areas, there was actually a decrease in service levels due to house
water pipe disconnections and the higher water tariffs (Hall and Lobina, 2006).
It is important to note that even though the Dolphin Coast Council is solely
responsible for setting water tariffs, it is evident that the council has favored Siza Water’s
181

requests for tariff increases. The strong opposition to increasing tariffs and implementing
substantial sewerage charges were overcome, mostly because of the Council’s support
Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002). Hence, it is evident that, along with Siza Water, the
government is responsible for the substantial price increases and for not addressing the
public’s opposition to them.
There is now a three-tier system that makes the first 10 kiloliters (kl) technically
free, but every household must pay a connection charge. Since 1997, water tariffs have
not increased much and have even decreased for those consuming between 11-53kl. For
those consuming more than 35kl, however, the water tariffs are more expensive. Siza
Water argues that many level four customers do not use more than 10kl and hence
technically do not pay the R3.53 (US$0.57, assuming 2000 South African rand) per
kiloliter, unless the household is large and uses a lot of water (Hemson and Batidzirai,
2002: 72). Once the contract began, however, all connected households have been
charged with a basic connection fee of R24.60 (US$4.00, assuming 2000 South African
rand) (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002: 72). In addition, it is surprising that the areas that
have communal standpipes (level two service) pay higher rates than even the highest rate
for level four service! Refer to Table 20 for a summary of customers’ opinions at the
four different levels of services. Tables 21 and 22 demonstrate the difference between
water tariffs before and after the concession began.
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Table 20. The accommodations and opinions of levels two, three, and four customers
(level one is excluded because they are not provided with services)
Accommodations
Not applicable - not provided
with services

Overall Opinion about the Concession Contract

Level Two Customers

Communal standpipes and
ventilated improved pit latrines
(VIPs) in each household

Unhappy and often unable to pay higher service
prices. Service price increases for this group have
been the most extreme.

Level Three Customers

Supplied with a 200-liter (53gallon) tank of water and a
septic tank in each household

Level One Customers

Level Four Customers

Not applicable - not provided with services

Often unhappy and unable to pay higher service
prices. Service prices have increased but not as
dramatically as they did for level two customers.
The poor level four customers are unhappy because
often they cannot afford the higher services prices.
Full (piped) water connection
The wealthy level four customers often do not
and at least one flush toilet in
complain and can afford the higher service prices.
each household
Service prices have increased but not as dramatically
as they did for level two customers.

Studies of other poor communities reveal that despite the government’s pro-poor
water policy, the poorest actually pay the highest tariffs of R3.94 (US$0.64, assuming
2000 South African rand) per kl. For a 25 l bucket, this turns out to cost R0.10 (Hemson
and Batidzirai, 2002: 72). If spending R5 (US$0.81, assuming 2000 South African rand),
a family would obtain 1.25kl; 10kl would cost them R40 (US$6.51, assuming 2000 South
African rand) (Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002: 73). While this may not sound like a lot of
money, it makes up a large chunk of a poor household’s income.
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Table 21. Domestic water tariffs in 1997
Water Consumption

Price

0-10kl (0-2,640 gallons)

R2.11/kl (US$0.45/264 gallons,
assuming 1997 South African rand)

11-35kl (2,900-9,246 gallons)

R2.51/kl (US$0.54/264 gallons,
assuming 1997 South African rand)

36kl+ (9,510 gallons+)

R2.61/kl (US$0.56/264 gallons,
assuming 1997 South African rand)

Source: Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002: 72.
Table 22. The current and proposed domestic water tariffs, 2000/2001
1998/1999
R20 (US$4.11,
Site metered (basic charge per month for assuming 1998
level four supply)
South African
rand)
0-10kl consumption (0-2,640 gallons)
0
R2.23 (US$0.46,
11-35kl consumption (2,900-9,246
assuming 1998
gallons)
South African
rand)
R2.92 (US$0.60,
assuming 1998
36kl+ consumption (9,510 gallons+)
South African
rand)
Water dispensers per kl

N/A

1999/2000
2000/2001
R20 (US$3.40, R24.60 (US$4.11,
assuming 1999
assuming 2000
South African
South African
rand)
rand)
0
0
R2.45 (US$0.42, R2.74 (US$0.45,
assuming 1999
assuming 2000
South African
South African
rand)
rand)
R3.15 (US$0.53, R3.60 (US$0.59,
assuming 1999
assuming 2000
South African
South African
rand)
rand)
R3.53 (US$0.60, R3.94 (US$0.64,
assuming 1999
assuming 2000
South African
South African
rand)
rand)

Source: Hemson and Batidzirai, 2002: 72.
To add insult to injury, it is evident that South Africa’s free water policy has not
been adequately enforced. Services have been completely cut off for those who do not
pay their water bills, despite the constitutional guarantee to a minimum amount of free
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water. Furthermore, those who use water standpipes have not received any free water
and connected households are required to pay a connection fee (Hall and Lobina, 2006).
Prior to privatization, there was a free communal tap system; privatization
changed the system to a pre-paid metering system, which is directly related to the cholera
outbreak (McKinley, 2004).

Bond (2006) also argues that the 100% cost-recovery

program that led to privatization (and promulgated by the World Bank) cut off many
water connections and ultimately caused the cholera outbreak throughout Kwa-ZuluNatal. Hemson (2006) states that the cost recovery policies harmed those low-income
people who were too poor to pay R20 (about US$3, assuming 2006 South African rand)
per month. The new charges initiated in August 2000 forced those who could not afford
the water bills to obtain water from untreated sources like rivers, which infected them
with cholera. The estimates of the number affected by the 2000-2001 cholera outbreak
vary slightly between 117,147 to 120,000 people infected and 265 to 300 people killed,
most of who were in the Kwa-Zulu-Natal province (Hemson et al., 2006: 4; McKinley,
2004: 184). Hemson (2000) contends that this cholera epidemic reveals the significant
fault-lines in water and sanitation service provision to the rural poor and provides
evidence for the contradiction in policy between water services as a public good versus
water as a commodity.
In addition, it is evident that the concession has not helped the community enjoy
the free water policy. In 2000, the ANC changed the policy to provide each family with a
minimum of 6,000 liters (1,585 gallons) of free water per month before service charges
apply (Farlam, 2000).

However, this policy has not yet been applied to level two
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customers in the Dolphin Coast who use pre-paid meters and are the neediest.

In

addition, although poor level four customers receive their 6,000 liters, they still have to
pay the basic monthly connection fee, which monopolizes a large portion of their income
(Farlam, 2005). Also in the Dolphin Coast, the same politicians who permitted service
disconnection for non-payment redesigned price schedules to provide the 6,000 liters per
household, per month lifeline. In the price schedule, there is a very sharp convex curve,
making prices very high after the first free 6,000 liters per month, ensuring that any
consumption after 6,000 liters is unaffordable for many poor people, which then leads to
even more service cut-offs (Bond, 2007). Furthermore, even if the policy were enforced,
Bond (2007: 3) argues that this is a miniscule free lifeline: 6,000 liters equate to just two
toilet flushes per person, per day (for those fortunate enough to have toilets) in a
household of eight people, leaving no water left for drinking, washing, or other household
uses.
Hemson (2004; 2006) notes that only the households that earn less than R1,000
(about US$150, assuming 2004 South African rand) a month benefit from this policy and
the rural population receives the least benefit since the infrastructure needed to
implement this policy is severely limited. Bond (2006: 15) argues that this so-called
constitutional guarantee has not lived up to its promise – the guarantee contains hidden
caveats about the availability of water resources and incremental and progressive
implementation. Hemson (2000) also notes that South Africa’s GEAR policy, which
promotes full cost recovery and financial austerity, actually works against the
constitutional guarantee of free water.
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While the water service prices may not appear expensive to many people, water
charges take a huge chunk of most poor people’s income. Hemson (2000: 41) notes that
40% of South Africa’s population is actually getting poorer because of the new high costs
of water. Poor people must make trade-offs: if they pay their water bills, then often they
cannot afford electricity or even food, for example, and vice versa (Hemson, 2000;
McDonald, 2002). In addition, child nutrition may be threatened since the poor have to
make tough decisions over essential resources (Hemson, 2000). If they do not pay their
bills, the water company is quick to disconnect their services (McDonald, 2002).
South Africa has often been referred to as a culture of non-payment, a legacy of
the Apartheid-era boycotts and protests. During Apartheid, the ANC actually encouraged
the black townships to stop paying for their water, electricity, and housing bills. This
non-payment boycott served as a strong weapon against the Apartheid regime by
bankrupting local governments (Daley, 1995). In the post-Apartheid era, however, some
scholars argue that citizens are not paying their bills simply because they cannot afford
them; it is not a form of protest. There are some residents who do not pay bills because
they think they can get away with it, but almost all non-payments are due to an inability
to pay (McDonald, 2002).
It is also argued that the privatization of water and sanitation services is a new
form of Apartheid, or at the very least, reinforces Apartheid-era service exclusion. There
is an inherent bias in service provision across racial lines.

The black African

communities, by and large, are too poor to afford privatized water services and the more
affluent white communities are more than able to pay (Francis, 2005; Bond, 2007).
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Scholars, for the most part, contend that the concession has had more negative
than positive outcomes. McKinley (2004) offers to most blunt assessment to the effect
that the water privatization project in South Africa has been disastrous. Hall, Bayliss,
and Lobina (2001) argue that the contract became unworkable because of pricing and
contract issues. Bond (2006) contends that so far, water privatization projects throughout
South Africa have largely failed to meet their goals and have not benefited the poor.
SAUR endured financial difficulties in 2001, largely because the housing
development market had not lived up to its projections and, as a result, the company’s
profits were lower than anticipated (Hall and Lobina, 2006). COSATU (2001) argues
that SAUR used “bait and switch” tactics – SAUR had reasonable contract terms at the
beginning, but planned on renegotiating once the contract began, thereby in effect forcing
the municipality to grant the higher water tariffs, decrease investment, and weaken
contract clauses which had protected the consumers at the beginning.
On May 3, 2007, Cascal Group acquired 73.4% of Siza Water’s equity and the
equity for the South African shareholders as well (Biwater, 2007: 1).

Cascal is a

subsidiary of Biwater PLC, a large water company from the UK. Cascal Group still owns
73.4% of Siza Water’s shares and the other shares are now owned by South African
Insurance Company Metropolitan Life Ltd. and three local black empowerment partners
as minority shareholders (Cascal, 2007: 1).
Farlam (2005) contends that smaller water concessions, like the Dolphin Coast
contract, are often less commercially viable than larger ones because it is difficult for the
private sector to take advantage of economies of scale. He recommends the following
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actions to address the shortcomings: capacity building for local municipal water and
sanitation authorities for improved performance, more accurate information for feasibility
studies, especially in terms of data used for projections, clarification from the government
on the free water policy and specific instructions on what to do if contract terms change,
and greater transparency from the local government and private company.
Farlam (2005) also contends that the difficulties experienced with this concession
may have been avoided if the municipality had chosen a management contract instead. A
management contract would have emphasized training local staff to assume management
of the public company and would have likely avoided the substantial service price
increases. In an interview, David Hemson stated that small municipalities, like the
Dolphin Coast, have little power in securing their interests when negotiating with large
multi-national companies (MNCs) (Farlam, 2005).
Hemson (2000) also contends that service delivery options should have focused
on the poorest of the poor in rural areas because they suffer most from the lack of
services. While the national government may acknowledge this on paper, policies often
exclude them because projects charge connection fees and full cost recovery in tariffs.
The policies particularly work against women who bear primary responsible for seeking
out water for their families. Most policies have focused on expanding and improving
services in urban areas (Hemson, 2000).
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The following data on rural people living in Kwa-Zulu-Natal demonstrate the gap
between policy and implementation:

•

Rivers and streams are the primary source of water for most people, although there

has been some progress in service improvement;

•

About 60% get their water from a source over 200m (about 219 yards) away from

home;

•

About 30% spend over an hour to get water;

•

Only 18% pay for water – meaning the vast majority (about 82%) are not served by

water projects, or cannot afford network connection;

•

About 60% state that they have an inadequate water supply since rivers sometimes

dry up, 20% state they cannot carry enough water, and 10% claim that they have no
regular supply;

•

88% claimed that they use pit latrines if they ever use a toilet; and

•

67% state that community water services were either worse or the same than before,

but 31% did report improvement (Hemson, 2000: 40).

The United Kingdom Case Study
The UK is where privatization of state enterprises originated in the late 1970s.
From 1979 to 1983, 12 SOEs were either fully or partially divested and raised net profits
of £1.6 billion (US$2.6 billion, assuming 2000 British pounds) (Gupta, 2000: 49).
Between 1987 and 1991, the profits had increased to £22.5 billion (US$36.4 billion,
assuming 2000 British pounds), after the government sold an additional 24 SOEs,
including British Steel, the regional electricity companies, and the water supply and
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sewerage companies (Gupta, 2000: 49). By October 1993, about two-thirds of the UK’s
SOEs and about 940,000 jobs had been shifted over to the private sector (Gupta, 2000).
By 1994, it had privatized over 40 SOEs through public flotation (Bakker, 2003a). In
1979, state companies accounted for 11% of Britain’s GDP, but by 1994, they only
accounted for 2% (Bakker, 2003a: 8).
The water supply and sanitation companies’ debt and shares holdings were sold to
the private sector between 1989 and 1992. Between 1988 and 1993, privatizing the
accrual of debt in the water sector had generated billions in net proceeds.

More

specifically, between 1988 and 1993, the privatization of water holdings had generated
£73 million (US$118 million, assuming 2000 British pounds) and the privatization of
water shares had generated £3.4 billion (US$5.5 billion, assuming 2000 British pounds)
(Gupta, 2000: 50).
In 1989, England and Wales experimented with one of the first modern water
industry privatizations. The UK’s national government sold all 10 of its regional publicly
owned water companies and created an independent regulator, the Office of Water
Services (OFWAT) (van den Berg, 1997).

The UK’s water privatization is unique

compared to other countries. The reform entailed large, private monopolies separated by
river basins and the UK has some of the highest WSS service connections in the world,
unlike the situation in developing countries (Bakker, 2003a).
The UK uses the Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM) approach, meaning
that the river basin is the basic water management unit and is believed to be a rational
means of exploiting natural hydrological and topographical features. Precipitation is
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garnered and used for many different (and often conflicting) uses. The hydrological
boundaries serve as the administrative boundaries of the management unit, thereby
making it harder to pass on problems to neighbors, such as pollution (Maloney and
Richardson, 1995).

The Water Sector before Privatization
England and Wales receive a lot of rainfall, but they still have water supply
problems. England in particular has issues with water supply and waste disposal because
of rapid urban and industrial development. Given these problems, England and Wales
had to respond by changing their water policies in the 1970s (Maloney and Richardson,
1995).
The UK’s water sector has undergone two major reorganizations in only 15 years.
In 1974, the UK established a regional organizational structure that substantially reduced
the number of administrative units and set up boundaries based on the IRBM approach.
Regionalization was seen as a technical, rational, and professional solution to water
shortages. Then in 1989, the UK embarked on a new regulatory regime – privatization –
and actually undermined the technical solution to water shortages because it separated
environmental control from water supply and sewage disposal. In short, privatization
was economically and ideologically based (Maloney and Richardson, 1995).

The

environmental regulatory responsibilities were transferred to the National Rivers
Authority (van den Berg, 1997) because the government felt it was inappropriate for the
private water companies to regulate their own water quality (Saal and Parker, 2001).
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The Water Act of 1973 established 10 regional water authorities (RWAs) in the
UK, giving them control over all water management in their particular region. The
RWAs provided water services to about 75% of English and Welsh consumers while the
other 25% of consumers got their water from 21 Water Only Companies (WOCs),
formerly called the Statutory Water Companies (SWCs). The WOCs are not involved in
any sewerage services. The RWAs provide 100% of the sewerage services to England
and Wales (Maloney and Richardson, 1995: 7). The RWAs are now known as Water and
Sewerage Companies (WASCs) (Maloney and Richardson, 1995).
The RWAs were established by the national government, not by the
municipalities, and were thus were no longer accountable to local government, but their
board meetings stayed open to the public until 1983 when the Thatcher government made
them private (Lobina and Hall, 2001). Lobina and Hall (2001: 4) note that the RWAs
made some significant efficiency gains between 1974 and 1989, as evidenced by
reducing the overstaffed workforce from 80,000 to 50,000. It should be pointed out that
this comparative case study is only concerned with the privatization of the 10 RWAs and
not with the 25% of consumers who receive their water supply from the WOCs.
Despite the sweeping reforms that privatized many of the SOEs in the late 1970s
and 1980s, privatization of the public water and sanitation sector actually emerged later
on the government’s agenda. Thatcher did not actively pursue it during her first term.
When her administration decided to privatize the sector, there was no clear strategy and it
was opposed by the public, as well as by government and civil servants. Thatcher’s
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administration privatized other network utilities, such as gas and the telecom industries,
but decided to postpone the privatization of water services (Bakker, 2003a).
Bakker (2003a) contends that the government was hesitant partly because it
realized that water was somehow different than other services.

The nature of the

distribution networks meant that a water company would have a monopoly, at least in the
short term. Public health and environmental issues are closely tied to water supply
services and thus a strong regulatory network is required. As a result, the water industry
requires much more regulation than other markets (Bakker, 2003a). The typical approach
in market capitalism to rely on the hidden hand of the market to fix issues does not work
well in the water industry. Another source of hesitation for the Thatcher administration
was the huge amount of capital investment required. The water industry had over 50,000
employees and assets worth over £28 billion (US$45 billion, assuming 2003 British
pounds) (current cost replacement) and, when it was privatized, it was one of the largest
utility privatizations in Britain (Bakker, 2003a: 8).
The UK’s water industry privatization was one of the most controversial and
complex privatization projects of the 1980s.

The Conservative Party government’s

ideological motivations played an important role in developing the broad privatization
program (Maloney and Richardson, 1995). Maloney and Richardson (1995) claim that
when the RWAs were set up, the path was being cleared for more fundamental change.
Financial aspects of water management became increasingly important and the
organizational culture began to shift. Water was starting to be seen as an economic good
and less as an essential public service (Maloney and Richardson, 1995).
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Maloney and Richardson (1995) argue that both the Water Act of 1983, which
worked to further reorganize the water industry, and the change from historic cost
accounting (HCA) to the current cost accounting (CCA) compelled the RWAs to stress
commercialism.

In addition, the local authority representation of the RWAs was

removed to facilitate the privatization of the RWAs. Although privatization had not been
consciously planned when the RWAs were established (Maloney and Richardson, 1995),
the water industry had already become more ‘managerialist’ (1995: 53) and
accountability to the public had decreased, at least since the early 1970s. Given these
policy developments, Maloney and Richardson (1995) argue that privatizing the water
industry was not as sudden and radical as it may have appeared, even though
privatization was a considerable change from public ownership and management.
The water management authority, especially in Thames, was one of the major
players behind the decision to privatize. The authorities were eager for change partly
because the national government’s financial policies had compelled them to find
alternatives to the existing system of political and financial control (Maloney and
Richardson, 1995).

It is unclear whether it was planned or not, but the national

government had encouraged support for privatization from the management of public
companies and actually made business unpleasant for nationalized industries,
consequently stimulating change in management attitudes towards denationalization. The
Conservative government believed that the public companies needed managerial
performance improvement. This, combined with the national government’s financial
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issues, was the main reasons for the series of changes between the government and public
companies (Maloney and Richardson, 1995).
At that point, the water authorities concluded that privatization was the best
option because it entailed freedom from government interference. They believed that the
RWA’s financial structure needed dire improvement because:

•

The government controlled RWAs borrowing levels;

•

Access to sources for borrowing was restricted;

•

The government set financial targets with the intention of reducing borrowing and

increase service charges;

•

The government set levels of operating costs;

•

The government controlled the form of accounts involving the publication of

accounts based on the historic cost convention while charges were based off the current
cost convention (creating unnecessary complications and lack of clarity); and

•

There was no visible control over the level of prices charged; instead the control was

covert and normally not understood by customers (Maloney and Richardson, 1995: 56).
The national government argued that privatization of the water industry would
increase efficiency, provide the much-needed investment for expansion and upgrades,
make up for past under-investment, and create competition (van den Berg, 1997).
However, Lobina and Hall (2001) contend that the government’s arguments for
privatization were neither supported by comparative studies nor international reviews of
the performance of public versus private operators. They argue that the primary motive
for privatization was the Thatcher government’s neo-liberal economic approach and the
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desire for a reduced role for the state and reduction of public borrowing to as low as
possible. In addition, under the new neo-liberal regime, the RWAs were finding it
difficult to leverage the necessary funding for investment and this difficulty in raising
funds was then used as another argument for privatization. In fact, when the government
had pursued privatization in the water industry in 1984, the public opposition forced the
government to abandon the plans before the elections in 1987 (Lobina and Hall, 2001).
There is virtually universal access to water and sanitation services in the UK and so
expanding services was not cited as one of the goals of the privatization program, as it
was in the other case studies.

The Water Contracts
The Water Act of 1988 awarded the private companies with 25-year contracts to
manage and provide water and sanitation services to all but those 25% that were not
served by the RWAs (Lobina and Hall, 2001). All 10 RWAs were privatized by flotation
on the London Stock Exchange (Bakker, 2003a). No other country had completely
privatized its water and sanitation systems via asset sales, floating former public
companies on the stock exchange with the infrastructure, property, and networks intact
(Bakker, 2001). The RWAs were transformed into publicly limited companies (PLCs).
The water and sanitation services business was transferred to a subsidiary company
acting under a license given by the Department of Environment, Transport, and Regions
(Bakker, 2003c). The RWAs maintained their river basin boundaries as established in the
IRBM program. In their respective regions, the private companies were established as
vertically integrated regional monopolies. As such, they were responsible for all of the
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water services: extracting raw water, delivering processed water and then collecting,
treating, and discharging wastewater (Bakker, 2003c).
Special discounts on the market were offered to the public to help gain political
support (Lobina and Hall, 2001).

This most extreme form of privatization, full

divestiture, was possible since the industry was concentrated in the RWAs. Privatization
protected the 10 companies from competition and the companies were given monopolies
for their regions for the contract period (Lobina and Hall, 2001). The 10 regional water
and sewerage companies created in 1989 were Anglican Water, Dwr Cymru (Welsh
Water), North West Water, Northumbrian Water, Severn Trent Water, Southern Water,
South West Water, Thames Water, Wessex Water, and Yorkshire Water (Lobina and
Hall, 2001). Refer to Table 23 for a list of their parent companies. Refer to Figure 4 for
a visual of the RWAs taken over by the 10 companies. The areas shaded in light gray
represent the RWAs; the darker gray regions represent the WOCs (water supply
companies on the map) and are not the subject of this case study.
Table 23. Parent companies of the 10 water companies
Company
Anglican Water
Dwr Cymru (Welsh
Water)
Northumbrian Water
North West Water
Severn Trent Water
Southern Water
South West Water

Ownership
100%

Thames Water

100%

Wessex Water
Yorkshire Water

100%
100%

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

Parent Group
Country of Origin
Anglican Water
UK
Western Power Distribution
USA
(WPD, Southern Company, PPL)
Suez-Lyonnaise
France
United Utilities
UK
Severn Trent
UK
Scottish Power
UK (Scotland)
Pennon Group
UK
Rheinisch-Westfälische
Germany
Elektrizitätswerke (RWE)
Azurix (Enron)
USA
Kelda
UK

Source: Lobina and Hall, 2001: 22.
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Figure 4. The boundaries for the 10 water companies

Source: Bakker, 2001: 146.
Three independent regulatory bodies were set up to oversee the 10 water
companies: the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI), the National Rivers Authority, now
known as the Environment Agency (EA), and OFWAT.

OFWAT establishes the

maximum prices that the water companies can charge consumers.

OFWAT’s main

responsibility is to make sure that the companies can finance themselves by earning a
reasonable rate of return on capital (van den Berg, 1997). Before privatization, the
government strictly regulated the water companies (which were individual authorities and
a few private companies) by setting a cap on their profits at a maximum rate of return of
5% (Lobina and Hall, 2001: 4).
Privatization sought to avoid political interference in the regulatory process. The
system has built-in checks and balances. For example, OFWAT has financial autonomy,
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is an independent government agency, and is instructed to limit political discretion in
policy and investment decisions (van den Berg, 1997). van den Berg (1997) also notes
that the British system of economic regulation invented price caps. OFWAT is supposed
to set price caps, or maximum prices, for the companies in five-year cycles. The price
caps are supposed to prevent efficiency disincentives on rate of return regulation, but the
continued use of priced caps can actually reduce the incentives over time (Saal and
Parker, 2001a). The system also invented yardstick, or comparative, competition that is
supposed to control water companies’ monopoly over information that OFWAT needs to
do its job. OFWAT designs yardsticks from performance comparisons to evaluate a
water company’s efficiency. The less efficient companies get more demanding efficiency
targets and are expected to meet the standards set by the best performers (van den Berg,
1997).

Lobina and Hall (2001) note, however, that OFWAT only compares the

companies with each other and does not make international comparisons.
It is important to note that the Thatcher administration helped increase the
profitability of the water industry for the companies by writing off all the debts that the
companies had before privatization, estimated to have been almost US$8 billion, and
gave the companies a ‘green dowry’ towards the cost of future investment, estimated at
US$2.6 billion (Lobina and Hall, 2001: 5; Maloney and Richardson, 1995: 84; Saal and
Parker, 2001: 65). In addition, the public companies were offered for sale at a discount,
estimated to be equal to 22% of the market value (calculated as the difference between
the issue price of the companies’ shares and the price after the first week of trading)
(Lobina and Hall, 2001: 5).
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Set before OFWAT was created, the initial price system favored the water
companies: the pre-tax profits for the 10 companies increased by 142% between 1989
and 1998 (Lobina and Hall, 2001: 11). In addition, the companies were exempt from
paying profits taxes (Lobina and Hall, 2001). van den Berg (1997) notes that since large
investments were needed and privatization was new to the government, the contract was
designed to be favorable to the shareholders to ensure that the public flotation would
succeed. Writing off the companies’ debts hurt the government by creating a deficit of
about £1.3 billion (US$2.2 billion, assuming 1997 British pounds) (van den Berg, 1997:
2).

Results of the Contracts
On the positive side, the companies have invested a substantial amount of money
in the water industry. During the first eight years, they had invested about £17 billion
(US$29 billion, assuming 1997 British pounds).

This compares to the £9.3 billion

invested by the government in the six years before privatization (van den Berg, 1997: 2).
Another positive aspect of the contracts has been a decrease in leakage. OFWAT
set leakage reduction targets after the 1995 drought for the first time. Leakage reduction
has been successful overall. It has fallen from 31% in 1994/1995 to 22% in 1999/2000
(Lobina and Hall, 2001: 19). In addition, drinking water quality has improved and there
has been a lower environmental impact of water production (Bakker, 2001).
However, it is evident that not all the investment has been efficient. The price cap
system functioned more like rate-of-return regulation during the first regulatory cycle
(1989-1994) thus it is believed that the companies may not have invested as efficiently as
201

possible. Furthermore, since the economic and environmental regulatory responsibilities
were separated directly prior to privatization, it made it difficult to create the right
investment incentives, especially since consumers are generally unwilling to pay for the
water quality improvements required by European Union directives (van den Berg,
1997).
Moreover, OFWAT’s responsibility is limited to ensuring the financial viability
of the water industry hence it is not concerned with public costs and benefits of water
policies when reviewing the companies’ investment programs. For example, almost no
progress has been made on metering residential users because of its very high initial costs
(even though in the long term it pays off) and thus the companies are slow to implement
progress. Finally, since privatization began, investments in the regulated water business
have been in sync with the regulatory cycle and this tends to alter the timing of
investments and undermine the companies’ drive to save on costs near the end of the
cycle (van den Berg, 1997).
The real sector operating costs per unit water slightly increased during the first
regulatory cycle (1989-1994) even though the staff was reduced. The water companies
associate this with the additional investment to meet higher water quality standards.
High transfer pricing between the regulated and unregulated parts of the industry could
also play a role in the rise in costs. However, it is clear that the principal reason is the
generous first cap price set by OFWAT. As a result, the companies had little, if any,
incentive to reduce their operating costs. OFWAT did in fact reduce the price cap in
1995 for the second regulatory cycle (van den Berg, 1997). However, Tables 24 and 25
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below show that service prices still increased in the second regulatory cycle and the
companies still reaped significant profits, but the largest increases happened between
1989 and 1995 (Saal and Parker, 2001a).
Table 24. Average annual water bills, by company, from 1989 to 1999
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 1992-1993
cash
real terms
cash
DwrCymru
real terms
cash
North West
real terms
cash
Northumbrian
real terms
cash
Severn Trent
real terms
cash
South West
real terms
cash
Southern
real terms
cash
Thames
real terms
cash
Wessex
real terms
cash
Yorkshire
real terms
cash
England and Wales
real terms
Anglican

157
217
149
206
111
153
108
149
107
148
147
203
124
172
101
140
139
192
123
170
120
166

178
224
169
214
125
157
123
155
122
153
165
208
138
174
114
144
155
196
136
172
135
170

205
247
197
237
143
172
148
178
139
168
194
234
161
194
130
156
178
215
155
187
156
188

226
264
218
255
156
182
160
186
153
178
231
270
173
202
141
164
193
225
166
194
171
199

1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999
244
280
237
272
170
195
177
203
166
190
268
308
183
210
153
176
210
241
179
206
186
213

259
289
255
285
182
204
188
210
181
203
304
340
197
220
163
182
223
249
192
215
199
223

272
294
263
284
194
210
197
213
189
205
318
344
214
231
174
188
234
253
204
221
210
228

279
294
272
287
208
219
207
218
200
211
329
347
229
241
182
192
243
257
213
225
221
233

282
288
281
287
221
226
216
221
208
213
339
347
244
249
190
194
252
258
216
221
229
234

288
288
294
294
234
234
229
229
222
222
354
354
257
257
201
201
265
265
226
226
242
242

Increase from
1989/1990 to
1998/1999
84%
33%
98%
43%
111%
53%
112%
53%
108%
50%
142%
75%
107%
49%
99%
44%
91%
38%
84%
33%
102%
46%

Source: Lobina and Hall, 2001: 6.
Table 25.

Pre-tax profits, per company, in millions of £ and in real terms from

1989/1990 to 1997/1998

Anglican Water
Dwr Cymru (Welsh Water)

106
46

188
158

202
163

212
177

148
162

236
132

252
119

215
215

274
209

Increase from
1989/1990 to
1997/1998
158%
351%

Northumbrian Water
North West Water
Severn Trent Water
Southern Water
South West Water
Thames Water
Wessex Water
Yorkshire Water
Total

52
14
176
81
61
218
31
137
922

265
58
307
120
109
263
81
141
1,690

271
72
313
136
106
278
91
146
1,776

282
79
308
136
106
287
98
158
1,844

302
70
316
143
104
271
116
161
1,794

298
99
292
157
69
332
128
155
1,898

368
97
395
175
115
242
142
172
2,077

396
129
373
N/A
118
384
150
223
2,203

394
135
351
N/A
106
419
139
206
2,232

658%
898%
100%
115%
72%
92%
351%
50%
142%

Company

1989/1990

1990/1991 1991/1992

1992/1993 1993/1994

1994/1995 1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998

Source: Lobina and Hall, 2001: 11.
One of the most important negative outcomes of the contract is the service price
increase across the board. van den Berg (1997) contends that the investment boom
created significant cost increases. The average household has been able to pay for the
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increased costs, but low-income households have a lot of difficulty paying (van den Berg,
1997). Table 24 demonstrates that for each of the 10 companies, service prices increased
in cash and real terms from 1989/1990 to 1998/1999. All prices are in £1998/1999 and in
real terms, prices were adjusted for inflation to 1998/1999 prices using the Retail Price
Index (RPI) deflator. For example, in real terms, an average annual bill for Anglican
water in 1989/1990 was about US$357 and in 1998/1999, the bill was about US$473. At
the bottom of the figure, England and Wales refer to the water only companies. In real
terms, Anglican and Yorkshire were on the low end with prices that increased by 33%,
but South West’s prices increased by 75% (Lobina and Hall, 2001: 6).
While service prices increased substantially for most consumers, the profit rates
for the 10 companies soared (van den Berg, 1997; Lobina and Hall, 2001). Their profits
have been very high, even for UK and international standards. During the first year of
privatization, their pre-tax profits doubled and in eight years, it rose by 142% in real
terms (Lobina and Hall, 2001: 10). In fact, even the biggest water MNCs, like Vivendi,
have had lower rates of return than the UK companies. The excessive profits have
benefited the directors of the companies by giving them large salaries and bonuses
(Lobina and Hall, 2001).
Table 25 shows the pre-tax profits for each company from 1989 to 1998, in real
terms. As a whole, the pre-tax profits for all 10 companies increased by 142% over that
period in real terms. Table 26 shows the salaries for the highest paid directors for each
company. The salaries increased substantially for all but Southern Water, which went
down by 1%, and Thames Water, which only increased by 7% over the whole period
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(Lobina and Hall, 2001: 13). The high profits resulted in a major public outcry (van den
Berg, 1997).
Table 26. Salaries of the highest paid directors by company, thousand of £, in real terms
and adjusted to 1997/1998 prices
Company
Anglican Water
Dwr Cymru (Welsh
Water)
Northumbrian Water
North West Water
Severn Trent Water
Southern Water
South West Water
Thames Water
Wessex Water
Yorkshire Water

N/A

126

186

210

239

211

223

378

Increase from
1990/1991 to
1997/1998
200%

176

166

178

175

150

206

336

345

96%

178
101
196
110
175
258
158
147

223
130
174
146
199
234
188
168

324
147
223
155
194
349
237
178

405
168
339
168
241
356
251
203

395
207
344
237
255
446
252
208

402
173
244
171
215
112
195
180

337
163
248
178
N/A
255
209
182

404
152
293
109
N/A
277
206
298

150%
50%
49%
-1%
23%
7%
30%
103%

1990/1991 1991/1992 1992/1993 1993/1994 1994/1995 1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998

Source: Lobina and Hall, 2001: 13.
Consumers have been very unhappy that their water bills have continued to
increase while the companies report more and more profits, especially since directors’
salaries are exorbitant. OFWAT claims that service prices need to increase so that the
companies can fund the much-needed investment in the industry (Fleming, 2006). The
water industry also contends that in order to deal with recurring droughts and the need to
conserve water resources service prices need to increase to encourage consumers to
conserve (Nicholls and Harris, 2006).
In addition to the price increases, privatization has also resulted in a decreased
water services labor force by 8,599 people in the 10 companies from 1990 to 1999, or by
21.5% (Lobina and Hall, 2001: 15). Despite the cuts, however, Saal and Parker (2001a)
found that the industry’s productivity has not increased as a result of privatization.
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Service disconnections also increased after privatization. During the first five
years, the rate of household disconnections tripled to 18,636 in 1994 (Lobina and Hall,
2001: 16). As a result, there was widespread public opposition on human rights and
public health grounds. It is reported that in 1992, dysentery cases increased in all major
towns except in London, which can be correlated to service cut offs. Many feel that the
companies do not practice social responsibility by cutting off people who cannot afford
their water bills. In addition, it is reported that the water companies did not inform the
local authorities about the service cut offs, even though they are required to do so (Lobina
and Hall, 2001).
The contracts are still active in the UK, but some important changes have
occurred. In 1995, companies were given less power to cut off services. The companies
then began to install pre-payment meters for those customers with a history of nonpayment that would supply water only when charged with a card, otherwise, the
household would receive no water. As of 1996, more than 16,000 were installed and
OFWAT reported that this led to a sharp increase in the amount of hidden disconnections
(Lobina and Hall, 2001: 17). These issues led the 1998 Water Act to deem it illegal for
the water companies to disconnect users and for them to install pre-paid meters or trickle
valves.
In 1995, there was a severe drought throughout the UK that revealed some very
important issues. Lobina and Hall (2001) argue that privatization made these issues
worse. The companies had under-invested to maintain dividends and consequently, water
shortages, particularly in Yorkshire, were more intense. Leakage rates were very high in
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the main water system. Additionally, the public perceived the companies as greedy and
thus were less willing to conserve resources, especially since the companies had not made
conservation commitments (Lobina and Hall, 2001; Bakker, 2003a).
As a result of the drought of 1995 and the underinvestment by the companies, the
regulatory framework was tightened (Hukka and Katko, 2003). OFWAT set the price
cap lower on April 1, 1995 and again on April 1, 2000, than it had for the first regulatory
cycle. However, when setting the price cap, the K figure still remained positive, so
consumers still witnessed sharp price increases.

The most marked price increases

occurred before 1995 when the price cap was set higher (Saal and Parker, 2001a).
In addition, in 1997, the New Labor administration organized the Water Summit
that resulted in a stricter regulatory environment. The tariff system was revised in 1999
(Hukka and Katko, 2003) and price limits were created for the companies. The 1998
Competition Act allowed the regulatory bodies to require companies with excessive rates
of return to lower their prices between periodic reviews. OFWAT was able to exercise
more power in lowering consumers’ bills. Actually, by 1997, OFWAT had started
arguing that future service prices should be decreased in order to “return gains from
outperformance—arising both from operating and capital efficiencies—to customers”
(Bakker, 2003c: 364). The idea was that lowering the price cap would give efficiency
gains back to shareholders by eliminating the “excess returns on regulatory assets which
have been earned” and give the companies the expected and more politically accepted
rates of return (Bakker, 2003c: 364). Indeed, bills started declining by 2000-2001 by an

207

average of 12.4% in real terms and were to remain stable until 2005 (Bakker, 2003c:
364).
There were final periodic review determinations made in mid-1999 that decreased
share prices by about 50% throughout the water industry (Bakker, 2003c: 365). Some
shares have traded well below their regulatory asset value, demonstrating that the
companies had been exposed to increased financing and taxation costs and to decreasing
revenues and profits. The majority of the companies did not have enough money to
finance investments since the prices had been set to cover capital expenditure and not
dividends or interest as well. There were little, if any, opportunities for new sources of
money in the regulated business – the demand for services would remain stagnant as the
industry matures and the water utilities could not increase market share (Bakker, 2003c).
By 2000, most of the water companies were finding it difficult to source finance.
Industry analysts predicted lower dividend growth and decreased earnings per share for
all but one company. Several companies cut jobs to save money (Bakker, 2003c). Some
scholars contend that privatization in the UK has come full circle (Bakker, 2003c). As a
result of the financial difficulties, the companies pursued one of the three following
restructuring strategies: diversification, internationalization, and vertical de-integration.
In diversification, a company remains vertically integrated but grows it business via
takeovers and merging and/or expanding into non-regulated businesses and other utilities.
In internationalization, a company becomes an international water business and may or
may not vertically de-integrate.

In vertical de-integration, a company completely

separates from the regulated business (Bakker, 2003c).
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Five of the 10 companies have been taken over, three of them by foreign
companies. Two of the companies, Thames and North West Water, have committed to
internationalization. The companies opted for vertical de-integration that would separate
ownership from operation (Bakker, 2003c). Vertical de-integration permits the asset
owner to contract out the supply of services based on competitive bids from water
operator companies (Bakker, 2003c). Table 27 lists the changes that each company
adopted.
Table 27. The takeovers, diversifications, and vertical de-integrations for each company
in 2003
Original Company

Status in 2003

Country of Origin

Anglican Water

Now trading as Anglican Water Group (AWG)

England

Dwr Cymru (Welsh
Water)

Took over South Wales Electricity to form Hyder,
which was then acquired by Western Power; water
assets later sold to non-profit management company

US

Northumbrian Water

Took over Norweb to form United Utilities

England

North West Water
Severn Trent Water
Southern Water
South West Water

Acquired by Suez (Ondeo)
Independently listed
Acquired by Scottish Power
Now trading as Pennon Group

France
England
Scotland
England

Thames Water

Acquired by RWE

Germany

Wessex Water
Yorkshire Water

Acquired by Enron subsidiary Azurix
Now trading as Kelda Group

US
England

Major Activities
Water, environmental services,
construction
Multi-utility (gas, electricity,
water), then water-only
Multi-utility (electricity, water,
telecommunications)
Water, environmental services
Water, waste management
Multi-utility (water,
Water, waste management
Water, environmental services,
construction
Multi-utility (water,
Water, environmental services

Source: Bakker, 2003c: 367.
One of the companies, Welsh Water, has moved away from the for-profit sector
and has adopted mutualization (Hukka and Katko, 2003). Yorkshire Water’s parent
company decided to return to public ownership in June 2000. The company planned on
selling the assets to the consumers through a non-profit community mutual and the
operation and maintenance were to remain as the private company’s responsibility.
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However, there was little public support for the community mutual and the regulator
decided to prohibit it. Shortly afterwards, a Wales-based water company was given
permission to convert the company’s core operations into a non-profit company owned
by its members (Bakker, 2003a).
While promoting the community mutual program, Yorkshire Water stated that
most of the debate in the water sector originated from the public’s opposition to
privatization in this particular industry. They argued that the importance of clean water
and sanitation services for public health contributed to an intuitive feeling that the assets
are better suited to community ownership (Bakker, 2003a). Many economists admit that
the water supply industry is characterized by ‘market failure’ because it has unique
qualities that inhibit the market from functioning properly (Bakker, 2003a: 10).
Despite the changes, however, OFWAT actually approved more price increases
for the 2005-2010 period. OFWAT and the water companies claim that they need to
increase profits in order to tap into capital markets to obtain the debt and equity to
finance investments. They also contend that the more money is spent every year on
investments than the profits the companies make (Fleming, 2006).
It is argued that overall, the water industry in the UK is more efficient than it was
before privatization. The main issue is that OFWAT has not balanced the interests of
customers and shareholders properly (Fleming, 2006). Despite the structural changes in
the water industry and although OFWAT tightened regulation in 1995 and 2000, it has
been very generous to shareholders and the consumers have paid the price for this. In the
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remaining years of the contracts, it remains to be seen if OFWAT will appropriately
consider the interests of consumers.

Similarities between the Case Studies
The Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Dolphin Coast, and the UK case studies have
some consistent and important similarities.

In this section, the similarities will be

presented and in the next chapter, they will be analyzed to make broader implications
about PSP in the WSS service industry.
First, the reasons why the governments chose to privatize in the first place in all
four case studies were very similar to one another. The governments adopted neoliberalism and free market capitalism, which then led to the privatization of public
enterprises, including WSS services. This fundamental political change also entailed a
critical change in the state’s perspective: water supply and sewerage services were no
longer considered public goods; they were now considered economic goods. Although
all four countries adopted this viewpoint, the new perspective played out somewhat
differently in each case because of different political climates. In the case of Mexico,
water is a very political subject because the people feel closely tied to their water
resources.

The public continued to view water as a public good, despite the

government’s decision to consider it a commodity. In the case of South Africa, the ANC
had fervently promoted socialism, but once in power, it changed its perspective and
adopted free market capitalism instead; some reasons for this are discussed in the next
chapter. The citizens of the Dolphin Coast, however, still viewed water as a public good
and defended their right to it. To a lesser extent, the citizens in the UK and Buenos Aires
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also defended their right to their water services as well, albeit for more pragmatic
reasons.
Argentina endured a long economic depression with several stints of skyrocketing
inflation. Mexico’s economy was in very bad shape and endured hyperinflation as well.
South Africa’s economy was also in relatively bad shape as a result of Apartheid. The
UK’s economy was also in very bad condition when Thatcher came into office, and this
is one of the reasons why the UK pursued such a radical privatization program. In
Buenos Aires, Mexico City, and the Dolphin Coast, the very poor state of the economy
undoubtedly played a major role in the governments’ decision to privatize state industries
and also played a role in their decision to adopt free market capitalism.
In all four cases, the WSS service industries were in dire need of rehabilitation
and upgrading. Buenos Aires’ infrastructure was deteriorating and services needed to be
expanded, particularly in the surrounding suburbs. On top of this, there was decreasing
state funding. Mexico City’s customers were charged very low prices for services and, as
a result, the billing only covered half of the industry’s expenses.

This issue was

compounded by deteriorating infrastructure and a severe shortage of water supply that
required expensive water imports. The federal government had been funding the industry
and was thus eager to relieve itself of this fiscal burden. In the Dolphin Coast, the local
government lacked the necessary funding for upgrades and expansion, and unlike the
other case studies, with the possible exception of the poorest neighborhoods of Buenos
Aires, the network was severely limited and did not reach most of the rural residents.
This is the most extreme case where the government had to work from scratch to build
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the network where it did not exist, and by and large, it did not have the funding to do so.
The UK’s industry was also constrained by a lack of funding needed for investment, a
situation that was compounded by a shortage of water supply as well.
In Buenos Aires, the Dolphin Coast, and Mexico City, the services prior to
privatization were of particularly poor quality in the areas with the lowest-income
residents. In Buenos Aires, the areas to the south of the metropolitan area endured the
lowest access rates.

In Mexico City, the southeastern area had the poorest service

quality. In the Dolphin Coast, the rural areas in the west of the municipality had almost
no formal access to the existing network. There are low income people in the UK as
well, but not to the same degree as the other three countries and furthermore, there was
virtually universal access to services.
Although the cases represent different levels of PSP, they still have some
similarities. Mexico City’s service contract had the least private sector involvement.
Buenos Aires’ and the Dolphin Coast’s concessions had heavy private sector involvement
where the operation, maintenance, management, and investment were the responsibility
of the private sector, but the fixed assets remained under public ownership. In the UK,
the private sector assumed full responsibility for everything: operations, maintenance,
management, investment, and assets.

Despite the different degrees of private

participation, each case had a regulator that was separate from the consortia. In Buenos
Aires, it was ETOSS; in Mexico City, it was CADF (though this was not an independent
third party; this was part of the government); in the Dolphin Coast, it was the Dolphin
Coast Council, later called the Ilembe District Municipality Council (though, like Mexico
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City, this was not an independent third party; this was part of the government); and in the
UK, it was OFWAT, which is an independent third party and not part of the government.
In addition, a number of the MNCs were involved in more than one case study.
Ondeo, the leader of the AASA consortium in Buenos Aires, was also present in the
TECSA consortium in Mexico City and is the parent group of the Northumbrian Water
company in the UK. Vivendi (Compagnie Général des Eaux) was part of the AASA
consortium and the SAPSA consortium in Mexico City and also submitted a bid for the
Dolphin Coast contract (but did not win it). Anglican Water PLC operates in the UK and
was present in the TECSA consortium in Mexico City. Severn Trent operates in the UK
and was present in the IASA consortium in Mexico City as well. North West Water
operates in the UK, was also present in the AMSA consortium in Mexico City, and
submitted a bid for Buenos Aires’ contract (but did not win it). Thames Water PLC
operates in the UK and also submitted a bid in Mexico City (but did not win it). SAUR,
which is the former leader of the Siza Water consortium, was only involved in the
Dolphin Coast case study. Biwater PLC is the parent company of Siza Water’s new
leader, Cascal, and although Biwater only operates in this case study, it submitted a bid
for the Mexico City contract as well (but did not win it).
It is clear that, in each case study, the lowest income residents have fared the
worst from privatization. While the water and sewerage services in Buenos Aires did
expand during privatization, AASA did not fulfill its obligations for expanding services,
especially in the poor areas. Recall that between 1993 and 1998, there were only about
400,000 new water connections in the low income areas, amounting to less than 20% of
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the contract’s requirements. Only about 100,000 new sewerage connections in the low
income areas were established, but 2.3 million new connections were required by
contract. In addition, Table 13 demonstrates that the western and southern zones of
Buenos Aires, which have higher poverty rates than the northern zone and metropolitan
area, also have the lowest access rates to WSS services.
Although access to services is very good by developing country standards in
Mexico City, there are persistent service problems in the lowest income areas. In the
Dolphin Coast, services have expanded mostly in the wealthier areas and only moderately
so in the low income areas. Currently, half of South Africa’s population still lacks access
to water and sanitation services, most of whom are poor. It remains to be seen if, in the
remaining years of the contract, access will improve in the poor areas, but so far the
record has been dismal. In the UK, access to services is almost universal, but the high
service prices made it hard for the lowest income consumers to pay their bills and as a
result, their services were cut off before a new policy prohibited this.
In Buenos Aires and the Dolphin Coast, the poorest residents were not included in
the service areas. In Buenos Aires, the slums (villas miserias) were excluded because
they were not considered urbanized. Similarly, in the Dolphin Coast, the level one
customers were left out, classified as those who obtain their water supply from bulk
suppliers or rivers and who do not have formal sanitation services. The possible reasons
why these residents were excluded will be discussed in the next chapter.
Another consistent result concerns the increase in service prices after
privatization. In every case study, the prices increased. In Buenos Aires, AASA was
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given permission from the government to raise water tariffs multiple times. Although the
1997 contract re-negotiation decreased the average bill for new water customers (Table
10), the prices charged to the already connected customers increased.

Table 15

demonstrates that AASA’s operating surplus (net billing minus operating costs) increased
from 1993 to 2000 and then slightly decreased in 2001 and 2002.
Water tariffs initially increased in Mexico City, and then decreased after that, but
only for those consuming between 30 and 100 m3 per bimester; these customers tend to
be part of the middle or upper classes. It is interesting, therefore, to observe that while
the prices decreased for middle and upper class consumers, they increased for lower class
consumers, and often the quality of service remained the same. Not only do the middle
and upper class customers tend to consume more resources, the higher prices charged to
the lower income groups hurt them economically more than the other customers.
In the Dolphin Coast, level two customers pay higher prices than level four
customers. This is surprising because one would expect those who consume more to pay
more. In addition, the poor pay a higher price per kl than wealthier customers. After the
contract re-negotiation in 2001, water prices for connected households increased by 19%
and by 80% for standpipe users. Furthermore, the Dolphin Coast customers were not
consulted about the new monthly charges they would be assessed under privatization and
thus were surprised to see new charges on their bills. In the UK, prices increased for
customers across the board, but the increases hurt the low income customers the most
since a larger chunk of their incomes go toward water bills. Tables 24, 25, and 26
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demonstrate that while service prices increased substantially, the private companies’
profits soared and the directors’ salaries often increased generously as well.
In Buenos Aires, the Dolphin Coast, and the UK, the private companies were
responsible for investing in the WSS service industry, but not in Mexico City. The
results are consistent in that the private companies did not invest as much as they were
obligated to under contract.

Within its first three years of the contract, AASA’s

investments were only 45% of the amount required by contract and it continued to fall
short during the rest of the contract period. The contract re-negotiation in the Dolphin
Coast allowed Siza Water to reduce its required investments by more than 50%. In
addition, although the companies did invest a substantial amount in the UK, they still
underinvested to maintain dividends.
One consistent positive result in all four cases is that the leakage rates decreased
and customer service improved. In Buenos Aires, renovation of the water network
reduced the leakages rate from 40% to 25% by 1996, ahead of schedule. In Mexico City,
repairs to the network cut the leakage rate from 37% to 24%. In the Dolphin Coast, the
replacement of old pipes decreased the leakage rate from 30% to 11%. In the UK,
rehabilitation reduced the leakage rate from 31% in 1994/95 to 22% in 1999/2000.
Under privatization, customer service centers were established, the backlog of repairs
improved, and, in general, the private companies were more responsive to new service
complaints than the public companies had been.
Despite improvements in customer service, however, service cut-offs due to nonpayment were common in the Dolphin Coast and the UK, but not in Buenos Aires, or
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Mexico City. The 1998 Water Act in the UK prohibited the water companies from
cutting off services due to non-payment and made it illegal for them to install pre-paid
meters and trickle valves, but no such law has been passed yet in South Africa. It is
interesting that services were not cut off in Buenos Aires or Mexico due to non-payment.
Recall that services were not even reduced for non-payment in Mexico City. Possible
reasons for this will be discussed in the next chapter.
In Buenos Aires, the Dolphin Coast, and the UK, it appears that the regulators
and/or the governments favored the private water companies over the consumers, despite
the fact that the consumers protested.

Until Nestor Kirchner came into office in

Argentina, ETOSS and the Argentine government consistently favored AASA by
granting them contract re-negotiations and increased water tariffs, even though the
government said it would not allow contract changes if AASA fell short on meeting its
obligations. The first re-negotiation was approved by ETOSS, and in exchange for
higher water tariffs, AASA was supposed to expand services sooner than originally
required. A later re-negotiation allowed AASA to delay service expansion and increase
water tariffs again. However, it is important to note that the consumption prices were not
supposed to be increased during the first 10 years of the contract, but ETOSS allowed this
anyway. ETOSS later fined AASA for repeated failures to meet contract obligations, but,
in 1999, Menem pardoned the US$10 million in fines issued by ETOSS. When de la Rúa
came into office, water tariffs were permitted to increase again, despite AASA’s
continued breaches of contract; the Argentine government did not penalize AASA for this
until Kirchner came into power.
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In the Dolphin Coast, the local government allowed Siza Water to renegotiate its
contract, which permitted it to halve its annual concession fee until 2006, reduce
investment from R25 million to R10 million, and raise water tariffs, despite the fact that
Siza Water had not kept up with the increasing demand for services and did not pay the
lease payment to the municipality.

The UK government favored the private water

companies from the beginning when it wrote off the debts that the companies had before
privatization, gave them a ‘green dowry,’ and offered the companies for sale at a hefty
discount (about 22% of the market value). In addition, OFWAT set generous price caps
during the first 11 to 12 years of the contracts, which led to generous profits for the
companies.
Finally, in Buenos Aires, the Dolphin Coast, and the UK, the overall result of the
contracts have been similar in the sense that they did not accomplish what was hoped for
and had in fact been promised. In Buenos Aires, the contract was terminated prematurely
and many scholars and Argentine government officials argue that despite some modest
service improvements, the consortium failed to fulfill its obligations. In the Dolphin
Coast, although the contract is still active, by and large, the contract has not been
successful, particularly in terms of its record in serving the poor communities. In the UK,
although the contracts are still active and were not terminated, the nature of the private
water companies’ operations in the RWAs has fundamentally changed.

The lone

exception is Mexico City which appears to be the most successful of the four cases.
Although the contract was not a sweeping success, it did appear to go more smoothly
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than the other cases and it endured its entire contract lifetime. The possible reasons for
this will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
DISCUSSION

Introduction
In the previous chapters, objectives one through six were addressed. In this
chapter, the research will be brought together for analysis to address objective seven,
which is to determine if there is a role that the private sector can play in providing
services essential to human needs and if so, identify the institutional conditions under
which private water companies can have such a role.

Analysis of the Results
Comparing the four case studies to one another sheds light on some significant
similarities between the cases; these similarities justify broad implications about PSP in
the WSS service sector. The context under which the contracts started in each case is
similar: there was a fiscal crisis and the federal governments adopted a neo-liberal
framework in hopes that neo-liberalism would bring economic relief. Then, free market
capitalism and broad privatization programs followed. In all four cases, the WSS service
sectors were in need of expansion, upgrading, and rehabilitation and all lacked the
necessary state funding. Privatization, to one degree or another, emerged as a very
attractive option because it was believed that the private sector could make the necessary
changes and investments and could relieve the economic burden endured by the state.
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The fact that all of the contracts did not accomplish what was required of them is
perhaps the most important result. In particular, recall that service expansion targets
were not fulfilled in Buenos Aires and the Dolphin Coast. In addition, the private
companies did not make the required capital investments in Buenos Aires, the Dolphin
Coast, and the UK. The Mexico City case study is arguably the most successful of the
four cases, but it still had its problems, especially in terms of service problems in the low
income areas. The comparison of the four case studies suggests that one of the main
reasons why the Mexico City case study was more successful is that it had a lower degree
of PSP than the other case studies; on the spectrum of PSP, service contracts also have
the least amount of PSP. It seems that less private sector involvement and thus more
government involvement (i.e., stronger regulatory oversight) means there may have been
more checks and balances in place to prevent the private sector from taking advantage of
their monopoly power – such as by preventing significant prices increases and ensuring
the private companies fulfill contract obligations (recall that service prices did increase in
Mexico, but not substantially). Proponents of PSP cite that the private sector can provide
more efficient services and can make the proper investments to incorporate the newest
technology, improve maintenance, and provide services to all. In these four case studies,
this largely did not happen and the results suggest that the private sector is not necessarily
superior to the public sector in providing water services.
Although the Buenos Aires and Dolphin Coast case studies were not full
divestitures, the private sector assumed responsibility for almost everything: operations,
maintenance, and capital investment – the state only retained ownership of the assets.
222

The presence of an independent regulator in Buenos Aires, ETOSS, may have helped
prevent some monopoly abuses, but recall from Chapter Three that ETOSS was largely
ineffective in its regulatory role and for a while even pardoned AASA’s repeated
breaches of contract. In the Dolphin Coast, the BoDC may have helped safeguard the
interests of the customers somewhat, but recall from Chapter Four that the BoDC favored
the concessionaire’s interests over the customers’ interests. In the UK, PSP was the most
extreme because in the divestiture, all responsibilities and ownership were transferred
from the state to private consortia and, like the concession cases, this case was rife with
problems as well.
The evidence from the case studies strongly suggests that a lower degree of
private sector involvement, such as a service or management contract, may make the
contract more successful in the long run. Since Mexico City, having the least private
sector involvement, was a success (relatively speaking) and since the UK’s privatized
sector underwent fundamental changes, I believe that a full divestiture is not a feasible
option for privatizing water services. As Bakker (2003a) puts it, when the market is
allowed to function on its own without regulatory oversight (i.e., as with a full
divestiture), it does not perform well in the WSS services sector because water is a
unique resource. One of the main reasons why water is unique is because it is essential to
human survival and treating it as a commodity inevitably neglects the poor since they
often cannot afford the higher service prices.
The service price increases and unfulfilled capital investment requirements are
also significant. Recall that the prices increased in all four cases. In Buenos Aires and
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the UK, prices increased for all customers. In Mexico City, prices increased for all at
first, but then only decreased for middle and upper class customers. In the Dolphin
Coast, the poor (level two) customers endured the highest price increases. At the same
time, in Buenos Aires, the Dolphin Coast, and the UK, the private companies brought in
very high profits. Some proponents of PSP in the WSS service sector contend that
private sector involvement can increase efficiency in the sector and thereby decrease
service prices. This did not occur in any of the four case studies and thus in this study,
there is no evidence that the private sector can provide superior services at lower prices.
It is true that freshwater is a limited and precious resource that needs to be
conserved and that WSS services are exorbitant, so customers should have to pay more of
the real or true cost of the resource. However, the government should also subsidize
these services since they are essential to human life.

If the government lacks the

necessary funding, then perhaps it should transfer some funding from other programs to
water services instead. Perhaps there should also be a global water fund that could serve
as an additional mechanism for states to draw funding from. The government should also
encourage conservation of water resources and provide incentives to help people avoid
wasteful uses.

Furthermore, there should absolutely be a safety net for the poor

customers who cannot afford to pay the real cost of water services; this recommendation
will be explained below.
The fact that the contract obligations were not fulfilled in any of the cases (but
especially in Buenos Aires, the Dolphin Coast, and the UK) and the fact that service
prices increased while the private companies benefited from high profits suggest that the
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private sector alone is not appropriate in providing WSS services. Perhaps there is
another alternative, such as a community cooperative, a partnership between the local or
federal government with a non-profit private company, or involvement from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (which will be explained below). Or, alternatively,
perhaps privatization can be adopted in a piecemeal process. When for-profit private
companies play a strong role, it proves difficult to ensure that all customers receive
adequate services because the companies are ultimately profit-driven.
In addition, there were a number of MNCs that were involved in more than one
case. Recall that these companies are Ondeo, Northumbrian Water, Vivendi, Anglican
Water PLC, Severn Trent, North West Water, Thames Water PLC, and Biwater PLC.
These companies, especially Ondeo and Vivendi (Hall, 2001), have a monopoly in the
water services market. Therefore, not only is water a natural monopoly, but there is also
little competition amongst private water companies because a small number of companies
dominate the market. If different and smaller private water companies had been involved
in these case studies instead, then perhaps the contract results would have been more
favorable to the customers.
Another important result from the case study comparison concerns the poor
people. In all four cases, the poor fared the worst. Privatization of the water services
entailed price increases in all four cases, and this often meant that the poor could not pay
their water bills and/or had to sacrifice other resources (e.g., other basic necessities like
food and clothing) in order to pay their bills. The governments should have designed the
contracts so that the poor would be the least affected. This could have been done by
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subsidizing their water bills and/or by providing them with a minimum amount of free
water every day, like South Africa was supposed to do. Although South Africa had the
free water lifeline policy on paper, it was not enforced well. Therefore, not only does the
policy have to be present, but it must be properly enforced as well, otherwise it is useless.
And furthermore, I would recommend a higher minimum amount of water in the lifeline
policy than South Africa implemented. Recall that studies have revealed that marked
human health improvements can be achieved when there is a minimum of 20 liters per
person, per day (Gleick, 1998: 496).
The poor people within the concession area were harmed by privatization,
however, the poor residing in the informal settlements were left even worse off. Recall
that those people residing in the villas miserias in Buenos Aires and those who obtain
their water from rivers and who lack sanitation services in the Dolphin Coast were left
out of the concession service areas entirely. The governments claimed that they were left
out because they are not considered urbanized areas. Although this is true, it is also
evident that they were omitted because these areas would not produce a return on profit
for the private companies.

Expanding services to these poor areas would be very

expensive, but not servicing these areas violates the human right to safe and reliable
water services. All humans need adequate WSS services to survive and it should be the
responsibility of the government to ensure that they are serviced, even when there will be
no profit. The fact that the concessionaires in Buenos Aires and the Dolphin Coast
favored the wealthier areas over the poor areas within the concession areas is evidence
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that they are profit-driven and would have no incentive to service the ‘un-urbanized’
areas.
The results of the comparative study also suggest that PSP will not help achieve
the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) to halve the number of people who lack
adequate water supply and sanitation services by 2015. In Buenos Aires and the Dolphin
Coast, services were only moderately expanded. Again, it is evident that the PSP has
little incentive, if any, to expand services to those who currently lack access, because
there is no financial incentive to do so. That said, state governments may not necessarily
be the party that can help achieve the MDG either. In many countries, the public sector
has not been able to sufficiently expand services, mostly because of the financial burden
that the WSS services sector poses. Recall that Budds and McGranahan (2003) argue
that neither the public nor the private sector is capable of providing services to the
majority of low-income areas; the difficulties of expanding services to low-income areas
can exist under both public and private control. Recall the question posed in the first
chapter: is it the nature of privatization that prevents the expansion of WSS service

provision, is it a combination of factors, or is it independent of private sector
involvement? The evidence from the case studies indicates that a combination of factors
prohibited the expansion of services: i.e., the private companies’ profit motive and the
governments’ favorable treatment of the private companies as well as the lack of a policy
that would subsidize services for the poorest customers.
The comparative case study method also reveals that there are some important
similarities between the Buenos Aires and the Dolphin Coast case studies. Part of the
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reason for this is that concession contracts were chosen that gave the private sector the
same level of responsibility. Another reason for this could be due to the fact that the
populations of Buenos Aires and the Dolphin Coast have both very wealthy people and
extremely poor people. Of course, Mexico City also has extreme poverty in some parts
of the city, and the UK has poverty as well (although less than the other three countries),
but it is evident that the scenarios were played out differently in Buenos Aires and the
Dolphin Coast than in Mexico City and the UK because of the level of PSP. The
concession contract in Buenos Aires and the Dolphin Coast led to substantial price
increases which the poor were often unable to afford and, as a result, the poor expressed
their displeasure with the price increases.
One important disparity between the four case studies concerns service cut-offs.
In Buenos Aires and Mexico City, services were not cut-off due to non-payment of bills;
recall that services were not so much as reduced in Mexico City. In contrast, however,
non-payment of bills in the Dolphin Coast and the UK led to service cut-offs.
Specifically in the Dolphin Coast, when level four customers did not pay bills, they were
reverted back to level two customers. Perhaps this disparity is due to cultural differences.
Although all cultures feel closely tied to their water resources, there is a difference in
Latin America. The comparison between the case studies suggests that the governments
in Buenos Aires and Mexico City would not dare permit service cut-offs, perhaps because
political repercussions would follow.
To be fair, the private consortia were successful in some respects. Customer
service was improved and they were better able to respond to service issues more quickly
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than the public sector. Perhaps this is because private companies can be more efficient in
their operations than public companies because there is no bureaucratic ‘red tape.’
Private companies also tend to have more financial resources available and so can devote
them to things like customer service. The other success was the reduction in leakage
rates. Leakage is a major problem in the WSS services industry because a lot of precious
water resources are wasted. In each case, the leakage rates were reduced either on time
or ahead of schedule. Of course, one could argue that the private companies had a major
incentive to address leakage: leakages waste resources and therefore waste a lot of money
as well. Still, this is an important improvement, especially because freshwater is a
limited resource.
It is important to note that the private companies were not solely responsible for
the unfulfilled contract obligations. The governments in Buenos Aires, the Dolphin
Coast, and the UK all favored the private companies to one extent or another. The
regulatory bodies, i.e., ETOSS, BoDC, and OFWAT, respectively, also tended to favor
the private companies as well. The governments were not doing their job to ensure the
well-being of all of their citizens. Therefore, it is the fault of the governments as well. It
is thus certainly possible that, had the governments not favored the private companies and
had they instead strictly held the private companies to their obligations, the contracts may
have been more successful.
In conclusion, recall that the research question in this study is: what preconditions
have to be present between the market and politics (or the government) in order for water
and sanitation services to be treated as both public goods and economic goods at the same
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time? The evidence from comparing the case studies indicates that if PSP is to be
successful in the WSS services sector, strong regulatory oversight must be present, as
well as transparency in the private companies’ dealings. There must also be stakeholder
participation before and after the contract begins, and furthermore, there must be a safety
net for the poor customers to ensure that they receive adequate services. This should
include all residents, including those in informal settlements as well. In addition, as Sclar
(2000) notes, the government should only grant a contract to a private company with a
reputation for honest dealing and expertise in the WSS service sector.
Of course, these preconditions carry heavy assumptions. The presence of strong
regulatory oversight assumes that the government is not corrupt and does what it is
supposed to: ensure the well-being of its citizens. These necessary preconditions are
probably somewhat idealistic and may only sound good on paper. Whether or not it is
possible to satisfy these preconditions to have a successful example of PSP in the WSS
service sector remains to be seen.

Successes and Limitations of the Study
The comparative case study approach revealed some marked similarities between
the case studies. No two case studies were exactly alike, but there are some clear
consistencies between all four cases, for example, the negative effect that private sector
involvement had on the poor people in the service areas. The clear consistencies mean
that the methodology was sound and that the implications made about private sector
involvement in water services provision have been justified. In addition, this research
study serves as a contribution to the debate over PSP participation in the WSS services
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industry. Contributions to this debate may help resolve some of the key issues that
prohibit water services expansion and thereby may help universalize services throughout
the world.
There are some limitations of the study that one must consider as well. Although
the comparative research method is a good way to investigate similarities between the
case studies to make broad implications about PSP in the WSS services industry, no two
case studies are exactly alike.

There are different cultural, institutional, political,

environmental, and historical factors that play a major role in how a contract is executed
and its ultimate success. As such, however, it is not possible to completely control these
factors and the broad implications can still be justified. However, it is important to keep
in mind that this is a shortcoming of the comparative research method.

Future Research
This study attempted to answer an important question about PSP in the WSS
services industry and thus there are many angles that one could take to answer this
question. The topic is also very broad, and so it is not possible to consider every factor in
one study. While this study answers the study question in general, future research could
shed light on related topics. For example, one should investigate if PSP could help
reduce the impact that the WSS service industry has on the environment. The industry
requires tremendous infrastructure, can disrupt aquatic ecosystems when extracting
water, and high leakage rates waste the precious resource. The private sector often
claims that it can be more efficient and reduce waste, so a study should investigate if this
is true. Mexico City in particular has a severe water shortage issue and extraction from
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the underground aquifer has a major effect on the local environment. The transportation
of water supply from other parts of Mexico also carries environmental consequences.
However, the environmental impact of WSS services on the environment is another
research topic and thus was not analyzed in this study.
Future research should also investigate if the private sector or the government can
better foster a new culture of water, such as by encouraging consumers to conserve water
resources. It would seem that the private sector could succeed at this since it often
charges higher prices for services, but, again, this should be subject to an investigation.
In some places, the government subsidizes the water industry and thus the consumer does
not have to pay the real cost for services that would reflect the environmental costs. If
the government were to include the real costs for services, then consumers would be
financially compelled to conserve. On the other hand, this presents a problem for the
lowest income consumers who often cannot afford unsubsidized prices, which reflects
other social issues. Perhaps a solution to this dilemma is for the government to subsidize
water resources only for those consumers falling below a certain income bracket to
ensure that they receive adequate resources.
Another possible future research avenue could concern the false dichotomy that
arises when we refer to water services as either a public good or an economic good.
There is a debate in that some claim that water services are both public and economic
goods because although water services are essential to meeting basic human needs,
money is critical to ensuring that adequate water services are provided and able to be
accessed. Others claim that water services can only be a public good or an economic
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good and, oftentimes, those in favor of this claim argue that water should be a public
good that is completely subsidized by the government.

However, as stated before,

governments often lack the necessary funding to maintain, upgrade, and expand
infrastructure and make necessary investments; perhaps the global water fund mentioned
earlier could be one solution to this problem. This also leads to another, related research
avenue. Future research should evaluate the current state of public revenue in the WSS
services industry – for example, does funding need to be distributed differently in order
to help increase efficiency and relieve some of the fiscal burden placed on the state?
An additional research avenue could concern the role of NGOs in providing water
services.

For example, the Christian Aid for Under-Assisted Societies Everywhere

(CAUSE) is one of many NGOs operating in Sierra Leone to provide potable water and
sanitation services to refugees from the Civil War that ravaged the country from 1991 to
2002 (Sierra-Leone.org, 2008). Although NGOs are often involved in small, isolated
projects, they can be very effective at providing much needed services to rural areas in
particular. Future research could shed light on how strong of a role NGOs play in
providing water services in countries like Sierra Leone. NGOs may be very instrumental
in helping to universalize water services since the state government in developing
countries is often unable to universalize services on its own. In other words, could NGO
participation be additional option when state and private companies cannot universalize
services on their own?
In conclusion, this study was very intriguing and helped me gain a genuine global
understanding of cross-national comparative research in the WSS services industry.
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Although there were some limitations, as there are in any study, there were many
successes as well. Water policy is one of the most critical issues of this century and it is
my hope that this research study will serve as a contribution to the debate over private
sector involvement in the water services industry and allow us to move forward and
ensure that everyone receives the water services that they deserve.
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